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CHAPTER 5:
DISCURSIVE PRACTICES OF ISRAELI TRANSBOUNDARY WATER/PEACE
PRACTITIONERS – FOCUS ON OFFICIALLY-SANCTIONED PROCESSES
Introduction
Recognising that Israel has constructed and then intentionally pursued a
relation of hydrohegemonic necessity with the Palestinians, it bears assessing if
and if so, how Israeli transboundary water-domain practitioners have been
constrained, contained by, even constitutively producing such a discourse in
practice. Both the current and next chapters address this and related questions
by telling the story of Israeli water-domain, and more specifically water/peace
practitioners whose relational engagement stems back to the Madrid and then
Oslo peace processes initiated in the early-1990s. It does so by telling and
discursively analysing Israeli transboundary water-domain practices situated
within and as peace processes within the context of, even against, a framework
of Israel’s hydrohegemony and narrative of necessity.
Conceptually, the current and next chapters recognise that systems of power
are constructed, (re-) produced and perpetuated through ideations and
practices that reflect a coerced and consensual acceptance of hegemonic, and
more specifically hydrohegemonic relations and necessity. It cannot however
be assumed that people in general, and Israeli transboundary water-domain
practitioners more specifically are “cultural dopes” (Garfinkel, 1967 in Holstein
and Gubrium, 2005: 486), merely reproducing hydrohegemonic discourse.
Rather, they must be recognised as conflict actors that engage with relational
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discourses (in this case, of Israel-Palestinian conflict and peace) when
practicing transboundary water; the relational nexus of which is referred to
herein as water/peace.
As conflict actors, Israeli transboundary water/peace practitioners may of
course be pursuing and (re-) producing hydrohegemonic relations, closely
aligned with the dominant Israeli state’s priorities. In such a case, it would be
appropriate to say that these water/peace practitioners are subsumed to,
contained by, even constitutively producing a discourse of Israeli
hydrohegemony and necessity. Nonetheless, at least some of these
transboundary water/peace practitioners may be critical of, and resistant to
hydrohegemony. They may be reflexively working to transform the water
domain and the broader conflict through alternative relational practices,
essentially building and bringing into being the peaceful world in which they
wish to live. The concept of hydropolitical peacebuilding has been developed to
capture the potentially critical, resistant, desistant and alternative engagement
of such Israeli transboundary water/peace practitioners.
In epistemological recognition of the discursive terrain between the ‘ideals’ of
hydrohegemony and hydropolitical peacebuilding, the concept of
hydrohegemonic residues has been developed in this study. It is used to
discuss the political substance, ambiguity and implications of practice located
between intended peacebuilding and hegemony in the water domain. In such
cases, we may speak of a discursive incongruity between hydropolitical
intentionality and practice. Overall, the current and next chapters focus on
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assessing hydrohegemony, hydropolitical peacebuilding and hydrohegemonic
residues through a discursive assessment of Israeli transboundary water/peace
practice drawing on the methodology of interpretive practice (Holstein and
Gubrium, 2005).
As articulated throughout this study, transboundary water/peace practice is
constitutive of the wider Israel-Arab and narrower, more specific Israel-
Palestinian conflict milieu. As one important (final status) relational domain,
water has seen the emergence and development of first an epistemic
community of water practitioners, and then a community of practice comprising
water/peace practitioners. The current chapter 5 provides thick description
(Geertz, 1973 in Rosen, 2000: 48; Spradley, 1990 in Robson, 2002: 320) of the
community of water and more specifically of water/peace practitioners. A
foucauldian discourse analysis is pursued with respect to their practices and
ideations. This chapter focuses on officially-sanctioned engagements and
activities in the transboundary water domain, as pursued and practiced in the
context of, and stemming directly from the Multilateral Working Group on Water
Resources (MWGWR) of the Middle East peace process.
The subsequent chapter 6 thickly describes and discursively analyses
academic and civil society activities and practices. It focuses on the seminal
Joint Management of Shared Aquifers project, as well as several telling
initiatives emanating from three transboundary organisations. Academic and
civil society initiatives started around the same time as officially-sanctioned
processes, and in some cases directly informed them. However, as shall be
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explained, they both diversified and became increasingly discursively
differentiated as evidence mounted that the official peace process was faltering.
In both of these chapters, description is made about the origins, composition,
organisations, institutions, events, funding sources and water-related practices
of transboundary water/peace practitioners. In process, the discursive practice
of these Israeli practitioners is analysed and visibly rendered.
Materials informing this and the next chapter are drawn from the academic and
professional literature, from extended observation over several years, as well
as through reflexive interviewing conducted with transboundary water/peace
practitioners in 2010. These chapters provide a big picture view, and then hone
in and discuss in detail a number of programs and initiatives situated at the
nexus of water and peace. Doing so provides a critical perspective of how, what
about, and why the discursive practices of transboundary water/peace
practitioners are of significance to Israel-Palestinian peace more broadly.
To begin with, it is valuable to briefly situate and contextualise transboundary
water/peace practices within a regional and historical frame, with particular
reference to the development of an Israeli-Jordanian epistemic community of
water practitioners. This Israeli-Jordanian community fundamentally enabled
and facilitated the development of an Israeli-Palestinian transboundary
community of water/peace practitioners.
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Epistemic Origins of a Transboundary Water Community
Until the late-1980s and early-1990s, hydropolitical relations between Israel and
the Arab world were undertaken principally through officially-sanctioned
processes. These were by far most developed between Israel and Jordan,
states that had cultivated mutually-constructive hydropolitical relations since the
1950s. Their relations were defining of Jordan River basin arrangements
through the 1960s (noting Israel’s occupation of the West Bank) and up to 1988
(with Jordan’s relinquishment of claims and political authority over that territory,
its resources and populations). Since then, these states continued to play a
decisive even transformative role in terms of water management and
development in the Middle East, while also accounting for a newly legitimated
Palestinian self-determination movement with hydropolitical priorities of its own.
Until the 1991 Madrid Peace Process and also the 1994 Israel-Jordan Treaty of
Peace, hydropolitical relations and negotiations between Israel and Jordan
generally took place far from the public eye in an effort to ensure
implementation and maintain confidence between the parties (Ma’oz, 2006: 13).
On the Arab street, negotiating and then coming to agreement with Israel were
not all popular, and secrecy was understood to be paramount in terms of
favouring agreement. Frequently, third-parties (e.g. global powers and/or an
international organisation) played important facilitative roles in such Middle
Eastern hydropolitical processes.
While hydropolitical negotiations were officially sanctioned by the states
themselves, hydropolitical relations demanded the participation of technical
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specialists, including natural scientists, engineers, as well as a broad spectrum
of academics and civil society practitioners. The required technical cooperation
set the stage for relationship-building among specialists, manifesting and
bringing texture to a domain of transboundary water practice. It is in the context
of hydropolitical relations between Israel and Jordan that intentional and
constructive transboundary water-related practice emerged and developed at
all. Thus, it is with respect to Israelis and Jordanians that a brief examination of
transboundary epistemic water community must be made. Doing so recognises
that the Israeli-Jordanian relationship would facilitate the development of an
Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian and then Israeli-Palestinian community of
water/peace practitioners.
Building on Israeli-Jordanian Hydropolitical Relations
In pursuing this study, it bears recalling that an epistemic community may be
understood as (P. Haas, 1992: 3):
…a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence
in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area… [A]n epistemic community
may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and
backgrounds…
In this view, an epistemic community may be understood as a network of
people, possessing domain-relevant knowledge, collectively sharing normative,
causal, some epistemological and even political beliefs, and endeavouring to
improve human welfare through their engagements95. While practically
                                                 
95 P. Haas’ work has been committed to investigating the nexus between epistemic community
practices and policy-relevant knowledge development and up-take (P. Haas, 2004; P. Haas,
1992; P. Haas, 1990; P. Haas, 1989).
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technical, this foundational view of epistemic communities recognises their
socio-political context and relevance, stemming largely from the engagement of
practitioners themselves.
In conflict environments like the Middle East, the development and
maintenance of domain-specific epistemic community practitioner relations can
and often does provide one avenue (often among others) for continued techno-
political cooperation, discussion and negotiation between conflict parties
themselves. A review of the historical record on the Israeli-Jordanian case
supports this point, suggesting that over the longer term, such epistemically-
based relations may contribute to wider peacemaking between actually or
formerly conflictual parties in a variety of ways.
Reviewing the Historical Record
Early mediation efforts undertaken during the 1940s and 1950s between the
newly-established State of Israel and its Arab neighbours were pivotal in laying
the groundwork of a transboundary domain and then community of water (and
eventually water/peace) practitioners. In particular, between 1949 and 1955,
extensive dialogue on water-sharing was undertaken under the auspices of the
MAC (Sosland, 2007: 33). This had notable and long-lasting implications for
Israeli-Jordanian (as well as Israeli-Arab) relations.
The early period of cross-boundary relationship-building, associated with the
1953-55 Johnston Mission, formed the fertile grounding for transboundary
epistemic water community development. It has come to light that US envoy
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Eric Johnston intentionally sought to cultivate an epistemic community of water
practitioners through transboundary technical cooperation (Sosland, 2007: 56-
59). He and others in the US administration held the belief that cross-boundary
epistemic water community development would catalyse rapprochement
between Israel and its Arab neighbours. It would also insure against
deteriorating bilateral and multilateral relations.
During the latter part of the 1950s and into the 1960s, relations cooled between
Jordan and Israel. The assassination of the Jordanian King Abdullah in 1951
resulted in political uncertainty within the Kingdom, as Hussein bin Talal took
over from his grandfather. The Suez War became a decisive moment in
creating political distance between Israel and the Arabs. Nonetheless, low-
grade hydropolitical relations based on implicit agreement with the Revised
Unified Johnston Plan and principally mediated by the US were maintained
between Israel and Jordan.
From the early 1960s, despite the hydropolitical build-up to the 1967 Six-Day
War, and perhaps because of Jordan’s ambiguous political stance vis-à-vis the
more radical Arab factions, hydropolitical relations of interdependence would
thicken between Jordan and Israel. Of political and symbolic relevance, in the
post-1973 war period and as early as 1974, Jordanian Prince Hasan bin Talal
sought Israeli water data through their mutual ally, the US. It was the first time
that a Jordanian official sought Israeli hydrological data through the US, and it
seemed a promising avenue through which to pursue political dialogue
(Sosland, 2007: 110).
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From the late-1970s to the early-1990s, Israeli and Jordanian water experts met
secretly to adjust Yarmouk River sharing arrangements. They had to manage
natural hydrological variations as well as Syria’s upstream abstractions
(Haddadin, 2001: 259 in Fischhendler, 2008b: 123). Such meetings were also
conducted to ensure maintenance of the diversion intakes on the Yarmouk,
notably during the 1980s. Through direct communication, innovative problem-
solving and modest institution-building, they established lasting working
relations grounded in mutual respect (Sosland, 2007: 118; Shamir, 2003 in
Fischhendler, 2008a).
Between 1979 and 1994, an average of 3-8 such meetings secretly took place
annually. Secrecy was ensured through cover of UN auspices or US
sponsorship. The meetings took place either at an Israeli Allenby Bridge
immigration shed or at Point 121 in what became known as the “picnic table
conversations”. Point 121 is the location at which the Yarmouk River branches
off southward to the East Ghor Canal and westward to Israeli pumps. It was
also the site over which hydropolitical conflict between Israel and Jordan was
both escalated and de-escalated throughout the 1980s.
The conversations, or meetings, generally included a representative from the
Jordan Valley Authority (Jordan’s JVA), TAHAL (Israel’s Water Planning
Authority), Israel’s Water Commissioner’s Office, and the head of the Yarmouk
Triangle Water Association (Sosland, 2007: 118). Additional water experts were
invited to participate as circumstances warranted. Israeli and Jordanian military
personnel were usually present, as was a representative or two from the
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‘mediating’ organisation. The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office and the Israeli
Water Commissioner’s Office, as well as the Jordanian Prime Minister’s Office
and the Royal Palace were kept readily informed about the meetings.
Participants of the picnic table conversations became increasingly comfortable
with, and knowledgeable of one another personally. More importantly, they
developed a sensitivity and responsiveness to each other’s hydropolitical
concerns and priorities over time. They undertook technical work together and
agreed on arrangements that were collectively perceived to be technically-
sound, mutually-acceptable and equitable. Given the intimate and detailed
involvement of water technocrats and state elites in the water negotiation and
management processes, here was the emergence of an epistemic community
consciously and intentionally seeking to promote a workable, mutually-
satisfactory, even equitable allocation of water resources. Such relations
between Israeli and Jordanian water practitioners were pursued right through to
the 1994 Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace and have continued for the most part
actively since.
Enabling Israeli-Palestinian Hydropolitical Relations
While extensive hydropolitical relations were cultivated between Israel and
Jordan, little contact of this kind was developed between Israelis and
Palestinians prior to the 1991 Madrid peace process. In subsequent years,
Israeli-Palestinian water-related experience would develop, mature and assume
a catalytic agency for the better part of one, and arguably two decades.
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As a component of the bilateral and multilateral processes that were initiated in
the early 1990s, Israeli, Jordanian and now Palestinian scientists, engineers,
social scientists and others in related fields were sanctioned to meet and
discuss a whole range of possibilities for cooperatively managing shared water
resources. Few Israelis and Palestinians had ever had any such meaningful
contact and none of these people had ever previously met. Unsurprisingly, early
meetings between these water experts were very tense, marked by personal
and political distrust (Personal interview, PW3 2010).
From 1991 to the present time, a growing and engaged community of
transboundary water and more specifically water/peace practitioners evolved,
with its participants meeting countless times since. Some such meetings
amounted to key practices of officially-sanctioned processes. Others were
academic and civil society based, receiving support originating both from within
the region and from around the world. For many of the people actively involved
in the emerging transboundary water community, such engagement was
perceived as cooperative problem-solving, partnership development and even
peacebuilding (Personal interview, PW1 2010; Personal interview, PW3 2010;
Personal interview, IF2; Personal interview, IX3 2010). It is from among these
people and their multigenerational offspring that transboundary water/peace
practitioner research participants have been identified and secured for the
current study.
Given the massive international support invested in the cultivation of water as a
domain of transboundary Israel-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian practice, it is
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revealing to note that in 2001, US Secretary of State Colin Powell and the US
State Department made clear that government’s intended leveraging of “water
where appropriate as a diplomatic tool to build trust and promote cooperation.”
(Sosland, 2007: 2) As reflected in this study, such an approach to hydropolitics
stems back to the Johnston negotiations and arguably earlier, to the
deliberations on the very contours of an eventual Palestine (e.g. with the AACI).
It remains today a central dimension of the international community’s practice,
notably through financing mechanisms that interpret and frame transboundary
water cooperation and development as peacemaking and peacebuilding
(Personal interview, IE3 2010; Personal interview, PW8 2010). While
sometimes accepted axiomatically, it bears questioning the kind, quality and
overall discourse of peace that is produced and circulated through such water
cooperation, in context rather than ideally or intentionally.
As articulated thus far, transboundary water in the Middle East is a complex,
layered domain of technical and political practice within and constitutive of the
Israel-Palestinian conflict milieu. It has been produced through decades of
grounded attention, engagement and the broader investment of local actors,
regional parties and the international community. Recognition, description,
deconstruction and analysis of this water domain as undertaken in earlier
chapters provides the context for appreciating the peacebuilding significance
and limitations of transboundary water-related practices and ideations; i.e.
hydrohegemony, hydropolitical peacebuilding, and hydrohegemonic residues.
Thus, in examining and analysing transboundary water as a domain of ideation
and practice in historical and discursive context, this study is revealing of the
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political fact that there is perhaps one transboundary epistemic water
community, but there assuredly are several discursive communities of
water/peace. Bringing such visibility to these ‘communities of practice’ both
critically and/or appreciably can be expected to diversely inform the
hydropolitical belief that transboundary water cooperation and development
contribute to building positive peace in conflict environments.
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A Transboundary Water Community
Anchored in a protracted history of Israeli-Jordanian cooperation, the now
widely-recognised Israeli-Palestinian transboundary community of water
practitioners finds its proximate origins in the bilateral and multilateral efforts of
the Madrid and then Oslo processes, and in the first Israeli-Palestinian
International Academic Conference on Water (1992). This transboundary
community is constitutive of the wider Israel-Palestinian transboundary water
domain, itself understood as a field of practice comprising individuals,
communities, organisations, governmental actors and others engaged on the
matter of transboundary water through events, projects, programs and other
socio-political productivities (e.g. media, education, etc). This domain may be
appreciated as a location for the transboundary deployment of hydropolitical
power, spanning the gamut from hydrohegemony to hydropolitical
peacebuilding. It is a field of contested practices, intentionalities and effects.
This domain and its constitutive community of practitioners is also particularly
dynamic, well-funded and increasingly diverse.
Capturing this expansive engagement, building on the work of Twite (2004) and
others, a table of key hydropolitical moments, projects, practices and
agreements has been constructed below (Table 5.1). It dates back to the late-
1980s and carries through to early-2011, spanning more than 20 years. While
obviously partial, the table provides a valuable hydropolitical snapshot of the
Middle East. Some of the most significant events, projects and organisations
incorporated into this table, including those which have seen the direct
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involvement of many research participants in this study, are described and
discursively analysed over the current and next chapters.
As a theoretical precursor to doing so, it is essential to appreciate that what has
often been referred to as an epistemic community of water in the Middle East is
herein also approached and critically interrogated as a community of practice,
emphasising the practice. In one leading formulation, communities of practice
may be characterised as (adapted from Adler, 2005: 15):
1. “[P]eople who are informally as well as contextually bound by a
shared interest in learning and applying a common practice.”
2. Configuring a domain of knowledge and there is a sense of joint
enterprise.
3. A community of people and therefore relationships of mutual
engagement.
4. Shared practice is sustained by a repertoire of communal resources
including “routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories,
symbols, and discourse.”
Adler (2005: 15) succinctly and effectively articulates the political and discursive
significance of such communities:
It is within communities of practice that collective meanings emerge,
discourses become established, identities are fixed, learning takes place,
new political agendas arise, and the institutions and practices of global
governance grow.
Of particular interest in this study are the practices and ideations of Israeli
water/peace practitioners engaged in what is herein framed as an Israeli-
Palestinian transboundary water/peace community of practice. Yet more
specifically, the epistemological focus herein pursued is on the discursive
content and peacebuilding significance of these practices and ideations in the
particular context of an asymmetric Israel-Palestinian conflict. By looking at the
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discursive practices of transboundary water/peace practitioners, it is possible to
situate and discuss the discursive range and significance of water/peace
practices and ideations in the region. Such a discussion begins in the current
chapter with specific reference to the MWGWR, a creation of the Middle East
peacemaking process.
1988 Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) founded
1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Process launched
1992 Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (MWGWR) of the
Middle East Peace Process launched
First Israeli-Palestinian International Academic Conference on Water
1993 Israel and the Palestinians agree to a water working group as part of
their bilateral process
Oslo Process is publicly launched – Declaration of Principles (Oslo I)
Middle East Water Economies project launched
1994 EcoPeace/Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME) founded
Regional Water Databanks Project/EXACT launched
Our Shared Environment conference (IPCRI)
Joint Management of Shared Aquifers project launched
1995 The Oslo Accords (II) signed, Palestinian Water Authority (PWA)
created, Joint Water Committee (JWC) created
Institutional Frameworks for the Management of Transboundary Water
Resources project launched
1996 Euro-Mediterranean Information System on Know-How in the Water
Sector (EMWIS) launched
Declaration of Principles on Cooperation on Water-Related Matters
and New and Additional Water Resources
Public Awareness & Conservation Project (PACP) launched
Arava Institute for Environment Studies (AIES) founded
WaterNet Project launched
Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC) launched
Last official meeting of the MWGWR
1997 Environmental Management and Planning as a Tool for Promoting
Sustainable Coexistence Between Israelis and Palestinians launched
1998 EcoPeace Middle East Environmental NGO Forum – One Basin, One
Strategy: Symposium on Promoting an Integrated Sustainable
Regional Development Plan for the Dead Sea Basin
1999 FOEME (Friends of the Earth Middle East) Regional campaign for
Dead Sea to be listed as Biosphere Reserve and World Heritage Site
(UNESCO)
Global International Water Assessment (GIWA) project implemented
2000 Joint Environmental Mediation Service (JEMS/IPCRI) launched
2001 FOEME Good Water Neighbours Project launched
GLOWA JR Project – Phase I / Effects of Climate and Global Change
on Jordan River Basin project launched
University of Oklahoma: Middle East Water Working Group (MEEWG)
2002 Culture of Water Program launched
FOEME and global partners conferences (2) – The Dead Sea,
Between Life and Death: Learning from Other Lakes
Announcement of Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance (RSDSC) process
at the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) in
Johannesburg, South Africa
Middle East Environment Future (MEEF) initiative launched
2003 World Bank commitment to RSDSC process; Palestinian inclusion in
process
Geneva Initiative launched publicly
FOEME meeting on the future of the Dead Sea
Joint Israeli-Palestinian delegation to Stockholm Water Week,
supported by IPCRI
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supported by IPCRI
A Future for the Dead Sea project launched
2004 2nd Israeli-Palestinian-International Water for Life Conference in
Turkey, organised by IPCRI
Monitoring Transboundary Palestinian-Israeli Streams: Implications for
Cooperative Management Strategies project launched
2005 Optimisation for Sustainable Water Management (OPTIMA) project
launched
GLOWA JR Project – Phase II
CollectiveWater – From Conflict to Collective Action: Institutional
Change and Management Options to Govern Transboundary Water
Courses launched
2006 Sustainable Management of Available Water Resources with
Innovative Technologies (SMART) project launched
AIES/NATO Advanced Study Institute – Integrated Water Resource
Management and Security in the Middle East
Adaptive Visions of Water in the Middle East (AVOW) project
launched
Pro-Aquifer Project launched
2007 AIES/NATO Advanced Research Workshop –  Water Resources and
Infrastructure in Areas of Conflict and Extreme Conditions
RSDSC Feasibility Process begins, including a stakeholder
consultation process with diverse Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian and
international water and peace actors, organisations and agencies
Environmental Management and Planning as a Tool for Promoting
Sustainable Coexistence Between Israelis and Palestinians project
launched
Water for Peace in the Middle East project launched
2008 Publication of Draft Agreement on Water Cooperation, Geneva
Initiative
Pro-Aquifer Project Final Regional Conference
2009 GLOWA JR Project – Phase III
2010 Understanding and Analyzing the current Israeli Wastewater Practices
for Transboundary Wastewater Management from Palestinian
Communities project launched
2010/2011 Conflict and Peace Effects Study (CPES) of the RSDSC initiative
2011 RSDSC Feasibility Study completed
Table 5.1: Transboundary Water Domain at a Glance (adapted from Twite, 2004 and
expanded)
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Introducing Officially-Sanctioned Transboundary Water Processes
The Middle East Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources
(MWGWR)
In the early-1990s, the Madrid peace process was designed along both bilateral
and multilateral tracks. Through bilateral negotiations, it was believed that the
various Middle East conflict parties could pursue agreement. Bilateral
processes took place between Israel and each of Syria, Lebanon, and a joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
Noting the challenges of coming to bilateral agreement, a multilateral process
was constructed as a mechanism for supporting the bilaterals through
confidence-building in the form of meaningful techno-political dialogue on key
issues. This was intended as a means of creating dialogical, political
opportunities through which to catalyse and galvanise innovative peacemaking.
Multilateral processes were also meant to address transboundary, regional
issues with major support from committed global powers.
The multilateral process was pursued through working groups, one of which
was the MWGWR. There were five such working groups, with the others
addressing the following issues: Environment, Refugees, Regional Economic
Development, and Arms Control and Regional Security. The MWGWR was
chaired by the US and co-chaired by Russia, while receiving the notable
support of both Japan and the EU.
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Between 1992 and 1996, the MWGWR officially met nine times, as follows.
Round 1 – Moscow organising meeting, Russia; 28-29 January 1992
Round 2 – Vienna, Austria; 14-15 May 1992
Round 3 – Washington, DC; 16-17 September 1992
Round 4 – Geneva, Switzerland; 27-29 April 1993
Round 5 – Beijing, China; 26-28 October 1993
Round 6 – Muscat, Oman; 17-19 April 1994
Round 7 – Athens, Greece; 7-9 November 1994
Round 8 – Amman, Jordan; 18-22 June 1995
Round 9 – Hammamet, Tunisia; 16 May 1996
During that time, numerous gatherings, workshops, courses and trainings were
held inter-sessionally, structuring the transboundary water domain and creating
the context and specific opportunities for a transboundary community of
practitioners to evolve. Since 1996, many members of the MWGWR have
continued to meet unofficially, sometimes on a bi-annual basis. These meetings
also enabled the development of many water-related civil society processes.
At Israel’s insistence, the bilaterals were attended by a joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation to engage in negotiation with Israel. The multilateral
working group process enabled a collective Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian, and
increasingly an Israeli-Palestinian water expert dynamic. Through this, Israelis
and Palestinians began developing a hydropolitical relationship that was not
specifically and necessarily mediated through Jordan (though Jordan was
pivotal in its evolution)96.
                                                 
96 Overall, the Jordanians played a central enabling role. Jordan, of course, also benefited,
given the eventual development of the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace with its innovative water
dimensions.
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The MWGWR created a location of hydropolitical encounter, dialogue, shared
reflection, collective imagining and mutual learning. It became a location for the
expression of hydropolitical dispute and development among Israeli, Palestinian
and Jordanian water practitioners. It also became a location of political insight
and problem-solving, notably given the practice of consensus-based decision-
making that was pursued. The significance of the MWGWR in structuring a
transboundary water domain and enabling the evolution of a transboundary
water community of Israeli and Palestinian practitioners is succinctly articulated
as follows (Sosland, 2007: 191):
The multilateral track has played an important role in organizing a
broader community of water experts who have created new ideas for
solving old water problems and providing a forum for international donors
and core states to work together, while developing the foundation for
water-sharing institutions.
Prior to this and other working group processes, very few Israeli and Palestinian
civil society expert practitioners were given the opportunity or even permitted to
encounter the other with official sanction. Through this initiative and onwards,
Israeli and Palestinian water practitioners began the journey of getting to know
one another, working together, even imagining the future, as expert water
practitioners, as Israelis and Palestinians, even as friends, on the premise of
techno-political cooperation.
The multilaterals were not successful at transboundary water/peace community
building on all fronts, of course. An important shortcoming was that Syria and
Lebanon refused to participate in the water and other working groups until
meaningful political progress was made on the bilateral front. It must also be
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noted that with the second Palestinian Intifada, the informal activities of
MWGWR participants declined in number and scope. For a few years, from
2000 until 2005, very little was taking place as an extension of the MWGWR,
though meetings did continue among certain members of the group (Personal
interview, PW1 2010)97. Since then, informal meetings have continued on a
peripatetic basis.
Recognising Discursive Cleavages
From the outset, the MWGWR process brought to light some of the
fundamental cleavages between preferred Israeli and Palestinian discourses of
water/peace, with implications into the present day. A central dimension of
Israel’s hydrohegemony in relation to the Palestinians has been its preferred
discourse of technically-based approaches and solutions. This is meaningfully
juxtaposed to the predominantly Palestinian political discourse for addressing
water/peace issues. The earliest dialogues associated with the multilateral
process brought to light these discursive cleavage. Notably, in 1992, after
Round 2 of the multilaterals, Israel’s Water Commissioner and head of Israel’s
water delegation, Dan Zaslavsky was quoted as saying: “[T]he Palestinians did
not speak about water even once throughout the conference. They only spoke
about politics.” (Sosland, 2007: 194)
Despite and perhaps because of its hydropolitical history and gains, Israel
endeavoured to reconstruct water into a purely technical domain while the
                                                 
97 It remains unclear what the role of the MWGWR will be in the post-Intifada period. It has
variously been imagined as a deliberative, advisory and enabling body with the ability to both
influence the making of government and intergovernmental water policy and to draw
international resources for its implementation.
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Palestinians sought to ensure its continued prominence as a political area for
negotiation, meaning-making and material production. This technical/political rift
between Israel and the Palestinians, and between predominantly Israeli and
Palestinian discourses respectively has become fundamental to water relations
between them. Finding its articulated origins in the MWGWR process, it persists
to the present time, notably with respect to seawater desalination, but also
more broadly. As the more powerful actor in the region and of this conflict,
Israel continues to privilege the geopolitical and hydropolitical status quo in
favour of a needs-based, technical and supply-oriented approach to water
management. As this disagreement over framing persists, it is unlikely that the
Israel-Palestinian conflict will be resolved without a significant politically-
informed approach and agreement on water resources, bolstered by the
quantitative benefits of technically-produced water.
This is not saying anything particularly new, or about which both Israel and the
Palestinians are not aware, as the historical record shows. Indeed, the
multilateral negotiators recognised the political significance of water a couple of
rounds into the MWGWR process. In 1993, Israeli and Palestinian water
practitioners moved to incorporate water issues into their bilateral process,
creating a bilateral water resources working group for this purpose. Water was
afforded a political significance with respect to the wider peace process. It was
clear to those involved that water issues could not be resolved simply through
technical arrangements without addressing at least some of their political
content and meaning. Thus, the newly-elected Labour-led government actually
recognised Palestinian water rights (albeit in a limited way) and the value of
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interdependent if not quite integrated, transboundary water resources
management and development. The product of efforts underway in the bilateral
water working group, this was recognised as an important success that enabled
continued negotiations on other political issues.
The technical/political debate is far from resolved. With the Madrid and then
Oslo processes, this debate and related others (e.g. governance of natural vs.
desalinated water) were essentially put onto the table for resolution through
final status talks. Indeed, this early, though pivotal, water-related transboundary
work created the discursive context for Israeli water/peace practitioner
engagements. In today’s environment, to privilege a technical approach for
resolving water issues with the Palestinians amounts to structuring Israel’s
growing hydrohegemony, essentially removing or severely restricting water-
related political engagement at every turn. Bearing this in mind, several of the
water/peace initiatives of the MWGWR are discussed below to reflect the
construction of an Israeli discursive discipline of ‘taking politics out of water’. As
discussed, Israeli water/peace practitioners associated with the MWGWR are
recognisable as having performed and (re-) produced Israel’s hydrohegemony,
as assessed in terms of equality, partnership, equity and shared sustainability,
and in terms of Israel’s narrative of hydrohegemonic necessity.
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Water/Peace Initiatives of the MWGWR
The MWGWR has been deemed amongst the most, if not the most active
working group of the multilateral process, and with the longest-lasting
implications. Becoming a dynamic institution of the Oslo process, this group
supported the development of a series of multilateral water/peace initiatives and
activities organised in terms of the following four issue-areas (adapted from the
WaterCare PAWC Website; CtC Website; Sosland, 2007: 195; See Diagram
5.1 below):
• Enhancement of water data availability;
• Promotion of sustainable water management practices, including
conservation;
• Enhancement of water supply; and
• Conceptual development on regional water management and
cooperation.
Diagram 5.1: The Project Portfolio of the Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources
(Sosland, 2007: 196)
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Without claiming to be comprehensive, a number of projects situated within
each of the priority areas of the MWGWR are described and analysed below.
Doing so provides insight into the discursive pursuit and operation of Israel’s
hydrohegemony and the circulation of its narrative of necessity through
foucauldian capillary circuits of power. In this vein, the focus of the current
study is on the particular engagement, discursive practices, ideations,
productions and knowledge-construction practices of Israeli water/peace
practitioners in relation to their Palestinian colleagues.
Enhancement of Water Data Availability
Perhaps most significant of the initiatives branching forth from the MWGWR,
the regional Water Databanks Project was approved in 1994. Launched the
following year, it was premised on the need to construct a shared, standardised
hydrological body of knowledge as the basis upon which to make national and
regional decisions. The initiative was intended to advance a sustainable
management of water resources in the region, to be pursued by Israel, the
Palestinians and Jordan. Equally important, the initiative was meant to create
the context and provide the hardware for information-sharing and experience-
sharing among scientists, experts and knowledge-oriented practitioners from
across the region.
The Water Databanks Project was produced by an Executive Action Team
(EXACT) with members representing the US, the EC/EU, Canada, France,
Norway, Australia and The Netherlands, in addition to the Core Parties (Israel,
the PA and Jordan). Funding and technical support was forthcoming from the
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non-Middle Eastern states and governing authorities. EXACT members met
together, and with donor representatives, bi-annually throughout the period of
the Oslo process. Since the start of the second Palestinian Intifada, additional
meetings have been organised by core party members into recent years
(Kramer 2008, 20; Personal interview, PW1 2010). Of note, subsequent to the
HAMAS 2006 victory in Gaza Strip elections, the PWA was no longer directly
invited to EXACT meetings. They were replaced by members of the Palestinian
National Water Council (itself representing the PWA).
The Water Databanks Project has been an opportunity for the core parties, their
knowledge-oriented water-domain actors and international partners to
cooperate on constructing a forward-looking initiative together. Doing so was
primarily undertaken through meetings, workshops, trainings, conferences and
academic side projects that provided space for water-domain experts to work
together and share experience directly with one another. While promising on
multiple fronts, the databanks project was fraught with challenges and
difficulties. It was also framed and pursued to reflect Israel’s hydrohegemonic
power.
From the outset and in terms of its framing and design, the Water Databanks
Project reflected an ahistorical perspective on water availability, and this on
multiple counts. It did not reflect a historically-contextualised assessment of
hydropolitical violence committed by one party against another. It was not
meant to ascertain responsibility, seek acknowledgement or demand
compensation for the different hydropolitical circumstances and realities of
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Israel and the Palestinians (or indeed, Jordan). The matter of equity was left off
the table intentionally, favouring the construction of a limited hydrological
instrument. Indeed, the project was pursued along a rigid technical framing that
favoured Israel and the relatively far more scientifically-savvy Israeli
practitioners.
The Water Databanks Project was ostensibly designed and pursued as an
exercise in cooperative trust-building through sustained communication and the
construction of a technical tool (Kramer, 2008: 21). Indeed, cross-border
cooperation and relationship-building have been deemed important by
participants of the Water Databanks Project. However, as they themselves
frequently expressed during recent research interviewing (e.g. Personal
interview, PW3 2010), such opportunities were regularly undermined by the
unpredictable unwillingness of Israeli authorities to issue travel documents to
Palestinians in a timely fashion (Kramer, 2008: 21; Personal interview, PW7
2010). Rather than supporting the development of a partnership between
increasingly equal parties and actors, the Water Databanks Project became an
important location for the Israeli hydrohegemonic construction and production of
a subordinate Palestinian subject.
On a related point, for cooperation and communication implicit to shared project
development and implementation to constitute confidence-building and trust-
building, it is fundamental that ‘shared’ projects and activities are pursued
cooperatively and transparently (as specifically relevant and appropriate). While
the Water Databanks Project was meant as one such cooperative and
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transparent initiative, this was only very partially the case in practice. A number
of key project activities were pursued on a uninational basis, notably with
respect to the scientific dimensions of their work (Kramer, 2008: 20). Israeli and
Palestinian experts often worked separately, then providing some of their data
and findings to a third party, which in this case was the US Geological Survey98.
In the case of the Water Databanks Project, the unwillingness of parties to
share information openly undermined confidence and damaged any trust that
might have found root. Israel leveraged its sharing, hoarding and use of water-
related knowledge, as well as its participation in knowledge generating
institutions, to project and reinforce its political power over the Palestinians and
in the region (Kramer, 2008; Personal interview, IG6 2010). Over time, it
became evident that Israel was unwilling to openly share its comprehensive
hydrological and hydropolitical knowledge with regional partners, creating an
asymmetric field of operation. In this way, the data generated as a product of
the Water Databanks Project was rendered relatively useless for the technical
and political bodies in the region; first for the Palestinians and then eventually
for everyone involved.
As such, trust between the parties was both pre-empted and undermined, as
the Water Databanks Project was constituted into a location for the (re-)
production and perpetuation of Israeli hydrohegemony as and through the
engagement of Israeli water/peace practitioners. The Water Databanks Project
                                                 
98 This framework and approach to transboundary water-domain cooperation persists to the
present day. In the context of the GLOWA Jordan River project, Israeli, Jordanian and
Palestinian participants work in national silos, submitting the results of their work to the German
project manager. Some details about the GLOWA Jordan River project are shared in chapter 6.
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is also revelatory of how a major cooperative water-domain project, situated
within a wider peacemaking efforts, was undermined through the maintenance
of a narrative of hegemonic necessity. In this case, the Israeli narrative of
Palestinian threat was not actually and politically relinquished, despite the
expressed willingness of Palestinians to accept the state of Israel’s legitimacy
(Personal interview, PW3 2010).
Sustainable Water Management and Conservation
In an effort to promote sustainable and efficient water management practices,
the second major priority of the MWGWR, a number of projects were launched
on a variety of different issue-specific areas. These included several projects
funded by Luxemburg, Austria, Britain and the US intended to promote the
efficient use of water resources in agriculture with consideration for the use of
varying qualities of water. Another major project conducted a comparative study
of water laws and institutions in the region, with support and funding provided
by the Norwegian government through the non-governmental organisation,
Center for Environmental Studies and Resources Management. Yet another
focused on the promotion of public awareness and conservation of water
resources in the water-stressed region. The current section provides details of
this last initiative.
In 1996, the Public Awareness and Water Conservation Project (PACP) was
designed to raise awareness and stimulate action on water conservation and
quality issues in Israel, the PA and Jordan. Its phase one practices involved the
compilation, sharing and promotion of best practices in water conservation
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throughout the region. In this vein, the World Bank funded a study of water
conservation projects in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,
involving many of the region’s countries. US Technical assistance was
forthcoming to promote conservation practices through public awareness and
education campaigns. These were implemented simultaneously in the three
Core Countries and in Tunisia.
The project’s second phase involved the creation of a video on water issues,
developed and produced by regional participants, intent on circulating
knowledge about water issues from a regional perspective. This video is geared
to youth and classroom environments for screening and discussion. A second,
intimately entwined initiative, is the WaterCare project. Its outputs include a
teacher’s guide, a website and a student handbook targeted at 12-15 year olds.
The materials were jointly prepared by Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian
water/peace practitioners and educators (WaterCare Website).
The PACP’s third initiative is known as Raincatcher. Bringing together Israeli,
Palestinian and Jordanian environmental educators, school administrators and
government representatives, the initiative seeks to develop rainwater-
harvesting and related experience in Core Country communities (Raincatcher
Website)99. These and other such efforts were developed to privilege a regional
framing of issues addressed through localised practice. Funding and support for
this initiative were provided by the US Department of State, as well as scientists
                                                 
99 Participating schools include: Al Ahliyyah College and Al Amari Girl’s School from the
Palestinian community; De LaSalle College and Guerea Um Al Mu’mineen School from the
Jordanian community; and Ein Karem Agricultural School and Abu Gosh School from the Israeli
community (MWGWR, 2005).
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from the US Geological Survey, the Israeli Water Commission, the Jordanian
Ministry of Water and Irrigation, and the PWA.
From a discursive perspective, however well-intentioned, these initiatives (re-)
produced and perpetuated Israel’s hydrohegemony in relation to the
Palestinians. The first overarching point is that they have specifically and
effectively ensured the complete absence of Israel-Palestinian relational
political issues (Personal interview, PW1 2010). Notably, the WaterCare
materials which continue to be used today were designed to be acceptable to
Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian authorities and communities. A Palestinian
participant in the production of these materials explains (Personal interview,
PW1 2010):
We did lots of things in public awareness. We did lots of things for
children. We wrote a book together. We actually wrote a book … about
water, without mentioning politics, showing that we all shared the same
water. It was good. It was aimed at late high school. Of course we didn’t
[discuss] politics... and it was circulated, and it was translated...
As water-related education materials, these are far from reproachable,
providing important and factual materials about precious planetary water
resources. However, in an effort to circulate knowledge about water,
hydropolitical issues related to the Israel-Palestinian conflict and peace process
were left out, thus perpetuating Israel’s favoured hydrohegemonic framing. A
reading of these ostensibly peace education materials reveals that they fail to
either contextualise or articulate the concept of peace in relation to water
through such concepts as power, occupation, responsibility and/or equity
(WaterCare TB1 Website). Effectively, Palestinian conflict-related knowledge
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was banished from these intergenerational water/peace materials. As such, the
Israeli transboundary water/peace practitioners engaged in this work may be
understood as having been hydrohegemonically contained in their production.
Enhancement of Water Supply
In an effort to promote the enhancement of water supply, to literally increase
the quantity of water available in the region, the MWGWR sought to forecast
water needs over the long-term and to identify sources and institutional
structures for meeting them. In the context of a German-sponsored Regional
Water Supply and Demand Study, the MWGWR evaluated opportunities and
initiatives for non-conventional water resource development. The intent was to
support the joint development of water supply solutions, with varying degrees of
interest and success. Some of these initiatives would eventually be piloted, like
water imports from Turkey. Others like the so-called peace pipeline would be
abandoned, at least for the time being. A few, like the RSDSC would be taken
to the feasibility stage.
Among the most significant of these initiatives was the Middle East Desalination
Research Centre (MEDRC). Based in Muscat, Oman, MEDRC was launched to
promote the development of desalination technology and practice in support of
Israel-Palestinian peace. Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians and others from
across the Middle East and internationally used the centre as a place to meet
and work together in pursuit of desalination research (Saidi, 2006). Some of the
work undertaken at MEDRC, combined with both technological developments
and a major drop in the costs of desalination, contributed to the massive
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increase in produced desalinated water in the Middle East over the last 15
years.
The MEDRC received a great deal of financial and political support from the
MWGWR, including major funding from the US, Oman, South Korea, Japan and
the EC. As of June 2008, MEDRC accomplished the following (adapted from
WaterWiki MEDRC Website; MEDRC Website):
• Assembled more than 200 global experts, working with MEDRC in a
voluntary capacity;
• Awarded grants on 74 multinational research projects valued at more
than US$10 million, involving 137 institutional research partners in 34
countries;
• Coordinated and sponsored more than 32 desalination training programs
in the PA, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan, Egypt and
members of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC);
• Awarded M.Sc. and Ph.D. scholarships for qualified regional nationals to
study at universities outside of the MENA region;
• Published more than 300 research articles in academic and professional
journals based on work performed in MEDRC-sponsored research
projects; and
• Established a Center of Excellence in Desalination and Water Reuse
technology, in cooperation with the PA.
The MEDRC has been one mechanism through which Arab governments and
civil society moved towards the normalisation of relations with Israel in the
water domain and elsewhere, on the premise that political change was soon to
follow. However, since the second Intifada, Israeli participation in MEDRC has
become rather limited. Nonetheless, all that took place with respect to MEDRC
contributed to the development of a transboundary water domain and
community of water/peace practitioners, with implications for the planning of
water management as it effects Israelis and Palestinians. A discursive analysis
of this work is warranted.
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Israel’s preferred and hydrohegemonic technical discourse is closely associated
with the production of water, notably through both the desalination of seawater,
and the recycling and reuse of wastewater. Work undertaken at the MEDRC
has been pursued in support of this agenda and in cross-border cooperation
between Israel and the Palestinians (among other parties). Insights stemming
from the research undertaken on seawater desalination among transboundary
water/peace practitioners have contributed to the formulation of an Israeli
proposal for an extraterritorial desalination facility on the Mediterranean for the
satisfaction of Palestinian water needs, dating to the late-1990s (Personal
interview, IG6 2010). As explained in the previous chapter, this proposal was
and continues to be rejected by the Palestinians so long as the issue of water
rights, and therefore of equality, equity and self-determination, remains
unresolved (Personal interview, PW5 2010; Personal interview, PW8 2010).
Israeli transboundary water practitioners meaningfully informed the
development of this option. They contributed to formulating and practicing a
discourse that is today referred to as ‘taking water out of conflict’ and that
remains very popular among all but the most critically-minded Israeli
water/peace practitioners (Personal interview, IF1 2010; Personal interview, IF2
2010; Personal interview, IX2 2010; Personal interview, IX3 2010; Personal
interview, IX4 2010; Personal interview, IG6 2010; Personal interview, IW1
2010; Personal interview, IW2 2010). This discourse reflects a commitment to
the value and necessity of ‘taking politics out of water’, as per Israel’s interest,
while ensuring that ever-increasing quantities of water are provided to Israeli,
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Palestinian and other regional populations. From the 1990s, through the 2000s
and into the 2010s, such discourse-in-practice fails to address the underlying
political issues between Israel and the Palestinians. Indeed, leading Israeli
water/peace practitioners perpetuate the dominant, Israeli, technically-oriented
discourse in this way.
Developing Regional Cooperation
The fourth and final dimension of the MWGWR’s efforts was the overt
promotion of regional water management and cooperation, in framings and
practical innovations and pursuits. The activities discussed below stem from
and build upon the Declaration of Principles on Cooperation on Water-Related
Matters and New and Additional Water Resources signed by the Core Parties in
1996 (DOPW Website; Kliot and Shmueli, 1998: 220). This declaration was
understood as a commitment by the parties to pursue water cooperation, a
coordination of water infrastructural projects and the shared development of
new water resources (Sosland, 2007: 199-200). This Declaration has also
informed the other issue-areas and activities of the MWGWR.
Several efforts were advanced for the promotion of regional water management
and cooperation, with financial support emanating from the US, the EU,
Canada, Japan, The Netherlands, Israel, Spain, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden
and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Projects included the
Water Sector Training Program, which provided training to some 275 water
resource personnel on the effective management of regional water resources. A
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modest Water Atlas Project was developed as a compilation of political,
historical, economic, sociological and technical literature.
In support of innovative regional water cooperation and management, one such
initiative, WaterNet was developed by the Core Parties and funded by the
Norwegian government. The WaterNet initiative was conceived along local,
regional and international tracks. It was designed as an interconnected
electronic hydropolitical information resource, nationally-based at organisations
in Israel, Jordan and the PA. It was constructed into a WaterNet Information
System (WIS), with every country harbouring a local base.
In Israel, for instance, WaterNet-Local is based at the Technion’s Stephen and
Nancy Grand Water Research Institute (GWRI-BFIC; see GWRI-BFIC
Website). A Regional WaterNet and Research Center was developed in
Amman, Jordan with the purpose of encouraging and supporting regional
cooperation on water issues. Additionally, a WaterNet Steering Group has been
developed, bringing together representatives of the Core Parties and the
Norwegian funder. Technical experts are consulted as required. This steering
group is supplemented by a Local Steering Group and a Local Technical Group
structure. The WaterNet Steering Group is responsible for initiating new shared
and regional water projects, as per the 1996 Declaration referenced above.
The development of regional cooperation in the water sector was in these (and
other related) ways primarily pursued along technical lines. This included
technical trainings, technical institution building, and published information
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sharing. These technically-oriented activities contain and privilege the Israeli
assumption that ‘final’ political arrangements would eventually be reached,
even emerge over time, without all the while working to build politics into the
specific processes of technically cooperative activities. It was essentially putting
the cart before the horse, so to speak, creating diverse functional arrangements
in the water sector (and elsewhere) and assuming that satisfactory ‘apolitical’
solutions to a political conflict would ensue from such processes.
Reflections on Technical Cooperation
The ideas underpinning such processes undoubtedly stem from an illustrious
intellectual pedigree, that of functionalism. Its founding theorist, David Mitrany
(1943; 1948) argued that cooperative frameworks on technical matters
elaborated in areas like natural resources management, energy provision,
highway building, cultural and educational practice, even security matters would
produce a form of integration among participating states and/or political
authorities. War would become undesirable and eventually even unthinkable as
the win-lose construct of realist engagement would be supplanted through
processes of integration.
In this sense, an ‘apolitical’ and progressive institutional approach centred
around common functions, enabled by developments in technology, would
create a “normal community” of participating states and authorities (Mitrany,
1948: 358). In these and other ways, Mitrany located a kind of peaceably,
almost invisibly transformative power at the nexus of socio-economic need,
technological  innovation and integrative practice (Mitrany, 1948). Pivotal actors
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in processes replacing belligerent in favour of integrated relations were argued
to be those elite, technical people that engaged across conflict lines, working,
planning, imagining and creating cooperatively with once-enemy counterparts,
in ever-expanding and growing community100.
The conflict and peace literature branching forth from Mitrany’s functionalism
has offered the kind of promise that the Middle East peace process was looking
for and fed off (though arguably with little direct peacebuilding benefit).
Specifically, Deutsch (1954; 1957) argued that cross-border cooperation could
enable the development of security communities. Deutsch understood such
communities to be comprised of integrated people, populations, states or other
collectivities, ceasing to imagine engaging in war and other forms of political
violence against one another. Integration, he understood as (Deutsch, 1957: 5
in Nathan, 2006: 275-276):
the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of
institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to
assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change
among its population.
Further, given the challenges and frequent instabilities inevitable to political
change, “there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not
                                                 
100 Today, the EU is perhaps the principal, though not only, descendent of functional (Mitrany,
1948) and later neofunctional (E. Haas, 1990) theorising. The EU has been built upon
cooperative economic and resource management arrangements formulated in the early 1950s
by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, originating in the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) and later the European Economic Community (EEC). Having bitterly
fought on opposite sides of two world wars, these countries identified socio-economic needs
(for coal and steel, for employment, for rebuilding Europe); they pursued and leveraged
technological developments (in communication, in transportation, in resource extraction and
management); and they elaborated a transboundary, institutionally-based, integrative practice.
From socio-economic origins, the ECSC was slowly and sometimes reticently transformed into
a massive, complex, integrated community. War between EU member states has become all
but unimaginable.
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fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”
(Deutsch, 1957: 5 in Nathan, 2006: 275-276) In other words, security
communities emerge through a process of integration that itself creates a
collective assurance of non-belligerent practice and change.
Over time, by means of communication and transactional flows around shared
concerns and through an awareness of their collective historical progression, it
has been argued that members of security communities develop and produce
shared and overlapping identities that further consolidate their mutual concern
and consideration (Adler, 2005: 215-216). In Deutsch’s work, the countries
comprising NATO built a powerful security community101. In the Middle East,
one cannot speak of an Israel-Palestinian security community, or a more
specific hydropolitical security community, in the same way. The perpetuation of
Israeli hydrohegemony pre-empts the possibility of Palestinian hydropolitical
security. Perhaps ironically, officially-sanctioned transboundary cooperation at
the nexus of water and peace in the context of the MWGWR has perpetuated
such an asymmetric and violent relational order.
Failure (to-date) of the functionally-rooted and oriented theories, as practiced in
the Middle East, stems largely from the apolitical, technically-oriented
assumptions and approaches to relations and relationships between conflict
                                                 
101 Such a community was based on a military alliance in the context of the Cold War, but also
saw its members engaged in extensive complementary economic, cultural and other relations,
given the global ideological conflict underway. Indeed, all fifteen 1957 NATO countries were
among the original twenty signatories of the 1961 Convention for the creation of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), reflecting the further
consolidation of areas of mutual concern and overlap. Further, the original six signatory
countries for the creation of the ECSC in 1951 all played an active role in NATO’s creation. In
other words, over time, cooperation in traditional and wider security matters has been shown to
meaningfully contribute to the construction and production of political communities concerned
with, and committed relationally to peace.
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actors implicit to them. They simply do not adequately account for the highly
politically-charged and asymmetric conflict environment on the ground.
Assuming the net value of this theoretical tradition, it might be said that the
Middle Eastern context has been inappropriate for application of the functional
theories. At the very least, functionalism presupposes the structural equality of
the parties. This was perhaps the case in Europe where the theory was
developed, but certainly not in the Middle East where it was being applied in the
1990s. In the Middle East, the functional theory has provided legitimating cover
for the dominant, Israeli political party and oftentimes Israeli actors as well, to
avoid engaging with issues of equity, equality, partnership and sustainability, all
the while doing cooperation. In so doing, the theory and its widespread
application have enabled the perpetuation of the relationally asymmetric and
violent order of Israeli hydrohegemony.
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Analysis of Officially-Sanctioned Practice
The MWGWR was perhaps the earliest, key pivotal factor in initiating,
supporting and propelling the transboundary community of Israeli and
Palestinian water/peace practitioners in the 1990s. In the first years, these
practitioners were largely embedded in the formal structures and objectives of
peace negotiations. Such proximity has produced ideas and practices that are
intimately tied to, aligned with, and constitutive of Israel’s hydrohegemony.
Indeed, the activities and practices of the MWGWR have been pivotal in
constructing, implementing, (re-) producing and perpetuating this dominant
discursive framework of water cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians.
The current section discusses these practices and ideations in terms of the key
theoretical tenets of water/peace relationship and power used in this study,
namely: equality, partnership, equity, and shared sustainability. This discussion
also engages with the key elements of Israel’s narrative of hegemonic
necessity, identifying where and how the discursive practices of Israeli
water/peace practitioners specifically construct and uphold it.
Equality
With the Madrid/Oslo peace process, as conflict parties, Israel and the
Palestinians were not equal from the outset, as explained in the previous
chapter and above. Stemming in part from this, Israeli and Palestinian water
practitioners were in no way equal, and more importantly perhaps, nor were the
discursive practices they pursued. At the outset, the Palestinians saw in this
MWGWR of the peace process a location for political progress. Thus, they
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privileged a political approach to water cooperation as well as resource
management and development issues. This was perceived as another front
through which to pursue equality between Israel and an eventual Palestinian
state in terms of (hydropolitical) power.
In line with the dominant Israeli perspective, Israeli water/peace practitioners
pursued a predominantly technical approach to water resources cooperation,
management and development within the context of the MWGWR. They
attempted to maintain a scientific approach to discussions over water
resources, while privileging inter-personal relationship-building with Palestinian
participants to the extent that they were permitted on security and other
grounds.
The Palestinians gained only limited success in bringing their discursive
preferences onto the table through this process, shifting the conflict asymmetry
somewhat at best. Perhaps most significant of all, in the 1993 Declaration of
Principles, Israel recognised the principle that Palestinians had rights to water
of the Mountain Aquifer. This principle would then translate into something akin
to actual (though limited) rights over specific water resources, as follows. In
1995, with the Interim Agreement and then in 1996, with the institutionalisation
of the PWA, water from the Eastern Mountain Aquifer was placed under
Palestinian jurisdiction pending final status talks. These agreements were
pivotal to moving the peace process forward. Israeli water/peace practitioners
played a significant role in validating the hydropolitical discourse of the
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Palestinians, resituating and transforming the radical asymmetry between Israel
and the Palestinians.
Careful not to overstate the case, the relatively modest and highly strategic
Israeli concession on Palestinian water rights to the Eastern Mountain Aquifer
made it possible for Israel to continue pursuing a technically-oriented, discourse
of water production from 1996 onwards. For Israel, this was a narrow sacrifice
for larger ‘political’ gain. Increasingly, the Israeli government let it be known that
it was disinclined to discuss the matter of Palestinian water rights further, as
these had been satisfied with the Interim Agreement. As per the narrative of
necessity, both a national Israeli hydropolitical imperative and a strategic
integration of water resources management and development was enabled
through this concession. Eastern Mountain Aquifer water would be recognised
as Palestinian, but even that would be subject to the JWC’s asymmetrically
shared institutional power.
Recognition of Palestinian water rights to the Eastern aquifer would also feed
into Israel’s narrative of benevolence in its treatment of Palestinians, since the
latter in fact saw their (albeit limited) water rights recognised. Beyond that,
Israeli water/peace practitioners became key producers of the Israeli trope that
the Palestinians had to stop blaming Israel for its woes and begin actively doing
the best it could with the gains secured and agreed to (Personal interview, IF2
2010; Personal interview, IX3 2010; Personal interview, IG6 2010; Personal
interview, IW1 2010). Equality is indeed nowhere to be found in this discursive
equation.
290
Partnership
One central approach to peacebuilding entails the building of partnerships
among conflict actors intentionally engaged in transforming relations, through
critical, resistant, desistant and/or alternative practice. Looking to the MWGWR,
and to Israeli water/peace practitioners in particular, it cannot be said that such
partnerships were developed during the early years of officially-sanctioned
relations. Water/peace relations were deeply embedded in the Oslo process,
such that very little critical reflexivity would inform such practice early on. Israeli
water/peace practices of so-called partnership were fundamentally constitutive
of Israel’s hydrohegemony.
At first, this hydrohegemony was veiled, given that it was pursued in the form of
a transboundary agenda. Such an agenda, and its concomitant framings and
practices, was and remains important to the Palestinians who frequently argue
that an Israeli unilateralism is to everyone’s detriment (e.g. Personal interview,
PW8 2010). A transboundary approach to water resources management and
development is perceived to be essential given the transboundary hydrology of
the Mountain Aquifer and the Jordan River, both highly contested bodies of
water between Israel and the Palestinians. Yet, the transboundary agenda and
the practices of partnership pursued by Israeli water/peace practitioners proved
violent by the terms of the current study.
Through the MWGWR, partnership was primarily done through the elaboration
of techno-political frameworks for water resources governance, developed by
Israeli and Palestinian water resources experts. It was believed that over time,
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these frameworks would evolve to integrate the two societies, in the water and
possibly, eventually other sectors. Communitarian expert relations would be
reproduced elsewhere, spilling over into other domains of society and then at
large (Personal interview, IX4 2010). It was also believed that the early
technical orientation would shift meaningfully, translating into political gains.
In practice, Israeli water/peace practitioners participated in undermining such
ideal partnership practice under the rubric of protecting national security. The
Water Databanks Project failed largely and specifically because Israeli
practitioners hoarded and shared information selectively, at the behest of and in
collusion with the Israeli government. This resulted in their so-called
partnerships being useless and fruitless, given that both the Palestinians and
Israelis separately went on to build their own partial water resources databases.
The practice of partnership-building remained infused with an Israeli
unwillingness to trust in their Palestinian colleagues, reflecting Israel’s narrative
of distrust towards the Palestinians.
At another level, there was no real discursive diversity among Israeli
water/peace practitioners involved in the MWGWR and informing the future of
transboundary water management and development in the region. Partnership
remained possible in the specific areas and so long as Israeli and Palestinian
practitioners were aligned with Israel’s priorities. Israelis and Palestinians
engaged in technical research together, notably in areas of seawater
desalination through MEDRC. They built shared information provision
institutions through WaterNet. They jointly created education materials on water
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issues in the Middle East. Throughout, Israel’s technical discourse was
unequivocally maintained and perpetuated by Israeli water/peace practitioners.
In this way, the longstanding Israeli narrative of Jewish victimisation remained
unblemished by Palestinian claims and related political matters, because
Palestinian conflict knowledge was banished from the process and its many
productions.
Equity
Political processes and agreements between conflict parties are known to be
fragile where the perception of equity is low on fundamental matters between
them. Conversely, the practice and promotion of material and perceptual equity
are essential for political processes and agreements to have traction, meaning
and lasting potential effects. Looking to the Middle East, Israeli water/peace
practitioners engaged in the MWGWR were reticent to raise and address
matters of equity. As such, they were perpetuating Israel’s hydrohegemonic
relations with the Palestinians, as well as several components of its narrative of
necessity.
Despite constant Palestinian urging, Israeli water practitioners were unwilling to
pursue a discourse of Israeli responsibility for the inequities in water
governance between Israel and the Palestinians. They were also unwilling to
accept the Palestinian claim that Israel should compensate the Palestinians in
both water and infrastructure for any water-related wrongs committed against
the Palestinians. The following passage from a longstanding Israeli water/peace
practitioner is telling (Personal interview, IX3 2010):
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The Palestinians do not have money. And they claim that we pumped all
the water from the Mountain Aquifer. So now we have to give them back
the Mountain Aquifer, and ‘don’t ask us to pay the high price of
desalinated water’?! That is what the Palestinians say. Everybody can
say a lot. I have my story. I gave a lot of work to build the NWC, a lot of
money, a lot of life … in the 1960s, to dig… in the Mountain Aquifer. It is
very costly and we did it. But now… we have to stick together and to
start again?! Are we going to… be blamed? [We] should give it back?…
This practitioner continues:
I was born in Israel. We are a family that is growing. And this is the only
home that we can build in our region. Israel will survive anyhow. But I
think that if we [Israelis and Palestinians] want to succeed, the only way
to look for success is to be together and not one against the other. To
destroy things, is very easy. To build something, it is very difficult. And it
takes years.
Israeli water/peace practitioners pursued a forward-oriented discursive practice
focused on two priorities. The first was to increase the overall quantity of water
available to Israeli and Palestinian populations, based on a human needs
based and technically-oriented model of seawater desalination. The second
was to promote efficiencies in waters already being used, promoting the
recycling and reuse of wastewaters. It should be noted that the 1996 agreement
on cooperation explicitly stated that existing uses of water would be unaffected
by this agreement.
In other words, the Core Parties agreed to develop water regionally and
cooperatively, while not reconsidering the past and its inequities. In these
different ways, the fundamental principle of equity was largely abandoned by
Israeli water/peace practitioners. This is akin to ‘taking politics out of water’ and
privileging once again the dominant Israeli national discourse of water
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governance. In pursuing a discourse that has sought to take politics out of
water (itself a reformulation of the current Israeli discourse of ‘taking water out
of the conflict’), Israeli water/peace practitioners were largely practicing and
performing Israeli hydrohegemony. Israel’s continued willingness, even desire
to provide the Palestinians with desalinated seawater also further informs its
narrative of benevolence and hegemonic necessity towards the Palestinians.
Shared Sustainability
The concept of sustainable development emerged with the 1987 World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report Our Common
Future, building on extensive work undertaken by the Club of Rome, the North-
South Commission and numerous other organisations, communities, theorists
and practitioners in diverse sectors and around the world. It was further brought
to the fore with the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It was
during this time that the Israel-Palestinian peace process was just getting
underway and the activities of the MWGWR were being launched and pursued.
As the international community endeavoured to make sense of, and articulate
commitments to sustainable development, the concept was also starting to be
used to analyse and critically shift North-South relations the world over,
including relations between Israel and the Palestinians. In this way, sustainable
development and sustainability more specifically would become and remain
core concepts through which to assess and shift inter-group relations as they
relate to the environment and to the construction of political subjectivities
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(Escobar, 1998; Escobar, 1995). While it is beyond the scope of the current
study to engage in detailed theoretical discussion and development on matters
of sustainable development and sustainability, a few words are warranted on
the construction of sustainable subjecthood, with specific reference to the
Israel-Palestinian conflict102.
The foucauldian subject may be understood as the product of a relational order,
and the agent of both its discursive perpetuation and transformation. In the
context of this study, the sustainable subject is defined only partially by its
particular practices of water. It is also constituted through its relational practices
with the other on matters, and at the nexus of water, sustainability and peace.
Thus and throughout the MWGWR and wider Oslo process, Israel and Israelis
have been subjectively defined as sustainable subjects while the Palestinians
have been constructed as unsustainable subjects. Indeed, this has become a
fundamental narrative element for Israel, legitimating the perpetuation of its
hydrohegemonic dominance as well as its sovereign, disciplinary and
biopolitical interventions among Palestinians. Israeli water/peace practitioners
engaged in MWGWR process have discursively participated in the construction
and perpetuation of such differentiated subjecthood, as well as in the projection
and implementation of sanctioned remedies.
In basic terms, the whole MWGWR process sidesteps the issues of Israeli
responsibility for the deterioration of shared water resources. Nowhere in all
MWGWR literature is it found that Israel bears primary responsibility for
                                                 
102 For insightful discussion of sustainable development and sustainability, see Kates et al.,
2005; Princen, 2003.
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damaging the integrity and replenishability of the Mountain Aquifer, for turning
the Jordan River into a sewage canal, for deteriorating the Dead Sea. The
WaterCare materials are a case in point. They are profoundly short on critique
and analysis, but long on technical and cooperative solutions, with no specific
allocation of Israeli responsibility. Israel is simply not an unsustainable subject
in the cooperative sphere.
This is contrasted to Israel’s internal, national sphere, as seen through the
Israeli State Comptroller’s 1990 Special Report on water resources, which
scathingly depicts Israeli over-exploitation and mismanagement of West Bank
water from the 1970s through to 1990 (Sosland, 2007: 153). Such Israeli
unsustainability was largely left out of the MWGWR process and concomitant
activities, despite legitimate Palestinian concerns and efforts to have them
recognised and visibly addressed. Israeli water/peace practitioners were
complicit participants in the construction of sustainable Israeli subjecthood,
while also promoting the environmentally dubious practice of seawater
desalination as the future of Palestinian and regional water supply.
Sustainable subjecthood is intimately bundled with peaceful subjecthood in the
Middle Eastern context, stemming back to the Oslo peace process and the
MWGWR. It might simply have been an accident of history that the UNCED and
Madrid/Oslo processes were pursued meaningfully at the same time. Yet, even
such an accident has had repercussions on the discursive production of
Palestinian subjecthood and aspiration, as and through the interventions
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enabled by the MWGWR process and the more specific discursive practices of
Israeli water/peace practitioners.
Whether in terms of promoting seawater desalination, wastewater reuse and
recycling, or ideal and sustainable institutional forms, Israeli water/peace
practitioners have been involved intimately and cooperatively with Palestinians
in their research, reflections and decisions. For example, as some of the world
leaders on agriculture in arid environments, Israeli water/peace practitioners
actively shared their experience of wastewater reuse and recycling with the
technologically-deficient Palestinians through MWGWR processes. In another
example, Israelis supported the Palestinians in adopting Israeli-style national
institutions and laws for water governance. The MWGWR produced a basic
Palestinian Water Law (1995) and a PWA (1996) that very closely resemble
Israel’s Water Law (1959) and the Israeli Water Commission (that would
become the IWA). In both cases, water was nationalised, and its management
was institutionally centralised. In the case of the PWA, this became threatening
to the diversity of localised water management practices still maintained by
many Palestinian families and clans throughout the West Bank (Trottier, 2007;
Trottier, 1999).
In both of these (and in other) cases, Israeli water/peace practitioners actively
endeavoured to work with Palestinians in an effort to support the latter’s
‘sustainability’ and peacefulness through MWGWR processes and activities. On
their own and decontextualised, these efforts are perhaps laudable as
experience-sharing between people and communities in society, even solidarity
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with one another. From another vantage point, as adopted herein, these
amount to discursive practices of Israelis endeavouring to produce Palestine to
resemble Israel, through the production of Palestinians that resemble Israelis,
i.e. as peacefully and environmentally sustainable subjects (Personal interview,
IF2 2010). The environment, and sustainability more specifically, have thus
become and to this day remain technologies for constructing, managing and
transforming the threatening Palestinian subject.
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Concluding Thoughts
In the first decade of transboundary water/peace practice with respect to
officially-sanctioned processes, it is nearly impossible to disaggregate the
hydropolitical discourse of Israeli water/peace practitioners from that of the
Israeli state. The vast majority of relational water/peace practices of Israeli
transboundary practitioners is thus located hydrohegemonically. The activities
and practices underway are situated within a dominant peacemaking process.
The stated intention is for the production of relational peace between Israel and
the Palestinians. However, the discourse being pursued by Israel and Israelis
perpetuates asymmetric relations between the parties. Israeli transboundary
water/peace practice in the context of the MWGWR cannot, in any way, be
termed hydropolitical peacebuilding as framed in this study.
As made clear in this and the two prior chapters, the Israeli and Palestinian
parties are in no way equal, nor are their discursive preferences equally and
equitably informing officially-sanctioned water/peace processes. It cannot be
said that a partnership among equals was pursued through water/peace
practice, nor that equity was woven into the fabric of Madrid/Oslo peace
processes and outcomes. Israeli water/peace practitioners engaged in officially-
sanctioned processes were operating within hydrohegemonic constraints that
prevented them from working with Palestinians to promote water-related equity.
The most that can reasonably be said is that these practitioners contributed to
the Israeli state’s recognition of Palestinian water rights over the Eastern
Mountain Aquifer. This is water that both replenishes and is withdrawn inside
the West Bank, and has thus come to be recognised by all involved as
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Palestinian water; water over which Israel has nonetheless maintained its
integrated involvement through the JWC.
The state of Israel has considered itself a leader in water-related sustainability,
while depicting the Palestinians as environmentally unsustainable. The
Madrid/Oslo peace process has created seeming partnership processes
between Israelis and Palestinians largely intent on producing Palestinian
sustainability, though not quite for practicing shared sustainability. This has
largely been in the realm of wastewater recycling and reuse, and in terms of
technical experience-sharing for increasing the productivity of available water
resources. Any recognition of Israel’s disproportionate responsibility for causing
the deterioration of the Mountain Aquifer was neither articulated nor addressed,
failing to create asymmetric obligations on Israel for remedying the situation.
Further, Israel pushed for promoting (unsustainable and energy consumptive)
desalination as a solution to water stress and human needs in the region, with
Israeli water/peace practitioners providing technical advice for making this
possible. In these and other ways, Israeli transboundary water/peace
practitioners were constitutive of the Israeli state’s hydrohegemonic relational
prerogative with respect to the Palestinians. In this narrative, the Palestinian
subject was targeted for sustainability as a component of peacemaking. All the
while, Israeli practices were largely unproblematised, thereby also perpetuating
Israeli and Palestinian inequality.
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By the end of the Madrid/Oslo process, with the start of the second Palestinian
Intifada, the official track of water cooperation largely became technically-
defined. Israel and the Palestinians have since dealt with water-related permit
granting processes within the context of specific and strictly adhered-to
agreements (Personal interview, IW1 2010). These largely inequitable
agreements continue to define official hydropolitical relations between Israel
and the Palestinians. The Madrid/Oslo process, both formally and with respect
to officially-sanctioned processes of Israeli water/peace practitioners, has
constructed and discursively produced an Israeli hydrohegemony that is
perpetuated today. Such Israeli hydrohegemony is denounced by much of the
international community, including the World Bank (2009) and Amnesty
International (2009a). It is the focus of diverse academic and popular critique
(Zeitoun, 2009; Kramer, 2008; Frederiksen, 2007; El-Hindi, 2000; Elmusa,
1997). Israel has rejected such critique, on the grounds that it is both motivated
by an anti-Zionist intentionality (Personal interview, IW1 2010; Personal
interview, IG6 2010) and also unsupported by the facts, as officially perceived
by the state of Israel (Nagar, 8 June 2010; Personal interview, IW2 2010).
Thus far, this study has advanced the discursively-informed argument that
Israel is a hydrohegemonic state in its relations with the Palestinians. It also
maintains that Israel’s hydrohegemony has been constructed, (re-) produced,
circulated and narratively inscribed by Israeli water/peace practitioners engaged
in officially-sanctioned water-related processes of the Madrid/Oslo peace
process, as seen through an examination of the MWGWR. A fundamental,
related question remains to be explored within this study. Are Israeli academic
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and civil society practitioners, specifically those engaged in transboundary
practices of water/peace with Palestinians, also discursively contained by and
constitutive of Israel’s hydrohegemony? The next chapter focuses on answering
this very question.
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CHAPTER 6:
DISCURSIVE PRACTICES OF ISRAELI TRANSBOUNDARY WATER/PEACE
PRACTITIONERS – FOCUS ON ACADEMIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY
PROCESSES
Introduction
The argument crafted in this study thus far has been that Israeli water/peace
practitioners engaged in officially-sanctioned processes of the Madrid/Oslo
period have practiced, (re-) produced and perpetuated the dominant
hydrohegemonic discourse of the Israeli state. Noting discursive variants and
degrees, there has been no compelling evidence, as yet, of hydropolitical
peacebuilding among these practitioners, as defined by the terms of this study.
The current chapter extends the study, intent on further informing the analysis
of hydropolitics and peacebuilding in the Middle East. It identifies, examines
and analyses the practice of Israeli water/peace practitioners engaged in
academic and civil society processes, drawing on the methodology of
interpretive practice (Holstein and Gubrium, 2005). It critically narrates the
history of such processes from the early 1990s onwards. It provides thick
description of one seminal initiative, the Joint Management of Shared Aquifers
project, contrasting it to selected practices of the region’s three transboundary
water/peace-oriented organisations and their affiliated Israeli practitioners. It
also pursues a discursive analysis of their practices and ideations in terms of
hydrohegemony, hydropolitical peacebuilding and hydrohegemonic residues.
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This chapter is similarly theoretically anchored as the previous one. It assumes
that Israeli water/peace practitioners are not cultural dopes (Garfinkel, 1967 in
Holstein and Gubrium, 2005: 486). It is rooted in the belief that such
practitioners cannot be assumed to merely blindly engage in the (re-)
production of systems of power. These practitioners are held to be aware,
reflective and even intentional actors in the socio-political milieu that is the
Israel-Palestinian conflict. It is of course possible that Israeli academic and civil
society water/peace practitioners are engaged in hydrohegemonic practice, or
with hydrohegemonic residues. In making visible their discursive practices, this
study also recognises the possibility that some may be building peace through
water-related practice.
Analysis is informed by the four key concepts of hydropolitical relation and
relationship of this overall study: equality, partnership, equity, and shared
sustainability. This study is further informed by the elements comprising Israel’s
justificatory narrative. Finally, materials informing this chapter emanate from the
academic and professional literature, from extended observation in the field
over many years, and through interviewing with Israeli (and also Palestinian)
water/peace practitioners in June, July and October 2010.
The current chapter is of particular importance to this research project, which
was itself motivated by a desire to ascertain the peacebuilding significance of
Israeli, transboundary water/peace practices. Thus far, analysis supports the
circumscribed argument that Israeli, officially-sanctioned water/peace practices
are hydrohegemonically-oriented and inscribed. Before concluding, one
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analytical piece remains to be undertaken in this study. Thus, the current
chapter leverages the theoretical framework of hydropolitical peacebuilding to
assess the discursive practices of Israeli, academic and civil society
water/peace practitioners in the region.
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Academic and Civil Society Processes
The Madrid/Oslo peace processes ushered in an era of extensive Israeli-
Palestinian activity on transboundary water management and peace-related
matters. The previous chapter analysed the formal and officially-sanctioned
water/peace processes of the MWGWR. The current one introduces and
examines academic and civil society endeavours launched and pursued on
their heels. Initiating such efforts was the First Israeli-Palestinian International
Academic Conference on Water held in Zurich, Switzerland from 10-13
December 1992. In the twenty-year period since then, academic and civil
society efforts have multiplied, numbering in the hundreds.
Most individual water/peace practitioners in the region, and also those based
internationally but with a commitment to Middle East peace, have participated in
at least a handful of these initiatives during this period. Participation has
included practices of shared leadership, joint research and publishing, strategic
advising and advocacy, multilateral and multi-sectoral relationship-building and
the like. Such transboundary and relational practices have fundamentally
constituted the Israeli and Palestinian transboundary community of water/peace
practitioners identified and discussed in the previous chapter. Also, some of the
practitioners engaged in officially-sanctioned processes have pursued
academic and civil society practices.
Transboundary water/peace practice and community development has
fundamentally been enabled by the international community’s political and
financial support (Personal interview, IE3 2010; Personal interview, PW8 2010).
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Leading donors have included the EU, NATO, the World Bank, the Canadian
International Development Organisation (CIDA), the Swedish International
Development Organisation (SIDA), the British government’s Department for
International Development (DFID), the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and a host
of others. Donor organisations are generally listed throughout this chapter in
relation to the programmes and projects they support.
With hundreds of academic and civil society water/peace activities and
processes constituting the transboundary domain, it is impossible to list and say
something meaningful about them all103. Rather than attempt to do so, the
approach pursued herein has been intentionally selective. To begin with, the
Joint Management of Shared Aquifers initiative, one of the earliest
                                                 
103 The following is a partial list of relevant initiatives:
• Institutional Frameworks for the Management of Transboundary Water Resources (Kliot
and Shmueli, 1998)
• Middle East Environment Futures Project (MEEF) (Schoenfeld, 2005)
• A Future for the Dead Sea: Options for a More Sustainable Management (McCulloch, 2007)
• Sustainable Management of Available Water Resources with Innovative Technologies
(SMART) (SMART Website; Kramer, 2008)
• Peres Center for Peace: Culture of Water (COW Website) and Water for Peace in the
Middle East Research Project (Water for Peace Website; Kramer, 2008)
• Environmental Management and Planning as a Tool for Promoting Sustainable Coexistence
Between Israelis and Palestinians
• Optimisation for Sustainable Water Management (OPTIMA) (Kramer, 2008)
• University of Oklahoma: Middle East Water Working Groups (Hambright et al., 2006; Ginat
and Chumchal, 2006)
• Red Sea Dead Sea Conveyance Project (RSDSC) (Abitbol, 2009; Abitbol and Schoenfeld,
2009; Abitbol and Schoenfeld, February 2009; Lipchin et al., 2007; Abitbol, 2006; Lipchin,
2006; World Bank, 2005; Becker et al., 2004; Asmar, 2003; Bromberg et al., 2000; Katz et
al., 1998)
• GLOWA Jordan River Basin Project
• Kidron Valley/Wadi Nar International Master Plan Project
• Euro-Mediterranean Information System on Know-How in the Water Sector (EMWIS
Website)
• Global International Waters Assessment (GIWA Assessment, 2006)
Limitations of space prevent discussion of most of these initiatives, however valuable and
insightful they may be to the current study.
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transboundary academic and civil society projects, is examined. It reveals some
of the discursive strengths and limitations of academic and civil society
processes operating in affinity with, and in proximity to the dominant peace
process. Subsequently, a detailed discursive analysis is undertaken of Israeli
water/peace practices engaged in each of the region’s following three
transboundary organisations:
• Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI)
• Arava Institute for Environmental Studies (AIES)
• Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME)
Each of the organisations, projects and practices discussed in this chapter
offers an insightful perspective into the discursive environment of water/peace
as practiced by Israeli practitioners. This study allows for an appreciation of
relationships on the ground between Israeli and Palestinian water/peace
practitioners, contextualised and assessed against a wider conflict relation of
hydrohegemony.
Joint Management of Shared Aquifers
From the early-mid 1990s until the end of the decade, Israeli Professor Eran
Feitelson and Palestinian Professor Marwan Haddad undertook a project to
investigate the possibility and contours of a joint Israeli-Palestinian
management of shared aquifers. They premised their research on the need to
develop principles, frameworks and insights particular to the management of
groundwater. Most of the work on transboundary water resources had until then
focused on surface water. They believed there were particularities to
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groundwater that needed specific attention in the context of Israel-Palestinian
relations.
Much of the contested water between Israel and the Palestinians is found in the
Mountain Aquifer, an underground and transboundary water resource. It was
therefore critical to the peace process that greater clarity be brought to the
recharge, discharge and flow of such groundwaters. In an effort to do so, and in
the wake of the 1992 water conference, Feitelson and Haddad conducted joint
research, organised workshops and experience-sharing opportunities, and
jointly published their conclusions in academic and Non-Governmental
Organisation (NGO) literature. Their cooperative work made an important
contribution to the MWGWR as well.
Studying the Joint Management of Shared Aquifers project as a point of
departure to this chapter is valuable on multiple fronts, not least because it
reflects some of the leading political shortcomings of well-intentioned projects
and practitioners, as examined through the lens of hydropolitical peacebuilding.
This despite the continued praise that Feitelson and Haddad have received for
their cooperative work (Tal and Rabbo, 2010; Abitbol and Schoenfeld, 2009;
Schoenfeld et al., 2007; Feitelson and Haddad, 1998; Kliot and Shmueli, 1998).
Managed by the Israeli Professor Feitelson and the Palestinian Professor
Haddad, the project was structured as a Palestinian-Israeli research team.
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Members of the research team included Shaul Arlosoroff104, Taher
Nassereddin105 and Ali Wihaidi106. The project was conducted under the
auspices of the Palestine Consultancy Group and the Harry S. Truman
Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. Essentially, team members practiced an Israeli-Palestinian research
partnership and sought to promote a hydropolitical partnership between Israel
and the Palestinians107.
Through the Joint Management project, Feitelson and Haddad’s research team
argued that West Bank groundwater needed to be managed jointly,
cooperatively and in a coordinated manner by Israel and the Palestinians
(Feitelson and Haddad, 1995). This was premised on the hydrological fact that
the groundwater system of Israel and the Palestinians was a single functioning
unit that constantly traversed the Green Line. It was believed that doing so
would effectively ensure the protection of transboundary water resources, limit
and contain crises if and when they occurred, and promote an efficient use of
water resources among Israelis and Palestinians. Building a management
system atop a hydrological reality would thereby construct and produce a
hydropolitical nexus of technique and politics in the service of Israel-Palestinian
peace.
                                                 
104Formerly Deputy Water Commissioner of Israel and head of a committee responsible for
examining Israel’s national water policies.
105 Director of the West Bank Water Department (WBWD).
106 Director of the Gaza Water Department.
107 Project funding was forthcoming from the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) Canada and the Charles R. Bronfman (CRB) Foundation. Supplemental funding in
support of the initiative was provided through the Dialogue Fund of the Government of Canada
and the Jewish Community Foundation of Los Angeles.
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The proposals put forward by Feitelson and Haddad argued the merits of what
they called a stepwise, flexible-sequential approach (Feitelson and Haddad,
1998: 232). Essentially, they proposed building a joint, flexible and integrative
water management system in stages, moving from technical to political
orientations through time. Strategically-minded, such an approach would
ensure that relatively straightforward monitoring and other technical practices of
cooperation could provide the basis for high level, complex and sensitive
integration of water resources governance.
In conflict environments, threats to continued transboundary cooperation are
generally recognised to be real. Attempting to account for this, the Joint
Management initiative proposed a ‘technical’ approach as a point of departure.
Project team members believed doing so would provide a buffer to political
tension and conflict escalation (Feitelson and Haddad, 1998: 235). These
transboundary water/peace practitioners perceived themselves to play an active
role in cooperatively resisting regional tensions and political obstacles to Israeli-
Palestinian joint activities. They did this by being engaged over time in multi-
sectoral and multi-level contacts across borders, pursuing and practicing the
shared values of transboundary cooperation (Feitelson and Haddad, 1998:
235). Their work is thus situated in the functionalist (P. Haas, 1992; P. Haas,
1990; Mitrany, 1943) and neo-functionalist traditions (E. Haas, 1990).
Side-Stepping Equity
The Joint Management initiative focused on the centrality of building a
partnership between Israelis and Palestinians to ensure an ostensibly
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sustainable management of the shared Mountain Aquifer. In so doing, this
project specifically and intentionally recognised the importance of equity; and
then intentionally side-stepped it in practice. Feitelson and Haddad argued that
equity was very difficult to define, let alone programmatise and operationalise.
Thus, they concluded that equity could and should be tackled in another
context, by other people, at a later time (Feitelson and Haddad, 1998: 230).
They chose to give preference to a rather narrow framing of sustainability that
did not immediately address fundamental concerns of equity108. In so doing,
they downplayed the centrality of social and even economic dimensions of
sustainability in favour of narrowly environmental ones.
Failure to actively engage with the concept and concerns of equity, being one of
the fundamental pillars of hydropolitical peacebuilding, reflects a potent and
destructive hydrohegemonic residue in the practice of these Israeli
transboundary water/peace practitioners. It particularly privileges a technical
approach to the transboundary management of the Mountain Aquifer, as
discursively preferred by Israel, at the expense of the predominantly Palestinian
hydropolitical discourse seeking political change through relational
engagement. While it can be understood that privileging a technical approach
might be framed as a buffer to the uncertain politics in the region, doing so does
not engage with the difficult issue of equitable water management in a real and
timely way.
                                                 
108 On equity and sustainability, see the framework of Prugh and Assadourian, 2003, who
argue that ‘sustainability’ is comprised of a) human survival, b) biodiversity, c) equity, and d) life
quality, where the latter build on the former.
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The concept of equity has been central to the discourse of water management
for more than fifty years. Equitable and reasonable utilisation principles are
contained in the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Water on International
Rivers, the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Use of
International Watercourses and then in the 2004 Berlin Rules. In the
contemporary Middle Eastern context, the Joint Management project is one
among many initiative to have side-stepped such equitable concerns. Such
failure to engage with issues of relational equity between Israel and the
Palestinians into the latter-1990s is appreciable as one of the discursive causes
for the demise of the Madrid/Oslo process. As part of a wider relational order of
Israeli-dominated hegemony, the failure to incorporate mutually-acceptable
notions of equity into hydropolitical practice may also be appreciated as a
contributing factor to the second Palestinian Intifada.
This important cooperative endeavour provides a cautionary tale. It tells of the
well-intentioned efforts of several Israeli and Palestinian practitioners and
organisations, intent on contributing to the dominant peace process and a more
generalised peaceful outcome for Israelis and Palestinians. Its telling reveals
how such a joint initiative could (re-) produce and perpetuate highly contested
dominant relational formations. In this case, technical practice was prioritised
over political practice. In so doing, equity was side-stepped as a priority and
practice of the Israeli-Palestinian partnership.
In these (and perhaps other) ways, the Joint Management initiative (re-)
produced a dominant Israeli discourse of hydrohegemony, thereby perpetuating
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the asymmetric Israel-Palestinian conflict hydropolitically. Indeed, academic
and civil society practices have been shown to also contain the possibility of
(re-) producing and perpetuating violent relational formations. Bearing such
insight in mind, the next few passages introduce three of the region’s
transboundary organisations engaged in practices at the nexus of water and
peace. Subsequently, analysis will be undertaken of the discursive practices of
their Israeli, transboundary water/peace practitioners.
Transboundary Civil Society Organisations
There are three leading, independent regional organisations engaged in
creating opportunities and structuring transboundary water/peace practice
among Israeli and Palestinian academic and civil society practitioners in the
Middle East. They are IPCRI, the AIES and FOEME. While their efforts differ in
notable respects, together they have supported and produced discursive
practices that have galvanised the water/peace engagement of many
thousands of people in the Middle East, regionally, and internationally109.
These are not the only civil society organisations actively intervening in the
transboundary water/peace domain and building the community of water/peace
practitioners. Other organisations whose members were interviewed and whose
activities were examined in the context of this study include the Palestinian
Hydrology Group (PHG), the House of Water and Environment (HWE), the
Center for Environmental Diplomacy (CED) and the Van Leer Jerusalem
Institute. A number of other organisations that support and/or engage in
                                                 
109 For FOEME in particular, this work is overtly framed as a practice of environmental
peacebuilding. See Harari and Roseman, 2008 on the work of FOEME and others.
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transboundary hydropolitical practices include the Applied Research Institute of
Jerusalem (ARIJ, in the West Bank) and EcoConsult (in Jordan).
It would be impossible to say something about all of these organisations, hence
the focus on IPCRI, the AIES and FOEME. These organisations have a clear
mandate to cultivate and pursue transboundary water/peace practice.
Leadership within these organisations is to varying degrees transboundary. All
pursue activities that bring together Israelis, Palestinians, as well as Jordanians
and internationals. The following three sections of this study describe each of
the three organisations and then analyse some of their practitioner water/peace
practices, all within the larger framework of hydrohegemony, hydropolitical
peacebuilding and hydrohegemonic residues. Subsequently, a comparative
analysis of the hydropolitical peacebuilding and hydrohegemonic residues of
these practitioners is undertaken.
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Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI)
Perhaps the earliest of the transboundary organisations to emerge in the Israel-
Palestinian conflict milieu, IPCRI has played a leading role in enabling
transboundary water cooperation efforts in support of regional peacebuilding
and peacemaking. Since 1988, they have done this through project
development, publishing, conference hosting, network development, advocacy
and international relationship-building and fundraising with donors (See Brauch,
2007: 128-130).
IPCRI is referred to as a transboundary organisation for two principal reasons.
Its management structure is such that there are two co-directors, one Israeli
and one Palestinian. During the period covered by the current research project,
their co-directors were the Israeli Gershon Baskin and the Palestinian Hanna
Siniora110. Both are outspoken supporters of a two-state solution premised on,
and enabling extensive relations between Israelis and Palestinians. Working
towards this objective, they and their staff have advocated in favour of a
transboundary framing of conceptual and practical solutions to the final status
issues, including water governance.
IPCRI’s staff has always been skeletal but politically engaged. Organisational
practice has been to generate important opportunities for Israeli, Palestinian,
even Jordanian and international conflict actors and practitioners to work
together and engage with one another on key issues in discursively-laden
environments. The intent has been to meaningfully tackle difficult matters with
                                                 
110 In 2012, Dan Goldenblatt replaced Gershon Baskin as the Israeli Director of IPCRI.
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political relevance, whether on the environment or otherwise. The
organisation’s strengths and limitations reside in the fact of it being an enabling
and lobbying organisation, building transboundary community, sustaining
cooperative academic and civil society momentum, while advocating selectively
for relational transformation. It is also an organisation that has demonstrated its
sometimes controversial willingness to encourage conflict parties and actors to
make strategic and pragmatic compromises together in the interest of
peacebuilding and peacemaking.
The following discussion focuses primarily on IPCRI’s environmentally-focused
and water/peace-related programming and practices, under the headings of
public dialogue and political lobbying. In so doing, it specifically privileges
IPCRI’s Israeli water/peace practitioner discourse for analysis.
Public Dialogue
The public dialogue component of IPCRI’s work primarily involves enabling
public, cooperative, peace-related processes. Such activities include
conference hosting, environmental mediation, process facilitation and the like.
Such processes have specifically been designed and facilitated to expose
Israeli water/peace practitioners to Palestinian experiences and political
interests. They also seek to promote relationship-building between similarly-
intentioned Palestinians and Israelis, with a long view of history and
peacebuilding. Their efforts are underpinned by the idea that resolution to the
Israel-Palestinian conflict will likely be based on techno-political problem-
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solving, rooted in creative compromise, at the nexus of technical and political
discourses favoured by Israel and the Palestinians respectively.
In two significant hydropolitical public dialogue efforts, IPCRI hosted first the
1994, Our Shared Environment conference and then the October 2004, 2nd
Israeli-Palestinian-International water and peace conference entitled, Water for
Life in the Middle East. Out of the 1994 conference, a Middle Eastern
Environment Caucus emerged, composed of Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians
and internationals. The Caucus has since sought to build initiatives and develop
solutions on a wide range of ecopolitical and hydropolitical issues111.
The second of these key events, the 2004 Water for Life in the Middle East
Conference hosted by IPCRI in Antalya, Turkey gathered some 120
water/peace practitioners from the Middle East and internationally over five
days112. The broad goal of the conference was defined as (Shuval and Dweik,
2006: 7):
the promotion of fruitful dialog (sic), exchange of ideas, the development
of mutual understanding and the desire to prepare the ground work (sic)
for a better appreciation of shared problems and the development of
approaches to resolving the water problems in the region.
                                                 
111 These include: Environmental technologies for cooperative sustainable development; Water
supply, distribution and quality; Solid waste management (in particular the problem posed by
the disposal of hazardous waste); Private sector’s role in preserving the environment; Energy
issues; Air pollution; Developments in recycling; Preservation of open space; Long term future
of biodiversity; Confronting desertification; Climate change and drought; The future of the Dead
Sea and the proposed Red Sea/Dead Sea Conduit; and Coastal management.
112 This conference was sponsored and/or funded by several international organisations. These
included USAID, UNESCO, the British Government, the International Water Resources
Association (IWRA), the Heinrich Boell Foundation (Tel Aviv/Ramallah), and the Deutsche
Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).
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The conference remains a key moment in the development of the
transboundary water domain and water/peace community, notably as it took
place during the escalated conflict period of the second Palestinian Intifada. Of
note, many of the participants in the current doctoral research project
participated in this conference and related follow-up activities. The practices
pursued by IPCRI at this conference were on the whole balanced between
facilitating transboundary cooperation, techno-political experience-sharing and
catalysing political engagement. Since 2004, IPCRI has continued to host
dialogically-based events, pursuing projects on environment and more
specifically water/peace issues.
Design and Facilitation
A fundamental point of departure to IPCRI’s public dialogue (and other) work is
an acknowledgement of the asymmetric Israel-Palestinian conflictual relation.
Thus, in designing and implementing its public dialogue processes, IPCRI’s
practitioners have actively sought to counter-balance the asymmetric
relationship shared by Israelis and Palestinians in situ. Israeli practitioner
engagement through IPCRI is discursively situated to promote and practice the
relational equality of Israelis and Palestinians.
In terms of dialogue process design, the hosting location of events is a means
of enabling and practicing Israeli-Palestinian equality and partnership. In 1994,
IPCRI deemed it important to host the Our Shared Environment conference in
Jerusalem. This was a practice of recognising the legitimacy and equality of
Palestinian concerns over the future of Jerusalem as constitutive of both
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Palestine and Israel, after decades of being ignored, vilified and marginalised
by Israel and Israelis. Alternatively, IPCRI hosted its 2004 conference ex-
territorially in Antalya, Turkey in an effort to favour open, critical and creative
discursive practice among participants by bringing them outside the direct
asymmetric conflict environment. In other words, while the occupation persists,
IPCRI’s approach has been to favour its containment, to the extent possible, by
hosting an important relational event outside the immediate sub-region.
In terms of implementation, facilitation has been a location, an instrument and a
practice for pursuing and practicing relational equality. This is explained by an
Israeli IPCRI facilitator of water/peace processes (Personal interview, IX1
2010):
When I facilitated meetings… between Israelis and Palestinians, I leaned
towards the Palestinians. I made sure that if they did not speak – and
sometimes they did not [as] the Israelis would go on and on and they
would not say anything – that they spoke, that they felt themselves to be
equal. And that is very important, I think. You can mitigate, but you
cannot abolish the fact that Israel is the richest and most powerful
country in the region. But you can mitigate it.
These examples and practices of process design and facilitation reveal a
similar intentionality as the pro-active facilitation adopted by leaders at the
celebrated Israeli/Jewish and Israeli/Arab/Palestinian community of Neve
Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam (NS/WAS) within Israel. Practice at NS/WAS is
situated to strengthen the Palestinians individually and collectively in their
encounters with Israel and Israelis (Halabi et al., 2000: 67). Shifting this
relational balance also creates the space for key issues and concerns of the
different conflict parties and actors to be raised, framed and addressed
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meaningfully (Halabi and Sonnenschein, 2000; Nadler, 2000: 25). This is
recognisable as a discursive practice of equality, partnership and equity at
NS/WAS, and likewise, of hydropolitical peacebuilding in IPCRI’s case.
Political Lobbying
IPCRI’s political lobbying work largely involves relationship-building and
targeted advocacy in multilateral, government and civil society circles. Such
political lobbying is technically-informed and politically-targeted, adapted to the
context in which it is pursued, also frequently engaging with the region’s water
and national political authorities. IPCRI does so while drawing on, and in the
context of, public dialogue processes and strategies described above.
IPCRI’s political and diplomatic efforts are vast. It has lobbied the Israeli
government to recognise the need for, and pursue consultation with the
Palestinians on all Israeli water development planning and use. This refers not
just to that which takes place geographically within the occupied West Bank,
but wherever and however the Mountain Aquifer is implicated, including Israel
‘proper’. IPCRI has advocated for the JWC to be transformed such that a
neutral third party (e.g. from the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP)) would participate in the institution directly. More fundamentally, it has
advocated for a restructured JWC to be involved in policy-making, which is
currently not the case. On the other side of the political balance, IPCRI has
encouraged the PA and PWA to implement water developments for which the
Palestinians have received permits through the JWC (as well as international
322
funding), instead of placing all the blame for its water woes on Israel (Personal
interview, IX1 2010; Personal interview, IF2 2010).
In a more civil society orientation, IPCRI’s political presence in the context of
water/peace related projects is almost always tangible. It is one of the few
organisations that actively seeks to put hydropolitical issues to the fore of all
water-related discussions, while also encouraging Israelis to engage
constructively with such historically-informed critical perspectives. This has
been the case in the context of IPCRI’s involvement in the GLOWA Jordan
River initiative.
Hydropolitics at GLOWA JR
Funded by the German government113, the GLOWA JR initiative (2001-2011)
was built on the assumption that climate change would impact Israel, Jordan
and the Palestinians, if not equally (given environmental and socio-political
factors) then to a large extent concurrently. Both in the Middle East and
internationally, much concern has been expressed about the possibility that
climate change might contribute to heightening stress, notably in the water
domain, among actors already in unstable relations. It is assumed that
collective initiatives could provide scientific and socio-political insights on how
best to craft effective responses to the impending uncertainty in such
environments. Thus, GLOWA JR has been motivated by a desire to construct
scientific knowledge on climate change that is regionally-specific, rooted in
                                                 
113 Germany is a major player in Jordanian water governance.
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cooperative practices among a broad range of knowledge-based water/peace
practitioners (Personal interview, IX3 2010).
In practice, knowledge-based cooperation pursued through this project was
primarily structured in the form of national teams, with each of the Israeli,
Jordanian and Palestinian teams working almost entirely on their own.
Conferences of project parties (COPs), every few years on average, presented
opportunities for scientists and experts from the basin to meet, share results,
and informally deliberate the scientific and political implications of their efforts.
Epistemologically, GLOWA JR saw the construction of different scenarios,
including one that studied the implications of climate change and how best to
respond given “regional peace”. A WEAP tool, a form of dynamic, shared
regional database (with transparent Israeli participation; Personal interview, IG6
2010) was used in conjunction with storying methodologies that projected the
unfolding of different scenarios (Hoff et al., 2011). In more overt ‘political’ terms,
the initiative refrained from intentionally advancing an agenda of building peace
through scientific cooperation, though an underlying desire and hope for peace
has been integrated into the work.
Anchored in technical research and scenario building, GLOWA JR did not
create an intentional forum for political discussion, framing and imagining with
reference to the development of joint responses to climate change and water
management. Such issues were sometimes mentioned in Steering Committee
meetings, but quickly shut down by the majority of participants (personal
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interview, PW7 2010; personal interview, PW8 2010). The donor, conveners
and most Israeli and Jordanian participants accepted the sanctioned premise
that GLOWA JR was advancing shared technical work but that political
deliberation and decision-making would remain in the hands of national
governments (Personal interview, IG6 2010). The Palestinians present were
disciplined in following along with this premise but did not readily accept it
(Personal interview, PW3 2010; Personal interview, PW7 2010; Personal
interview, PW8 2010).
In the context of GLOWA JR, IPCRI’s representative on the ground
endeavoured through multiple strategies to infuse this project’s technically-
dominated approach with specifically hydropolitical discourse. The
representative circulated a working paper arguing the merits of addressing
relational water management issues and not just techno-scientific ones. This
Israeli water/peace practitioner attempted to raise this issue, similarly intended,
during the Steering Committee meetings. This practitioner supported a small
contingent of other like-minded, hydropolitically-oriented Israeli, Palestinian and
international water/peace practitioners to do so114. Their efforts were largely for
naught hydropolitically, if assessed by immediate, project-specific outcome.
Nonetheless, the IPCRI practitioner was among a small number of Israeli
participants to pursue a critical discourse that placed the Israel-Palestinian
conflict front and centre of water/peace deliberations among Israelis,
                                                 
114 For example, this emerged in the form of a poster presentation and conversation entitled
‘Transboundary Water Development as a Practice of Peace: Shared, Cooperative, Equitable?’
(See Appendix 1 for a copy of the poster used at the session). These activities made evident
that the political dimensions of sustainability were kept at a minimum, if present at all.
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Palestinians, Jordanians and internationals. This practitioner resisted the
disciplinary power of the project’s sanctioned techno-scientific discourse. In
narrative terms, they sought to construct a discourse of Israeli-Palestinian
political cooperation, beyond that of contemporary Palestinian threat to Israel.
That they were shut down on multiple occasions is secondary to the discursive
intent, ideations and practices of hydropolitical peacebuilding they pursued.
What happened in the context of GLOWA JR reflects a wider practice pursued
by IPCRI within the broader Israel-Palestinian relational context.
Analytic Reflection
Overall, IPCRI has strategised and implemented its practices and interventions
to enable academic and civil society, hydropolitically-intentioned cooperative
processes. It has lobbied Israeli (and to a lesser degree Palestinian)
governments and civil society actors, intent on cultivating a real partnership
among (progressively greater) equals. Its objectives also include the promotion
of equity and shared sustainability among the parties, pursuing legislative
change in Israel and political flexibility in the PA. Underpinning IPCRI’s
approach is the discursive practice of advocating for Israel to “give the
Palestinians a fair deal” (Personal interview, IX1 2010) while creating dialogical
opportunities for greater meaningful and political understanding about what that
might mean for all parties involved. In these many ways, Israeli water/peace
practitioners at IPCRI are engaged in hydropolitical peacebuilding.
Yet, IPCRI’s work and practice has not been without controversy, on both sides
of the political fence, reflecting both a strategic and pragmatic approach.
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Overall, IPCRI encourages and supports nearly all shade of hydropolitical
cooperative practice between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israelis
and Palestinians. For instance, IPCRI strongly supported the joint and official
2001 Israel-Palestinian statement for keeping water and water-related
infrastructure out of the cycle of conflict during the second Palestinian Intifada.
Rather than being an uncritical position that likely veils the effects of Israeli
power and continued occupation (as suggested by Zeitoun, 2009: 88), this may
be understood as a principled and strategic position. It is appreciable as one
rooted in the belief that strategic, humane, economically-sound and
environmentally-responsible cooperative practices among the parties likely
contribute to building confidence and a shared responsibility for the future.
In another select case, IPCRI’s water and environment practice has
encouraged Palestinians and Israelis to cooperate on wastewater management
issues, even where this might involve highly-selective, creative, indirect
Palestinian cooperation with Israeli settlements. IPCRI has specifically and
exceptionally called for this where highly detrimental impacts are being seen on
the environment and on human health. For these Israeli water/peace
practitioners, the environment and both Israeli and Palestinian human health
are assumed to be on equal footing with Palestinian political principles of self-
determination. This work reveals a discursive practice of promoting shared
environmental sustainability, while promoting partnership on issues that include
wastewater management, solid waste management, toxic waste disposal,
urban zoning and planning, and the like.
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Arguably, such IPCRI practices violate the basic Palestinian principle of not
legitimating Israeli settlements or other institutions constitutive of the Israeli
occupation. It also appears to betray the more hydrohegemonically-oriented
Israeli water/peace practitioner inclination and practice of seeking to support the
construction of Palestine to resemble itself/Israel, in this case environmentally,
through cooperative practice (Personal interview, IF2 2010). They also reflect a
technical orientation of building Palestinian well-being in conjunction with the
political practice of promoting a relational equity and equality to benefit the
Palestinians. Thus and arguably, these practices reflect a hydrohegemonically
residual practice of water/peace.
The last point informing this analytic reflection is IPCRI’s commitment to
countering growing Israeli unilateralism, both of the state itself and of Israeli
transboundary water/peace practitioners. The very essence of its efforts, as
explained by one Israeli practitioner at IPCRI, is as follows (Personal interview,
IX1 2010):
If there is no activity of the kind of FOEME, IPCRI, and the other
organisations which do this kind of thing, you could have a situation in
five years when nobody knows anybody. And that was the situation up
until 1990. When the people started talking in 1990, when the Israelis
finally gave in to the pressure of the first Intifada, we had a meeting in
1993 or 1994, in Tantur. We pulled together environmentalists, and we
had a speech by an Israeli about water and a speech by a Palestinian.
And all the way along, they did not know one another. They had not set
eyes on one another... You see, as we are going backwards [today], as
people cannot meet anymore, as the logistic problems are growing,
people are losing contact. And one of the things we have to do, is to
maintain the contacts at a professional level, so that when things
improve, there is something to build on. This is a very defensive way of
thinking about it. I think this is what needs to be done…We do it because
we believe that in the end, the people have to know one another, know
their concerns, know how many children they have, know that there are
human beings on the other side.
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IPCRI is working to prevent the Israeli abandonment of the transboundary
project, because this would likely result in Israel’s continued dominance over
the subjugated Palestinians. Continued cooperative practice challenges the
constructed subjectivity of Palestinian threat. It favours relationship-building and
confidence-building, with likely engaged possibilities for reflexive, internally-
practiced change and transformation. It also creates the opportunity for Israelis
to engage critically and alternatively in hydropolitical peacebuilding through
their relationships with Palestinians, in spite of and in opposition to Israel’s
hydrohegemony. Echoing these sentiments, a Palestinian water/peace
practitioner and leader of the anti-normalisation movement in the West Bank
uncategorically welcomed the continued Israeli academic and civil society
interest in, support and joint practices of joint water/peace, interpreting them as
socio-politically meaningful (Personal interview, PW8 2010).
Analysing Israeli discursive practices associated with IPCRI, it can be said that
they constitute hydropolitical peacebuilding, with some hydrohegemonic
residue. Such practitioners have played a leadership role in cultivating a
transboundary community of water/peace practitioners through partnership
practices that endeavour to construct structural and relational equality between
Israelis and Palestinians. They have pursued a hydropolitical, as compared to a
strictly techno-scientific discourse in addressing water/peace issues of Israelis
and Palestinians, with equitable intent. Such water/peace practice reflects
unwavering commitment to continued cooperation between Israel and the
Palestinians, and between Israeli and Palestinian water/peace practitioners. In
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some very particular cases, this appears to reflect support for the dominant
hydrohegemonic discourse of Israel, if seemingly unintentionally.
On the whole, this study maintains that IPCRI and its Israeli water/peace
practices are not actively pursuing the perpetuation of Israel’s dominance over
the Palestinians. However, the programmatic, politically-charged actions and
risks taken may enable such a discourse in practice, if and until final status
talks are indeed completed. Thus and in conclusion, IPCRI’s Israeli
water/peace practitioner discourse is largely understood as hydropolitical
peacebuilding with hydrohegemonic residue.
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Arava Institute for Environment Studies (AIES)
The second of the transboundary organisations to be examined in this study is
the AIES. The organisation’s leadership structure is predominantly Israeli (and
Jewish). However, a few Israeli Arabs/Palestinians play key leadership roles as
well, notably at AIES research centres and at programme level. With respect to
research initiatives, Israelis and Palestinians often share leadership roles and
responsibilities as equals.
As a transboundary organisation, the AIES115 has brought together Israelis,
Palestinians, Jordanians and internationals in the fields of environment, water,
sustainability and peace since its inception in 1996. Modestly at first, the AIES
has developed and pursued diverse programmes, projects, methodologies,
tools and activities in an expanded capacity since 2000. These are
predominantly focused on research, education, training, experience-sharing
and networking undertaken through multiple AIES programme areas and
research and action centres116.
Of particular interest, the AIES has pursued transboundary and cooperative
water development and water/peace efforts among experts and practitioners,
including transboundary community development at the nexus of environment,
water and peacebuilding (Zohar, Schoenfeld and Alleson, 2010; Alleson and
Schoenfeld, 2007). It has also maintained a Peace-building and Environmental
Leadership Seminar (PELS) for undergraduate and graduate students in
                                                 
115 The AIES is often referred to as the Arava Institute.
116 AIES centres are as follows: Center for Sustainable Agriculture, Center for Renewable
Energy and Energy Conservation, Center for Transboundary Water Management, Long-Term
Socio-Ecological Research, Arava Center for Sustainable Development, Dead Sea and Arava
Science Center (AIES Research 1 Website).
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residence at the AIES, intentionally building an intergenerational transboundary
community of environment, water and peacebuilding practitioners.
Thus, the gist of the current study of the AIES’s work and of the discursive
practices of its Israeli water/peace practitioners focuses on two things. It
examines cooperative water development practice, as pursued through the
AIES. It also analyses community development processes and practices of the
transboundary water/peace community itself. In both these areas, a discursive
analysis is conducted of Israeli water/peace practices, against a guiding
framework of hydrohegemony, hydropolitical peacebuilding and
hydrohegemonic residues.
Cooperative Water Development Practice
In the water domain, the AIES has been involved in many initiatives over the
last fifteen years or so117. Many of these have either had a significant research
                                                 
117 A partial list of these projects is provided as follows (adapted from the AIES Research 2
Website and expanded):
• Hebron/Besor and Nablus/Alexander Streams Project: The first-ever Israeli-Palestinian
monitoring project of pollution sources in transboundary streams in the region. Over three
years, it has been funded by the USAID Middle East Research and Cooperation Program
(MERC);
• Red Sea Dead Sea Conveyance Project (RSDSC): A study on social and ecological
impacts of the proposed Red Sea Dead Sea water conveyance system, on behalf of the
World Bank;
• GLOWA Jordan River (GLOWA JR): An interdisciplinary, international research project
providing scientific support for sustainable water management in the Jordan River with
reference to climate-related uncertainties;
• Middle East Environment Futures Project (MEEF): A global network of eco-political and
peace-oriented practitioners based at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International
Studies (from about 2002), engaged in Middle East environment/water/peace research and
practice (See Schoenfeld, 2005); and
• A Future for the Dead Sea – Options for a More Sustainable Management: In the period
2003 to 2006, a consortium that included ARC Systems Research (Austria), the University
of Newcastle (UK), the AEIS (Israel), the Applied Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ - Palestine)
and EcoConsult (Jordan) secured major European Union funding to study and then
advance a vision of water-wise management for the Dead Sea Basin (See McCulloch,
2007: 2079).
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focus or have been defined by one. They have frequently included both a
training component and a dialogical one. Limited space prevents an elaborate
treatment of the AIES’ many initiatives. Thus, a concise and telling discursive
analysis is undertaken of Israeli water/peace practitioner engagements with
specific respect to the Institute’s Hebron/Besor and Nablus/Alexander Streams
Project.
The Hebron/Besor and Nablus/Alexander Streams Project
In the Israel-Palestinian region, there are some 16 recognised transboundary
streams. Many of these transboundary waterways have become conduits of
raw or poorly treated sewage. This is highly problematic given their flow over
precious Mountain Aquifer groundwater resources threatened with pollution. In
many cases, environmental deterioration is acute in areas of immense cultural,
religious or historic value. Precious fertile land areas are left uncultivated.
Stream deterioration often causes damage downstream, to people, economies,
landscapes and public health.
Addressing the causes and implications of transboundary streams is generally
complicated enough, given the necessity of tackling wastewater treatment,
surface water rehabilitation, groundwater pollution prevention, and end-user
preferences (including residents, farmers, tourism sector actors, and others).
This is rendered yet more difficult in the Middle East due to the political conflict,
where the conflict parties and actors generally harbour little trust for one
                                                                                                                                                
The most recent projects in which the AIES is involved include (AIES Research 2 Website):
• Small Scale Solar Desalination: Technology and Training for Gaza;
• Jordan River & Dead Sea Forum; and
• Med-Dead Conduit feasibility assessment.
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another. Within such a context, a growing number of cooperative projects has
emerged over the last decade intent on researching, analysing and restoring
transboundary streams118.
The Hebron/Besor and Nablus/Alexander Streams Project of the AIES and
partners is one such cooperative transboundary initiative. From a hydrological
perspective, the Hebron/Besor and the Nablus/Alexander streams flow across
both Palestinian and Israeli territories (with the Hebron/Besor rising in the West
Bank, flowing through Israel and then into the Gaza Strip). The Streams Project
has monitored the water quality of these streams and identified specific
pollution sites, intent on informing the development of joint strategies for their
restoration.
In the Streams Project, a team of Israeli and Palestinian researcher-
practitioners planned and implemented the studies. Project partners were the
AIES, the Palestinian Water & Environmental Development Organisation
(WEDO), the HWE, and research centres at Ben-Gurion University of the
Negev and Tel Aviv University, both in Israel. At every stage, this
transboundary project saw the shared and equal practice of Israelis and
                                                 
118 A partial list of such initiatives include:
• Pro-Aquifer Project: 2006-2008 (Freimuth et al., 2008; Personal interview, IF3 2010;
Personal interview, IF4 2010; Personal interview, PF1 2010; Personal interview, PF2 2010);
• CollectiveWater – From Conflict to Collective Action: Institutional Change and Management
Options to Govern Transboundary Watercourses: 2007-2009 (Dombrowsky and Feitelson,
2008; CWW Website);
• Understanding and Analysing the Current Israeli Wastewater Practices for Transboundary
Wastewater Management from Palestinian Communities: 2010-2011 (Personal interview,
PW2 2010); and
• Kidron Valley/Wadi Nar International Master Plan Project (Laster, 2010a; Laster, 2010b;
Personal interview, IX2 2010). Of note, Zeitoun (2009: 114-115) is highly critical of the
Israeli practice of Master Planning, as a form of ideational power that favours asymmetry
and hydrohegemony.
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Palestinians in partnership with one another. They jointly planned and
conducted research. Small teams of Israeli and Palestinian students undertook
fieldwork together. Analysis was a joint exercise as was the sharing and
dissemination of results with participants, implicated communities, governments
and supportive international organisations (Personal interview, IE4 2010).
In these many respects, participants framed project practices as “meaningful
environmental cooperation” (Tal et al., undated: 1). Rather than perceiving their
project as exceptional or isolated, participants imagined their efforts to be
constitutive of wider socio-political processes seeing the political parties and
socio-political actors of the Israel-Palestinian conflict “muddle towards ultimate
reconciliation.” (Tal et al., undated: 1) As compared to one-off or isolated
encounters between Israelis and Palestinians (as per many people-to-people
projects or even problem-solving workshops), initiatives like the Streams
Project provide the basis for sustained relational negotiation and relationship-
building between participants over multiple years, heightening their
“acquaintance potential” (as per insights from the revised contact hypothesis;
see Nadler 2000: 23-26). Further, given that such projects are themselves
constitutive of a larger body of technical, social and political practices, they
contribute to building momentum in terms of cooperative approaches to overall
water management. Finally, they fundamentally contribute to the development
of a domain-specific transboundary community of Israeli and Palestinian
water/peace practitioners.
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The project’s final report concludes with a stated desire to move from Israeli
pragmatic approaches of river management to the development and
implementation of a joint and “effective, long-term, hydrological strategy.” (Tal
et al., undated: 30) It concludes with the stated conviction that “the cooperation
that a joint restoration strategy requires can also engender unanticipated
benefits in terms of confidence building and reduction of tensions.” (Tal et al.,
undated: 34) For this project’s work on municipal level cooperation on stream
restoration, it was awarded the international Riverprize (sic) in Brisbane,
Australia119.
Project participants recognise and expressly indicate the importance of
international funder support and involvement, notably of USAID/MERC.
Specifically, they state that “international assistance is essential for evening the
playing field between Israeli and Palestinian water managers.” (Tal et al.,
undated: 35) In doing so, project participants reveal their concern for the power
asymmetry between them, along the Israeli/Palestinian axis. While there are
many ways to accommodate for such asymmetry, the parties leveraged the
power of their international donor to shift the relational balance. This reflects a
practice of partnership rooted in the intentional pursuit of relational equality
between Israelis and Palestinians. This is also reflected ontologically in the
project’s premises, including the desire to promote stream restoration, to
improve the health and quality of life of both Palestinians and Israelis, and to
encourage partnerships in pursuit of environmentally-based cooperation.
                                                 
119 The Riverprize is recognised to be among the most prestigious environmental awards given
anywhere in the world. See Riverprize Website.
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A dominant, Israeli hydrohegemonic justificatory narrative point identified in this
study differentiated Israelis and Palestinians in terms of their environmental
responsibility and sustainability. The Streams Project critically challenges such
a narrative in practice, explicitly denouncing as unsustainable both Israeli and
Palestinian water-related practices through water quality analysis at multiple
points on either side of the Green Line. The study reveals that both Israeli and
Palestinian communities, via their municipal, agricultural and industrial
activities, are responsible for the significant deterioration of the
Nablus/Alexander and the Hebron/Besor streams. Both communities have
dumped raw or inadequately treated effluent, as well as their agricultural and
industrial wastewaters, into the streams120. This both challenges the Israeli
narrative of environmental responsibility as compared to Palestinian
irresponsibility, while also constructing and practicing a shared Israeli and
Palestinian discourse of sustainability.
One Israeli water/peace practitioner who participated in this initiative, explained
their quadruple motivation for engagement in such transboundary water/peace
practice (Personal interview, IE4 2010):
                                                 
120 For example, the Palestinian and Israeli communities of Hebron and Kiryat Arba have
contributed effluent and raw sewage to the Hebron/Besor watershed during the study period
(Tal et al., undated: 11). Also, the Israeli communities of Beer Sheva, Ofakim, Rahat and Meitar
have all dumped inadequately treated sewage into the tributary Beer Sheva Stream during this
time. Regarding the Nablus/Alexander watershed, raw sewage and industrial effluents flowed
from Palestinian communities in the West Bank into the Nablus Stream tributary during the
study period (Tal et al., undated: 18). While much of this is treated on the Israeli side of the
Green Line at the Yad Hanna wastewater treatment facility, the downstream Israeli city of
Netanya then dumps sewage effluent into the watershed before it discharges into the
Mediterranean (Tal et al., undated: 6). Indeed, “the study confirms that some 60% of the
nonpoint source discharges in the Zomar/Alexander watershed are actually on the Western-
side of the green line (sic) and can be associated with Israeli runoff.” (Tal et al., undated: 32)
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1. Addressing an environmental issue
2. Meeting and working with Palestinians
3. Building shared memories
4. Being part of a growing constituency for peace
As a critical point of departure, they specifically recognise the responsibility of
both Israel and the Palestinians for continued environmental damage that
affects both peoples. They appreciate that working in a transboundary capacity
is an effective way of addressing these transboundary environmental issues.
They recognise the value of building shared memories and narratives grounded
in sustainable water/peace practice. Finally and overall, working in this capacity
is specifically understood as a practice of ‘peace’ that contributes to building a
peace constituency engaged in alternative relational practices to
hydrohegemony.
On this last point, peace constituencies are sometimes understood as counter-
hegemonic forces in conflict environments. They are recognised as actively
transforming violent discourses through their engagements where they
(adapted from Mouly, 2008):
• Build and diversify support for peace with the other;
• Establish common norms around which to engage politically;
• Mobilise against oppression;
• Establish the bases for collective existence;
• Renegotiate relations across socio-political boundaries;
• Establish propositional platforms for peace;
• Construct alternative practices of relationship with the other;
• Diversify shared meanings and practices of relationship and ‘peace’ with
the other;
• Broaden participation and ownership of peace processes;
• Sustain peace processes over time;
• Develop transboundary collective identities; and
• Replace dominant and specifically violent discourses.
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The Streams Project and its Israeli water/peace practitioners are understood to
discursively engage in hydropolitical peacebuilding, as framed in this study (and
in the tradition of peace constituencies). They are practicing relational equality
in true partnership with their Palestinian colleagues at every level of work. They
are pursuing a discursive practice of shared sustainability, rooted in an
appreciation of the need for equitable benefits-sharing for Israeli and
Palestinian communities as effected by streams restoration. As Israeli project
participants clearly state, their efforts are situated within a wider asymmetric
Israel-Palestinian conflict that makes such cooperation challenging certainly,
and perhaps of limited direct and immediate impact on the dominant
peacemaking process (Personal interview, IE2 2010; Personal interview, IE3
2010; Personal interview, IE4 2010). Nonetheless, their discursive practices
may be understood as building alternatives to asymmetric conflict discourses.
Such discursive practices, as evident in the Streams Project, challenge the
dominant Israeli hydrohegemonic narrative of necessity. They specifically and
meaningfully contribute to the development of a shared Israeli-Palestinian
narrative (and identity formation). Rather than perpetuating separate narratives
intent on vilifying or marginalising the other, or further justifying the perpetuation
of asymmetric relational practice, the cultivation of a single shared narrative of
joint practice as undertaken by the Streams Project contributes to the
development of a critical and alternatives-building perspective on Israel-
Palestinian relations. They also desist from perpetuating hydrohegemonic
justificatory narrative elements at the nexus of continued Jewish victimisation
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and sustainability, given that Israelis (and also Palestinians) are recognised as
perpetrators of unsustainable environmental and violent relational practices.
Transboundary Water/Peace Community Development
Over many years, the AIES has engaged in transboundary water/peace
network development and community building, drawing together Israelis and
Palestinians, as well as Jordanians and internationals. Efforts of the AIES have
specifically been designed to create opportunities for existing and active
practitioners to share experience and where appropriate, develop and
implement projects together. The AIES also pursues an intergenerational
mandate, training younger people on environment, water and peacebuilding
issues, while cultivating a transboundary community of graduates at the
intersection of these fields.
Together, the existing practitioner and intergenerational foci reflect a
transboundary practice of the AIES that amounts to environmental, and more
specifically hydropolitical peacebuilding, though with an ever-present
threatening hydrohegemonic residue. As a point of departure to this analysis,
the next section describes and examines a set of AIES activities that promote
engaged transboundary relations among existing practitioners.
Existing Practitioners
In 2006 and 2007, the AIES leveraged resources of the NATO – Science for
Peace and Security Programme to host two water and cooperation workshops.
Bringing together a broad range of academic-practitioners in the field, as well
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as students from and working on regional water issues, these workshops
focused on water, governance and security in the Middle East. The first
conference was an Advanced Study Institute (ASI) on Integrated Water
Resources Management and Security in the Middle East (Schoenfeld et al.,
2007). The second was an Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on Water
Resources and Infrastructure in Areas of Conflict and Extreme Conditions
(Abitbol and Schoenfeld, 2009). Both the ASI and ARW were held in Israel.
Together, the ASI and ARW brought together about 100 people from across the
Middle East and internationally to reflexively share experience and examine
opportunities for building a shared, secure and sustainable transboundary water
regime, in consideration of the opportunities for peacebuilding and
peacemaking thereby generated. ASI and ARW activities included plenary
sessions, workshops, small group breakout activities, and large group
experience-sharing. Field trips were organised that included visits to the Dead
Sea and surrounding wadis and hills, as well as to scientific research centres in
the Eilat region. A published edited book emerged from each of the events,
compiling experience from among practitioners in the field of water governance
and Israel-Palestinian (and other conflict) relations (Lipchin et al., 2009; Lipchin
et al., 2007).
The discursive practice of Israeli transboundary water/peace practitioners
engaged in this AIES work may be situated at four principle levels. The first is in
terms of building, sustaining and expanding the network and community. The
second is appreciable in terms of the quality of relationships developed. The
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third is with respect to the significance of donors. The fourth is with respect to
the relational development of specific transformative ideas and practice of
water/peace. Each of these is examined and analysed below.
Building, Sustaining and Expanding the Community
The Israeli-Palestinian transboundary water/peace community of practice is
built, sustained and expanded through intentional encounters (e.g. ASI and
ARW), project development, ideational practice and funding. It is perceived by
Israeli practitioners as both immensely important and expanding. And it is
increasingly receiving recognition as people, practitioners, donors and even the
Israeli government come to invest their efforts and resources in the
community’s activities.
A core Israeli practitioner involved with the AIES working on transboundary
water/peace issues shares their perspective on the community (Personal
interview, IE2 2010):
[T]his is a network that other people are beginning to realise the value
[of] and this has allowed the network to broaden, because now, people
who want to work collaboratively, or people who think they want to work
collaboratively, are coming to me and saying: OK, you know people, you
have a relationship with these people. How do I get in? Assist me in
developing my own relationships. And so the network just keeps growing
and expanding. It is a lot of energy.
These efforts are premised on building ideational and practical partnerships
among Israeli and Palestinian practitioners, drawing together both experts and
up-and-coming practitioners. The partnerships are rooted in a cultivation of
equality among Israeli and Palestinian participants, both of experts and of the
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next generation of Israeli, Palestinian and other leaders. The work itself seeks
to promote shared Israeli-Palestinian visions of sustainability, while creating
spaces for discussions of partnership and equity, two factors of peacebuilding,
to be pursued. The points introduced here are further developed in the context
of the next sub-sections.
Cultivating the Quality of Relationships
For Israeli practitioners, participating in and establishing partnerships through
this community has also meant allowing themselves to be known and
transparent, in terms of their national identity, political opinions, and preferred
professional practices. In the context of the wider Israel-Palestinian conflict,
where conflict lines are frequently imposed hegemonically, explicitly and in
alienating fashion, to be public and transparent with the other in sustained
dialogue has been described in emancipatory terms by Israeli transboundary
water/peace practitioners. One practitioner interprets their own such
engagement as follows (Personal interview, IE2 2010):
[W]hen I interact with these people, I don’t in any way have to be
pretending to be somebody that I am not. I never have to deny that I am
an Israeli. I never have to deny that I am Jewish. My identity, my national
identity and my ethnic identity… never need to be disguised… That
lends itself to the integrity of the partnership. These people know who I
am. They know what I stand for. They might not agree with it. It is their
prerogative. But there is enough respect in the partnership that these are
issues… [that] do not come at the expense of us being able to work
together. In other words, the people I work with, I look at them, they are
equals in every way. And just as they are equals, this does not mean
that I need to agree with everything that they say. Actually, that is a test
to how strong the partnership is… These are people that I feel I have a
deep relationship with. I can pick up the phone, I can visit, I can interact
with freely and openly and transparently. And what this also means, of
course, is that things also really get done. We really do work together.
We really have products to show on what we are doing.
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Political, national and ideational transparency as practices of partnership
contribute to the production of equality between Israeli and Palestinian
practitioners. They also produce interpersonal trust that informs the
development of ideas pursued in transboundary community. On another level,
this allows transboundary water/peace practitioners to live an alternative
relational reality together in contrast to one of Israeli hydrohegemonic relations.
In so doing, they are creating a parallel relational world, a micro- and meso-
level kind of peace between people and organisations despite the dominance
and perpetuation of Israeli-Palestinian relational violence (Personal interview,
IE2 2010). In this parallel relational world, Israeli and Palestinian water/peace
practitioners create and produce together, as made evident by wastewater
treatment initiatives, the Streams Project discussed above, and others.
At the same time, whatever takes place in this so-called parallel relational world
is intentionally and reflexively juxtaposed against, and integrated into the wider
conflict context by Israeli water/peace practitioners. The issue of power in
relation to partnership is specifically engaged with, so as to transform at least
some of the power asymmetries between Israeli and Palestinian participants.
As explained by one Israeli practitioner (Personal interview, IE2 2010):
[P]artnerships is a better word for what I am describing than coexistence
or even collaboration… [P]artners also means that there is a level
playing field. It does not mean a hierarchy, by any means… What I have
seen in many instances where there is so-called, let us say, Israeli-
Palestinian collaboration, there is clearly by intent or otherwise, a
hierarchy. Israelis always have the upper hand. Not because they insist
on that, but it is just the nature of it. Why do I say that? If you are looking
at a collaborative endeavour, Israelis have better capacity. Israelis have
more money. They are clearly at an advantage over Palestinians and
Jordanians and it is very clear. And this hierarchy might not be very
obvious to the Israelis but it is very clear to the Palestinians and the
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Jordanians. When I work in partnership with a person or an organisation,
I do my best to remove that hierarchy as much as I can.
In this sense, removing hierarchy has entailed first reflexively recognising and
engaging with power, and then making every effort not to leverage it against
and over the other. It has entailed sharing resources and decision-making with
partners rather than imposing pre-determined outcomes on the other. Overall, it
has entailed being aware of the power differential, and intentionally addressing
it ideationally and in practice.
The Significance of Donors
The presence of international donors has been of relational significance to the
transboundary work of Israeli practitioners at the AIES, both quantitatively and
qualitatively. On the first point, two things need to be recognised. There is no
doubt that there are many more transboundary water/peace activities because
donors like NATO, USAID and the EU are interested in supporting them. This
point is effectively made by one Israeli practitioner at the AIES (Personal
interview, IE3 2010).
The community is fed by money. Money is what creates the community...
We are able to create conferences, workshops, research projects,
because money is available to do that. That is how we make a living. I do
not think that is so terrible. I think that humans… are economic
creatures. We respond to motivation. That is a motivating factor for us. If
we can get a grant by getting and doing cross-border or cross-boundary
research or work, then we will go for it. And, Palestinians and Jordanians
will do it as well… [T]he accessibility of funds for doing research, for
funding activities, that is what grows the community.
Indeed, grant monies are important factors in limiting and promoting
transboundary water/peace practice. The availability of these resources is also
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sensitive to the escalation and de-escalation of violent conflict dynamics, with
corollary implications for transboundary community practice. As one practitioner
put it, “[w]hen the politics in the region heats up, sometimes the [transboundary]
community can be very small” (Personal interview, IE3 2010).
The donor community also impacts the quality of Israeli-Palestinian
relationships. Indeed, there is clear recognition among Israeli AIES practitioners
of the value international donors bring as outsider third parties to political
processes of relationship and development (Personal interview, IE2 2010).
[T]here is great value in having a third party operating in the region as a
neutral, non-partisan actor. It certainly helps, especially when you try to
create any kind of collaborative partnership. You need that third party…
to make sure that each side behaves themselves… There is no question
that the level of trust that I might have at an individual level does not yet
permeate beyond that. And so because you do not have that, you need
that third party, you need that international actor to be engaged.
As third parties, the funders at best prevent or at the very least limit bullying,
lying, and other confidence-reducing and violent practices. They are essential in
encouraging the different parties to acknowledge each other’s claims (Personal
interview, IE2 2010).
On a point of concern, the AIES is increasingly receiving a greater proportion of
funds from the Israeli government (especially the Ministry for Regional
Cooperation) in comparison to international donors. This comes as a welcome
boost in recognition and support of transboundary AIES activities (Personal
interview, IE2 2010). It also raises the question of whether this will impact the
quality of its relational practices, a matter identified here for future study. This
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shift raises the spectre of a possible hydrohegemonic residue in future practice,
stemming from funding patterns at the AIES.
Relational Discursive Development
The AIES is an organisation that facilitates transboundary dialogue and
innovative relational practice. At its core, it is an ‘environmental’ organisation,
seeking to address issues in both Israel and in the region. Much of its activities
are transboundary, implicating Palestinian (and also Jordanian) people,
territories and resources. Thus, the organisation and its practitioners are
compelled to engage in discourses of peace. The following passages will
examine the ideational components of Israeli practitioner discursive practices
within the context of Israeli-dominated hydrohegemony.
At the AIES, the environment and sustainability discourses are appropriated as
opportunities and epistemologies of equality, partnership and equity. One
leading water/peace practitioner at the AIES explains (Personal interview, IE2
2010):
I work in trying to… address environmental issues as they pertain to the
region, and to develop collaborative research projects that better inform
on the nature of these problems and bring to the fore solutions that we
feel are the most appropriate from an environmental perspective… In
other words, we might propose solutions that might not be directly
implementable by any one government but yet we feel are the most
appropriate from the perspective of the environment…. So, what brings
me to dealing with collaboration and one step beyond collaboration, in
some ways supporting or moving to some kind of peace settlement, is
that it is really all about the environment.
In other words, Israeli practitioners at the AIES are not necessarily setting out to
‘build peace’ but perceive themselves as building a relational peace through
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cooperation and collaborative project development on the management of
transboundary environmental (including water) issues. The environment, and
transboundary water more specifically are domains of relational practice for
building and cultivating equality, partnership, equity and shared sustainability.
Israeli water/peace practitioner engagements speak directly to both Israeli and
Palestinian societies within their respective political contexts. With respect to
the Israeli side, partnership-based work is framed as a challenge to the agenda
and narrative of those within Israel who seek to promote an Israeli isolationist
politics vis à vis the Palestinians, the Arab World and the international
community (Personal interview, IE3 2010). With respect to the Palestinian side,
it is also situated in regional and global debates about how the Palestinians and
the Arab world more broadly might deal with Israel, considering Israel as part of
the Middle Eastern region as opposed to being its own entity separate from the
rest of the Middle East121. Israeli practitioners at the AIES in partnership with
Palestinian colleagues discursively challenge the two sides of this isolationism
and rejectionism (Personal interview, IE3 2010).
Just as Israeli practices of partnership pursued through the AIES challenge this
dual isolationism, they also create the context for innovative discursive
                                                 
121 Several notable examples of excluding Israel to varying degrees include Rotary
International and the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). In the
first case, Israel and the Palestinian Territories are considered separate “districts” in different
“zones” by Rotary international, a service and peace-oriented organisation (Rotary Zones
Website). As such, this creates a barrier to direct relationship between Israelis (District 2490,
Zone 19) and Palestinians  (District 2450, Zone 20) directly in the region. In the second case,
there is no Israeli organisation participating as part of the CGIAR Consortium of Centers. Israel,
a world leader on dry-land agriculture has been excluded from participating directly (Personal
interview, IE3 2010). The CGIAR is funded by the World Bank and the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation among others (CGIAR Donors Website), providing yet another example of how the
international multilateral and donor community reinforces cleavages between Israel and the
Arab World.
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development about the very pursuit of such partnership. Looking to the ASI and
ARW, the Israeli AIES conveners specifically created opportunities for Israeli
and Palestinian (as well as Jordanian and international) practitioners to engage
with one another on core conflict issues. Issues directly related to Israeli-
Palestinian relations that were tackled through presentations, dialogue
processes, academic writing and informal exchange include:
• Power asymmetry
• Palestinian water rights and self-determination
• Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinians
• Israeli security and water management
• Zionist ideology and Israeli policy
• Commodification and the development of a regional water market
• Transboundary stream restoration
• The Dead Sea as a transboundary resource
• Stakeholder participation and regional water governance
• Imagining equitable futures
In this sense, the AIES has been an enabler of critical transboundary dialogue
and innovative ideation. Such critical, dialogical ideation has encouraged
human, political and “analytic” empathy (Rothman, 1992: 74; Borradori, 2003:
17-18) among participants of the ASI and ARW for the perspectives of the
other. They also allowed for the dominant Israeli narrative of Palestinian threat
to be deconstructed and challenged, allowing for emancipatory Palestinian
subjectivities to be dialogically and relationally cultivated and supported. In
other words, such events and activities are not solely focused on technical
issues, but engage discursively, appreciably and meaningfully on issues of
Palestinian representation, priorities and power.
Overall, Israeli water practitioners engaged in transboundary water/peace
practice perceive themselves to be ideologically-motivated (e.g. Personal
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interview, IE2 2010; Personal interview, IE3 2010; Personal interview, IF2 2010;
Personal interview, IX1 2010). They engage in transboundary partnership-
based work because it is personally and politically meaningful and important to
do so for them, by order of importance, as political practices of (Personal
interview, IE2 2010; Personal interview, IE3 2010; Personal interview, IE4
2010):
• Resolving environmental issues practically;
• Providing alternatives to unilateral, patronising and/or asymmetric water
development planning;
• Redressing water-related inequities;
• Promoting ‘true’ normalisation and reconciliation between Israelis and
Palestinians;
• Promoting Israeli security;
• Legitimating Israel and Israelis’ presence in the Middle East; and
• Critiquing Israeli practices of occupation.
Yet, on the key point of independent Palestinian statehood, there is near-
unanimous agreement among Israeli water/peace practitioners at the AIES that
their efforts are not specifically targeted at cultivating an independent
Palestinian state, for lack of power to do so. At the same time, they recognise
the importance of their work to Israel-Palestinian relations in the eventuality of
successful Palestinian statehood (Personal interview, IE2 2010; Personal
interview, IE3 2010). In this sense, these practitioners desist from specifically
framing their work as peacemaking (Personal interview, IE2 2010).
I cannot make peace… Peace requires a government. Peace requires
governmental agreements. There is no way of getting around that… [I]t
means that there is resolution of the overall conflict. Again, does that
mean to say that everything is perfect afterwards? No, of course not….
[P]eace is very subjective. For Israelis, peace could simply mean no
more terror. That is peace, that is a kind of peace. What is peace for
Palestinians? A state. So, it is very subjective. Personally, it is not very
helpful for what I do. For me, I certainly am for peace, and I certainly
hope that what I do contributes to peace, but I do not look at what I am
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doing per se as making peace. I may be supporting a peace process by
what I am doing, or helping to foster openness, collaboration and mutual
understanding. But I am not making peace.
While not peacemaking, this work is framed as working to favour and create the
conditions to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinians, on the one hand, and to
promote Israeli security on the other. Related activities are rooted in practices
that bring such contextual meaning to the concept of peacebuilding (Personal
interview, IE3 2010).
In other words, such Israeli transboundary practitioners are no longer waiting
for politicians to make peace in the form of a peace agreement, as was the
case throughout the 1990s. This is a community of people engaged in working
to build the future, constructing the world in which they wish to live. They are
working together to improve Palestinian capacity, infrastructure and the like.
They are decrying the Israeli occupation as well as Palestinian violence. They
are preparing a time when the occupation will have been terminated. Ultimately,
they are creating an alternative to the dominant construct of asymmetric
relationship with the Palestinians, and to the concomitant narrative of
hydrohegemonic necessity (Personal interview, IE3 2010). In these many ways,
they are practicing hydropolitical peacebuilding.
Practicing Intergenerationality
In addition to the work pursued through the AIES with existing transboundary
water/peace practitioners, the AIES is also mandated to teach and train
younger leaders in building a shared and peaceful regional future through joint
environmental governance. Towards this end, the AIES has welcomed Israeli,
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Jordanian, Palestinian and international students to engage in applied study at
the Kibbutz Ketura-based Institute. It has offered training in environmentalism,
leadership development, trust-building and conflict resolution, within a multi-
generational transboundary perspective to socio-political change in the Middle
East (Personal interview, IE1 2010).
The AIES offers multiple and diverse educational and training programs in
regional environmental governance, with considerable attention to
peacebuilding. Its Year/Semester Program offers university-accredited courses
to those studying ecopolitics and related issues. The Masters Program is jointly
offered through the AIES and Israel’s Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,
allowing students to engage in study and research opportunities specific to
Desert Studies and to the Middle East. Also, the AIES offers a Summer
Program in association with US-based Dickinson College to students interested
in learning about human settlement in the WAAV (See AIES Academics
Website).
Focused on the regional environment, issues addressed through each of these
different educational and training programmes are transboundary in nature. The
academic staff delivering the programmes also reflect the region’s diversity,
though asymmetrically so. While largely Israeli (and Jewish), there are also
Israeli Arab/Palestinian, Jordanian and international faculty members involved
in these initiatives. Finally, the impressive body of participating students
continues to be transboundary in origin and nationality, including Israelis,
Palestinians, Jordanians and internationals from all over the world. Recognising
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the challenges of a transboundary education in the conflictual Middle East, the
AIES offers students training in conflict resolution.
It is nearly impossible to ignore the Israel-Palestinian conflict when engaging in
environmental studies in the Middle East. Much of the ecology is transboundary
and conflictually parceled. The bilateral and regional political context is volatile.
Participants emanate from different places, with often vastly different narratives
of the region. Thus, rather than ignore the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the AIES
has developed a PELS programme. PELS programming is offered as a
requirement to all students attending the AIES. Efforts are also made to
incorporate PELS programming into different projects and activities pursued by
students. It has assumed the form of dialogue among students on issues of
land and identity. It is incorporated into shared activities like hiking and rafting
where different students are paired or grouped together intentionally.
Occasionally, uninational groups are encouraged to assemble for the purposes
of deconstructing particular issues or experiences away from the gaze of the
other (as per the methodology pursued at NS/WAS; see Sonnenschein and
Hijazi, 2000: 159). Students are also exposed to, and trained in conflict
resolution tools and leadership through PELS at the AIES.
PELS practice is epistemologically based in front-lining the Israel-Palestinian
conflict rather than sublimating it. It is rooted in the assumption that students
benefit from learning how to respond to the conflict and its many narratives and
dynamics together with and sometimes separately from the other. Very much in
tune with the rest of the AIES, PELS teaches transboundary partnership
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through processes and practices of engagement (Personal interview, IE1
2010). It is based on the notion that all participants and participant narratives
are equal. As part of this, PELS is methodologically rooted in a “compassionate
listening model” of dialogue, where students are encouraged to speak and
listen from a place of compassion and empathy with regards to their interlocutor
(Personal interview, IE1 2010)122.
At the nexus of equity and sustainability, PELS presumes that both Israel and
the Palestinians are responsible for pursuing unsustainable environmental
practices and that transboundary endeavours must intentionally pursue
“environmental justice” (Personal interview, IE1 2010; Stoett, 2012). This work
also trains students in multi-sectorality, to understand and work with people
from different sectors and at different levels of society. It is based in a
sophisticated model of personal change and political transformation through
shared practice (Personal interview, IE1 2010).
The PELS offering of the AIES has proven essential to the success of the AIES’
education and training programme. PELS development emerged in response to
political tensions among students participating in environmental governance
programming at the AIES during its early years. Once recognised, this need
was filled appropriately and dynamically with PELS, which created the relational
context for students to engage effectively and meaningfully in transboundary
practice. One leader at AIES explained the importance of PELS programming.
                                                 
122 Compassionate listening underpins dialogue group processes all over the world (e.g.
Montreal Dialogue Group) and has been used in the context of German-Jewish reconciliation in
the wake of the Holocaust.
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They contrast it to attempts made to ignore or sublimate the Israel-Palestinian
conflict for the purposes of narrowly focusing on environment issues. They said,
“our program would implode if we did that.” (Personal interview, IE1 2010) An
example of one such experience is telling.
As part of its offerings, the AIES has organised field trips for the purposes of
giving students the opportunity to learn about the region’s waterways firsthand.
On one such trip, group leaders failed to incorporate a PELS element to help
students process the different narratives and perspectives on land ownership
and water rights, on issues of identity and nationalism, and the like. When
PELS is intentionally incorporated therein, these trips are generally
motivational, empathetic and relationship-building exercises among diverse
groups of students. On this particular trip, participating students returned
deflated, confused and frustrated (Personal interview, IE1 2010). Failure to
intentionally incorporate PELS into programme offerings stems in part from the
fact that not all AIES programme leaders appreciate the significance of, or are
adequately trained in peacebuilding. This also reflects the fact that Israeli-
Palestinian conflict issues are ever present and constitutive of regional
environmental governance issues. This lesson has not fallen on deaf ears at
the AIES, though at the time the current study was undertaken, it was the
subject of intense deliberation among staff.
Ushering Transboundary Futures
As noted earlier, the AIES has cultivated and continues to support a community
of some 600 graduates, some of whom are today involved in environmental
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governance issues, underpinned by peacebuilding training, in their respective
Middle Eastern countries. There is evidence to suggest that AIES graduates
practice a transboundary discourse in their professional and academic
engagements outside the AIES. One of the organisation’s leaders provides the
following analytic example of this point (Personal interview, IE3 2010):
We are working in peacebuilding and environment… Environment is all
about the long-term and so is peacebuilding. Maybe it will take a
generation… [Th]e critical mass of alumni from the Arava Institute has
been in the past ten years… so most of them are just at the beginning of
their careers back home and reaching levels of influence. And I think that
they will have an impact, but it will take a number of years, of more and
more people working and creating trust and becoming involved in their
home communities and creating their own non-profit organisations and
becoming involved in government and getting to the role where they can
actually be part of the policy-making process. So I think you have to
have patience… just let things slow down a bit, and build trust and create
partnerships and things that make sense for people. We have an alumni
who studied here from Jordan, just graduated and he is going back to
Jordan. He set up a company in Jordan that is partnered with a company
from here, at the Kibbutz, that is doing renewable energy. And they have
now set up a branch in Palestine. So you know, that kind of stuff, that
really solves people’s problems. It does not bring peace. It does not end
the occupation, but it provides people with economic welfare and gives
them empowerment and deals with creating a more sustainable Middle
East.
In these real senses, the transboundary water community has become the
location of multi-generationality, in terms of participation, dynamics and effects.
As noted, youth are pursuing transboundary water practices professionally, and
this with political intentionality. Transboundary community building prepares the
terrain for the future, as young people set the stage for their increased political
involvement as decision-makers of the future.
In addition to the perpetuation of environmentally-motivated, transboundary
professional partnerships among young leaders who appreciate one another as
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equals, it is equally relevant to consider effects that can be associated with
AIES practices. One Israeli AIES practitioner explains (Personal interview, IE3
2010):
[E]ntities like the Arava Institute are adding more people to that
community every year. We have got over 600 graduates of the
programme. About two-thirds of them are from the Middle East. One of
the interesting things that we are starting to see, is that we are starting to
see a critical mass of alumni from the Institute who are becoming more
visible as an entity, as a force... People are starting to be willing to stand
up and be seen (Personal interview, IE3 2010).
This point reiterates an earlier one brought up in the context of expert
transboundary practices. Transparent political engagement and practice is an
important peacebuilding factor in an environment marred by personal and
political distrust. Further, there is a sense that ensuing conversations and
political processes filter into the wider realm of participant experience, into the
future (Personal interview, IE1 2010).
I do think there is that ripple effect that goes into their home life, … aside
from the fact that students grow up and become colleagues… That is
definitely happening and it is inspiring… A multi-generational thing is
happening.
AIES practices are intended to create and sustain a transboundary
conversation and narrative, again challenging the supremacy of national
narratives in the region. Practitioners at the AIES speak of an us feeling that
develops among participants, as their identities are further textured and layered
in environmental and transboundary relationships that inform relations with, and
often challenge preconceived notions about the other (Personal interview, IE1
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2010). Rather than supplanting national identities, they add layers of
experience and identity both upon them, and in dialogue with them123.
Analytic Reflection
With a dynamic and globally networked organisation like the AIES, it is
obviously possible to say a great deal. This study has had to content itself with
analysing a limited number of programmes and practices, assessing the
discursive practices of Israeli water/peace practitioners. Having done so, this
study concludes that such discursive practices are appreciable as hydropolitical
peacebuilding, with some ever-threatening hydrohegemonic residues. A few
words to support this conclusion are justified.
Israeli practitioners have based their work on the development of transboundary
partnerships with Palestinian counterparts. These partnership are practiced for
the simultaneous pursuit of sustainable environmental governance and person-
to-person trust building among ‘equals’. The inverted commas placed around
‘equals’ suggest that Israeli water/peace practitioners recognise the existence
and operation of power asymmetry. They also suggest that practitioners
operate on the assumption that working in a person-to-person capacity limits
the wider operation of asymmetric power. In other words, asymmetry can be
dampened, though never completely ‘neutralised’, in micro- and meso-level
contexts. To further counter asymmetry, Israeli water/peace practitioners
recognise the value and power of international donor involvement that is
mindful of both Israeli and Palestinian concerns and relational dynamics. It must
                                                 
123 This is a theme that re-emerges with the work of FOEME below.
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also be noted that Israeli practices of partnership are also exacting of a
recognised legitimacy for Israel and Israelis in the Middle East.
The notion of equity is reflected in the Israeli practitioner discourses of “ending
occupation” and of promoting “environmental justice”. At its core, these contain
the recognition that there can be little equity between Israelis and Palestinians
so long as Israel’s occupation of Palestinian people, land and resources is
perpetuated. Israeli practitioners at the AIES strategically focus on
demonstrating the value of ending the occupation to Israelis. They also cultivate
an alternative and parallel relational practice that emulates and embodies a
post-occupation reality. In so doing, they promote micro- and meso-level
processual and relational equity, mindful of their inability to practice or ensure
macro-level Israel-Palestinian equity. One way in which this is done is through a
discursive practice of ‘environmental justice’, in education and training
processes and in programmatic work.
The work of the AIES is premised on the promotion of sustainability through
environmental governance. In this sense, there is clear acknowledgement in the
practices of Israeli water/peace practitioners of the environmental
ir/responsibility of both Israel and the Palestinians. Here, the environment does
not serve as a narrative or discursive instrument for the perpetuation of Israel’s
hydrohegemony or Israeli dominance over the Palestinians. Indeed, the
significant degree of reflexivity and transparency exhibited by Israeli
water/peace practitioners allows them to reveal Israeli weaknesses rather than
simply focus on identifying Palestinian limitations to be addressed through
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dominant Israeli interventions and practices. In partnership, Israeli and
Palestinian water/peace practitioners engage in practicing sustainability,
understood in both environmental and socio-political terms.
While the above conclusions reveal a discursive practice of hydropolitical
peacebuilding among Israeli water/peace practitioners through the AIES, the
current analysis also suggests the presence of a hydrohegemonic residue,
though more as looming threat than current reality in practice. This is especially
true with respect to PELS programming and funding patters. During the period
of doctoral research, the AIES was undergoing an organisational deliberation
about the extent to which PELS programming needed to be integrated into the
diversity of organisational activities. While some institutional learning had
clearly taken place as a product of these discussions, it was not clear by the
time of writing if widespread and integrated PELS programming had been
assured and secured. The spectre of possibly failing to do so reveals the threat
of hydrohegemonic residue.
In a similar vein, transboundary environment and water practice has historically
been funded by the international community. As a proportion of overall
transboundary programme funding of the AIES, the Israeli government
contribution is increasing. Several leading Israeli water/peace practitioners at
the AIES welcome this shift. While it does reflect the Israeli government’s
recent and growing appreciation for AIES experience in transboundary practice,
it also raises the threat that international donors (individually and as a pool) will
decrease in relevance and then perhaps cease to moderate and temper the
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asymmetric power of Israel/Israelis and Palestinians. That this was not overtly
recognised as problematic by Israeli water/peace practitioners at the AIES
(during the research phase of the current dissertation) reflects a threatening
hydrohegemonic residue.
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Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME)
Launched in 1994, FOEME has worked on environment and peace issues over
nearly two decades. Originally advocating for the incorporation of environment
and sustainability concerns into the Madrid/Oslo peace process, it went on to
intentionally transform itself into an environmental peacebuilding organisation
around 2001 (Personal interview, IF3 2010). Such a change was initiated as it
became increasingly clear that the dominant peace process was failing; a
change that was then consolidated as the second Palestinian Intifada took
shape.
FOEME’s transformation was premised on the belief that the environment was
a domain of shared concern. As such, it could be constituted into one among
several socio-political, relational platforms for equitably-oriented relationship-
building through transboundary programming and project development. This
belief and ensuing work draws inspiration from the praxis of Lederach (1997) on
relationship-building and peacebuilding. In a related vein, Lederach (2005: 47)
developed the concept of platforms for peace, defined as:
[O]ngoing social and relational spaces, in other words, people in
relationship who generate responsive initiatives for constructive
change… capable of generating adaptive change processes that
address both the episodic expression of the conflict and the epicenter of
the conflictive relational context.
The current section thus examines and analyses the work of FOEME, focusing
on the environment and more specifically water, through the lens of
hydropolitical peacebuilding as a dimension of environmental peacebuilding
more broadly.
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To begin with, FOEME is a transboundary organisation on multiple fronts. It is
the only organisation in the water/peace domain that is jointly directed by an
Israeli, a Palestinian and a Jordanian national. Its three head offices are each in
Tel Aviv, Beit Jala/Bethlehem and Amman. The totality of FOEME’s activities
are framed and implemented with transboundary and regional purpose, and
practiced in transboundary partnership (Personal interview, IF4 2010). On
occasion, this has meant that FOEME activities are strategically differentiated
and situated to allow for nationally-specific or internationalised objectives and
practices to be pursued.
As a longstanding organisation, it has an extensive track record of
transboundary initiatives and activities124. Rather than attempt to say something
meaningful about each of them, the focus herein will be on selected aspects of
FOEME’s Good Water Neighbours (GWN) and Jordan River (JR) rehabilitation
projects. Through these initiatives, this study will specifically focus on analysing
Israeli water/peace practitioner involvement in what the organisation refers to
as ‘people-to-people environmental peacebuilding’.
                                                 
124 These programmes and projects include (See FOEME Projects Website):
• Good Water Neighbours (GWN)
• Jordan River (JR) rehabilitation project
• FOEME EcoParks
• Jordan River Peace Park
• Save the Dead Sea (Becker et al., 2004; Hermon, 2004; Abu Taleb et al., 2003; Bromberg
et al., 2000; Katz et al., 1998)
• Red Sea Dead Sea Conduit (RSDSC)
• Climate Change
• Mountain Aquifer
• Water, Peace & Environment
• Sustainable Development Strategies
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It must also be recognised that most FOEME projects operate along multiple
tracks, often advancing several priorities strategically and simultaneously. As
has been done throughout the current chapter, this study will both describe
FOEME activities and discursively analyse the practices of Israeli water/peace
practitioners engaged therein. A specific note must be appended to this last
point on discourse analysis. Because FOEME is the most transboundary of the
three organisations discussed here, it is in fact epistemologically challenging to
disaggregate the discourse of Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians within the
organisation. Their discourse has assumed a profoundly integrated and
intentional transboundary quality that will be made evident in the discussion
below125. Nonetheless, the discourse of Israeli water/peace practitioners at
FOEME is identified and analysed in this chapter.
People-to-People Environmental Peacebuilding
The vast majority of FOEME projects includes three conceptual elements that
define this very section: people-to-people relationship-building; sustainable
environmental objectives and foci; and an intentional practice of peacebuilding.
To discuss each of these issues, study is undertaken of FOEME’s Good Water
Neighbours (GWN) and Jordan River (JR) rehabilitation projects.
Good Water Neighbours
Perhaps FOEME’s most renowned and effective initiative, the GWN was
launched in 2001. It is based on establishing partnerships between at least two
                                                 
125 This foreword is based on an analysis of both Palestinian and Israeli interviews conducted
for the current study. It is also based on analysis conducted of Israeli, Palestinian and
Jordanian interviews undertaken by this researcher for a different study on water and peace
issues in the Middle East in 2010 and 2011. Finally, it stems from analysis of the literature by
and about FOEME and its activities.
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communities from Israel, the Palestinian West Bank, and/or Jordan sharing a
common water resource. It implements multi-layered programming through
such transboundary partnerships, while pursuing environmental sustainability
and equitable water use as practices of peacebuilding, with an emphasis on
relationship-building rooted in shared visioning and action.
At the time of writing, twenty-eight communities were participating in the GWN
initiative, up from an initial eleven during the 2001-2005 period and seventeen
during the 2005-2008 period. The initiative is managed by three project
coordinators; one Israeli, one Palestinian, and one Jordanian. Project
management is also comprised of some twenty-five people in the field, six
expert advisors, and one Project Director that receives the support of an
international advisory group. The project is itself underpinned by a jointly
developed vision document, as with all FOEME initiatives. The practice of
developing and implementing GWN is based in the project equality and
partnership of Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians, resisting, desisting from,
and engaging in alternative relational formations to hydrohegemony.
Moving from project leadership to multisectoral community beneficiaries, GWN
project participants include young people, adult community members,
professionals who work on water and environment issues, people involved in
the private sector, as well as mayors and other municipal leaders. Overall,
project participants and beneficiaries from the different national communities
build relationships with one another on environmental and more specifically
water issues, pursuing people-to-people environmental peacebuilding through a
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vast array of activities. By participant group, specific activities include the
following (adapted from Kramer, 2008: 24):
• Geared at youth: Building an ecological garden, implementing rainwater
harvesting systems, carrying out studies and surveys, managing river
clean-ups, conducting awareness-raising campaigns;
• Geared at adults: Participating in workshops, regional visioning and
environmental problem-solving;
• Geared at the private sector: Developing sustainable tourism projects,
developing heritage projects;
• Geared at mayors and municipal leaders: Training, political support,
transboundary partnering of municipalities, relationship-building; and
• Geared to all: Participating in regional events organised by GWN and
FOEME staff, situated from the grassroots through to regional level,
environmental education in the form of lectures, field trips and hands-on
activities.
These and the rest of FOEME activities are rooted in appreciation of the
ontological equality of the narratives shared by the various Israeli, Palestinian
and Jordanian communities, in transboundary partnership with one another.
Doing so is a practice of building the subjective equality of all and between
them, rooted in fundamental critique of the hierarchical premise underpinning
Israeli hydrohegemony and its necessity. Indeed, the GWN is built in resistance
to the Israeli narrative elements of Palestinian environmental unsustainability
and socio-political threat.
Sharing Water Realities
Methodologically, the GWN initiative is based in narrative and reflexive
experience-sharing of “water realities” (Personal interview, IF3 2010).
Participating communities and their endogenous leadership from among each
of the sectors listed above have engaged in facilitated processes to identify,
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articulate, compare and contrast their own ‘water realities’ with those of a
partner community across the Green Line or across the Jordan River.
Water realities may be understood as narratives comprised of the following:
• Hard facts about water resources and wastewater management;
• Personal stories about how water is used within a community, a school,
etc;
• Discussion of joint dependence on water resources and on hydropolitical
relations;
• Discussion about the causes of water shortages and how people both
live and address them;
• Awareness-raising processes about differences in the ‘water realities’ of
communities across the borders;
• Reflexive processes about the causes and transformation of such
different ‘water realities’; and
• How efforts are pursued to create jointly sustainable and equitable ‘water
realities’ for these partnered communities.
There are multiple methodologies through which these water realities are
shared, discussed, deconstructed and addressed. This is done among and
between partner communities directly, through facilitated uninational and
transboundary encounters between young people, community residents,
entrepreneurs, municipal leaders and other stakeholders. It is also done with
national tourists in their own country (and to a lesser extent international
tourists), through the Neighbours Path programme. This allows participants to
reflect on their own national water realities as well as those of communities
across the border sharing a transboundary resource126. Every “path” both
begins and ends with a border.
                                                 
126 The Neighbours Path eco-touristic peacebuilding initiative has seen the participation of tens
of thousands of Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians to date along 25 paths. For more
information, see FOEME NP Website.
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The stories people tell are discursively-laden tellings of self, of community, of
responsibility and of actual and potential transformation underway. For
example, Israeli practitioners engaged in implementing and facilitating such
processes within participating Israeli communities specifically and intentionally
bring to light Israel’s responsibility for the water realities of Palestinian
communities that are inequitable by comparison (Personal interview, IF3 2010).
They have also worked with communities to address their own unsustainable
water practices, improving the efficiency of water use across the board (and
borders). The dominant Israeli narrative of Palestinian unsustainability is thus
critically challenged through the GWN initiative, bringing clarity to the relational
context within which different water realities have evolved. The water reality
approach also sheds light on the environmental and hydropolitical effects of the
Jewish redemption of Biblical Zion, both for Jews and for Palestinians in
relationship with one another, thus texturing this narrative element.
Working in Schools Across Borders
A powerful example of GWN practice and effect comes from the activities
pursued in schools across the borders of the Jordan River region. In these
schools, young people have assumed leadership as volunteer “water trustees”.
These young people have played a leadership role in turning their schools into
more sustainable water environments, in partnership with schools across the
borders. To date, more than 2,500 youth water trustees from partnered
communities have received regular environmental education and training
through GWN, more than 170 youth have engaged in building initiatives and/or
campaigns to address transboundary water issues, and participated in the
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development of Environmental Education Centers throughout the region. As
explained by FOEME in a project review of its successes since inception
(FOEME GWN Website):
These activities have resulted in the empowerment of Water Trustees to
carry out actions that promote water sustainability in their communities.
Empowerment, once experienced, allows the youth to take on new
challenges and be more active in their community with a more positive
outlook for a common future with their neighbor.
The future is thus imagined, practiced and produced in transboundary
partnerships rooted in equality, building shared sustainability and equity, and
incrementally developing zones of environmental and hydropolitical
peacebuilding. The significance of doing so is reflected in the concept of peace
zones, understood as sectioned off territories and human communities within
wider armed conflict areas that have disallowed the pursuit or even means of
violence in their midst. According to the Coalition for Peace, Peace Zone Primer
(Garcia, 1993: 39):
A peace zone area is a geographical territory varying in size from place
to place where the citizens declare that no form of armed conflict may
occur, and whose peacebuilding program seeks to address the roots of a
problem. It is declared and sustained by an aggrupation of citizens
coming from the community who do not believe in violence but in
peaceful means of resolving their differences. For its program, it requires
its citizens to look into forms of violence manifested in their community
so as to guide the direction of their initiatives, and to harness their
creativity in developing indigenous methods of responding to crisis.
In the Philippines, during the late-1980s and early-1990s, government soldiers
were asked to leave their weapons at the door when entering peace zones if
they wished to negotiate with local communities and their leaders. In this sense,
peace zones are social spaces (Garcia, 1993: 43), delimited territories,
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communities of people, and declarations of intentionality and willingness to
dialogue and negotiate, despite the risks inherent in their formation in the face
of powerful and threatening forces127. GWN communities are thus understood
to be zones of hydropolitical peacebuilding, creating an alternative relational
context and discursive practice in a milieu of asymmetric and violent conflict.
Hydropolitical Subpolitics
Another location of meaningful hydropolitical discursive practice is at the
transnationalised, subnational level. Beck (1997) has argued the growing
political significance of transnationalised “subpolitics”, denoting political
relations pursued below the national level and across national political
boundaries. Epistemologically-oriented by his argument, the current study also
examines GWN’s relationship-building work with mayors from Israeli,
Palestinian and Jordanian communities. As with youth and other members of
participating communities, GWN has sought to facilitate the building of
relationships and partnerships of equality between mayors. What started out
modestly, has become a focal area of extensive relationship-building as
practices of joint sustainability and equitable development.
In this respect, Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian FOEME offices and field staff
have enabled the development of a “mayor’s network”, bringing together
mayors from across the region. Their original and continued collective
engagement has reflected a shared concern for the deteriorating state of the
                                                 
127 Some theorist-practitioners and organisations refer to children as zones of peace, arguing
that children should be protected and shielded from armed conflicts. See UNICEF Peace Zone
Website; Machel, 1996.
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Jordan River and the Dead Sea, and a desire to collectively respond. Since
then, the mayor’s network has played a central role in several FOEME/partner
community campaigns and successes. Their contribution has been essential to
the following (a partial list of successes, compiled from a diversity of sources):
• Continued collective expressions of concern over the poor state of the
Jordan River and the Dead Sea, also informing the multilateral process
of the RSDSC Feasibility Study;
• Addressing Lower Jordan River (LJR) water quality issues, promoting its
rehabilitation, including the promotion and/or building of WWTPs in GWN
communities;
• Development of a joint Master Plan for the Tsur Hadassah (Israeli) and
Wadi Fukin (Palestine) communities, for the sustainable management of
shared water and wastewater resources;
• Directly impacting JWC planning for the favourable treatment of Baka
Sharkia (Palestinian) wastewater in Baka Gharbia (Israel);
• Enabling continued cooperation on wastewater management and
transboundary stream restoration between Emek Hefer (Israel) and
Tulkarem (Palestine), between Eshkol RC (Israel) and Yatta (Palestine),
and between Gilboa RC (Israel) and Jenin (Palestine) communities;
• Freezing construction of the Israeli Separation Barrier across the Green
Line, preventing grief to Palestinian communities with specific reference
to their water resource practices;
• Pursuing frequent meetings between mayors, residents, entrepreneurs
and potential investors, leveraging a total of US$240 million for potential
GWN communities’ infrastructure and development initiatives;
• Promoting the development of a Jordan River Peace Park in the
Naharayim/Bakoura area; and
• Collectively solving the problem of sandflies and promoting joint
responses to that of houseflies in the Dead Sea area.
The success of these initiatives, and the overall work of FOEME, is rooted in
the transboundary cooperative and partnership practices of Israeli, Palestinian
and Jordanian water/peace (and environment) practitioners. These practices
are rooted in equality, and meaningfully informed by dialogically-framed
ideations of equity and sustainability. They also ensure the building, sustaining
and expanding of a transboundary community of multi-sectoral and
intergenerational water/peace practitioners. While some core activities are
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undertaken by water-issue experts, others are clearly undertaken by a much
broader contingent of engaged people. In this respect, FOEME has hosted a
major event nearly every year since its inception, having attracted thousands of
participants that remain active in the transboundary water domain and
community.
As with other FOEME activities, the GWN is intent on layering a transboundary
collective identity atop regional national identities, in an effort to “blur the tribal
aspect of this region” (Personal interview, IF3 2010). Doing so creates the
space for “reconciliation” to take place at multiple levels, rather than
encouraging the perpetuation of tribally-defined and conflictual identities and
narratives (Lederach, 1997). Doing so is rooted in the pursuit of practices that
create shared experience, sensibilities and political engagement around shared
bodies of water and the environment more broadly. As explained by one Israeli
water/peace practitioner at FOEME (Personal interview, IF3 2010):
Rather than I being a member of the Jewish tribe and my Palestinian
counterpart being a member of the Palestinian tribe or the Jordanian
tribe or the Christian tribe or the Muslim tribe, because this is a very
tribal region, we are trying to introduce the concept that we are part of a
shared water body, so that we are residents of the Jordan Valley… We
are residents of the Mountain Aquifer. We are residents around the Dead
Sea. And not that that replaces our identity as Jewish-Israelis or
Palestinians or Jordanians, but it tries to broaden, to deepen, our
identities to beyond just our national or religious associations. And
through that, to find common ground and common interest. I think that
goes to the very heart, whether it is at the community level… It is very
much focused on all the residents. That is from the bottom-up.
And from the top-down perspective, also, very much trying to promote
these commissions (a Jordan River commission, a Dead Sea
commission, a Mountain Aquifer commission), so that the institutional
structures will be much more detailed than just a Joint Water Committee.
The devil is in the detail. In order to truly have impact, you need to go
down into those details. You need to change the mindsets and that is
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what we are trying to do. We are trying to change the mindset of being
neighbours that share a common water resource, of being residents of a
shared water basin, that clearly has peaceful relations, an understanding
of common interests, at its heart.
As was suggested above, GWN practices and successes have been central to
the development and implementation of other transboundary FOEME initiatives.
Space restrictions prevent a detailed discussion of such initiatives, however
there is much to be gained from looking briefly at one, the Jordan River (JR)
rehabilitation project.
Jordan River Rehabilitation
Building in part on GWN’s momentum, FOEME’s JR rehabilitation project has
worked to restore a natural historic flow to the devastated Jordan River. Today,
this culturally, ecologically and hydropolitically important river flows, in its lower
portion, at approximately 5-8 percent its historic pre-1964 flow (before the water
infrastructure developments were constructed in Israel, Jordan and Syria).
Today, most of this flow amounts to little more than sewage water.
The JR project has sought to transform the Jordan River and its surrounding
region from an ecologically devastated and “sacrificed” zone (Schoenfeld et al.,
2007) to one of peacebuilding and prosperity, for the benefit of the region’s
inhabitants and the large number of tourists arriving every year. It has sought
the return of one-third of the historic flow of the LJR, amounting to some
400MCM (and progressively towards 600MCM), in order to ensure that the river
“function as a healthy ecosystem.” (Gafny et al., 2010: 14). Shared
sustainability is at the heart of this initiative, while rooted in an
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acknowledgement of differentiated responsibility. In this equation and of the
three parties, the Palestinians have literally no responsibility for the devastation
of the LJR.
The Project is comprised of numerous elements which can be succinctly
described as campaign-building, awareness-raising, research and experience-
sharing, political advocacy and strategic development. Among other things,
FOEME practitioners conducted a study of economic benefits stemming from a
conceived rehabilitation of the LJR (Personal interview, IF1 2010; Becker et al.,
2004; See LJR Studies Website). It has held conferences and stakeholder
meetings to share-experience about doing so. The region’s water/peace
practitioners have pursued advocacy with their national governments, and also
with the European Parliament and the US Senate. Of specific interest, Israeli
water/peace practitioners and their counterparts engaged through FOEME have
accomplished the following (among others):
• Secured regional government support for FOEME efforts on the Jordan
River, including the Israeli Government’s commitment to rehabilitate the
Jordan River. Notably, on 27 July 2011, commitment was received from
Gilad Erdan, Israel’s Minister of Environment, that Israel would both
decrease sewage discharge to the River and increase the natural flow in
its lower section (FOEME Knesset LJR Website);
• Secured a Resolution of the EU Parliament on 9 September 2010 calling
on the region’s leaders to cooperate in rehabilitating the Jordan River
(EU JR Resolution Website); and
• Secured US Senate Resolution 387 of 20 November 2007 encouraging
Israel, Jordan and the PA to cooperate in addressing the degradation of
the Jordan River and Dead Sea (FOEME USSR 387 Website).
These successes would likely not have been possible without the collective,
transboundary practice of Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian water/peace
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practitioners, working together to address a sustainability and equity issue of
major and globalised importance.
Towards accomplishing its work, the JR rehabilitation project has established
National and Regional Advisory Committees. Bringing together civil society and
government experts from Israel, Palestine and Jordan (Personal interview, IF4
2010), these committees have become a context for broader hydropolitical
experience-sharing, discussion and strategising (Gafny et al., 2010: 17).
FoEME’s Regional Advisory Committee is today the only forum focused
on the Lower Jordan River (LJR) which brings Israeli, Palestinian and
Jordanian representatives together and as such serves as an important
medium for the region’s experts to exchange information and discuss
scenarios for the river’s rehabilitation.
While initially established to give feedback on research undertaken by
FoEME and proposals for the LJR’s rehabilitation, the forum quickly
expanded to an important meeting for the region’s ministries to present
and discuss cross border proposals related to rehabilitation and
development initiatives in the Jordan River Valley.
In stark contrast to hydrohegemonic approaches, the creation and continued
facilitation of this committee is a practice of bridging technical and political
approaches to water management and development. Such efforts allow for
continued problem-solving of hydropolitical matters (Personal interview, IF3
2010). Again, Israel’s narrative of Zionist redemption is deeply challenged
through this committee’s and others’ juxtaposition of the LJR’s acute
deterioration, the fact that Palestinians have no hand in its causes, and the
Palestinians’ direct involvement in building scenarios and approaches for
responding with shared sustainability. Indeed, practices associated with the
LJR initiative contribute to producing shared as well as Palestinian agency and
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legitimacy with respect to their claim of riparian status to the Jordan River, a
matter which was not explicitly addressed in the Oslo water agreements.
Before closing this section, it merits noting a few things. Some of the Israeli
FOEME water/peace practitioners engaged with the initiatives discussed above
are also involved in other transboundary FOEME-oriented and related
independent practices. The organisation itself is a member of the Palestinian-
Israeli Peace NGO Forum (PIPNGO Website), with one FOEME staff person
sitting on its Israeli board. Another is a board member of the Alliance for Middle
East Peace (ALLMEP), an organisation promoting people-to-people
peacebuilding (ALLMEP Website). Both IPCRI and AIES are also member
organisations of ALLMEP128.
For Israeli water/peace practitioners engaged through FOEME, perhaps most of
all, followed by IPCRI affiliates and then those with AIES, hydropolitical
peacebuilding is deeply inscribed in the wider effort to make peace between
Israel and the Palestinians, “creating constituents of peace” at multiple levels
(Personal interview, IF4 2010). As noted in an earlier section of the current
chapter, practitioners involved in AIES efforts imagine themselves also to be
                                                 
128 As with the two other transboundary organisations discussed in this study (IPCRI and
AIES), international funding has played a key role in perpetuating FOEME’s hydropolitical and
environmental peacebuilding work. Key funders for FOEME include EU’s SMAP Program and
its Partnerships for Peace Program, the US Government’s Wye River Program, the British
Government’s Global Opportunities Fund, and the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Fund. In more
recent years, funding has come from USAID’s Conflict Management and Mitigation program,
SIDA, as well as Belgium’s Peace Building Desk (Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation) among others. FOEME is poignantly aware that
their funding comes from the peacebuilding stream and not the transboundary water resources
stream because “donors agencies are very much focused in the water sector on their partner
country… but it is sad” (Personal interview, IF3 2010). Still, there is concrete evidence that
donors reward Palestinian communities that practice transboundary partnership-based
cooperation with Israeli ones (Personal interview, IF3 2010).
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involved in a growing transboundary peace constituency. On the Israeli and
FOEME side of things, participating in such constituencies has involved
perhaps more immediate giving than gaining; e.g. giving the Palestinians
discursive and material recognition of inequities and water rights as compared
to securing Israeli legitimacy and peace in the region. There is a deep
recognition among Israeli water/peace practitioners engaged with FOEME that
as the stronger party and actors in asymmetric conflict, it bears on Israel and
Israelis to relinquish perhaps more in the short-term, for longer-term shared,
equitable and mutually-gained benefits (Personal interview, IF1 2010; Personal
interview IF2 2010; Personal interview, IF3 2010; Personal interview, IF4 2010).
Analytic Reflection
Overall, FOEME’s projects and activities have endeavoured to cultivate a
transboundary culture and community, based on the transboundary framing of
issues and the development of transboundary relationships. It is a culture and
community practicing partnerships among equals rooted in sustainability and
equitable development. It is an organisation whose Israeli, Palestinian and
Jordanian practitioners are engaged in hydropolitical and environmental
peacebuilding in the terms defined by this study.
FOEME projects and practitioners engage in discursive practices that
recognises a kind of ontological equality of Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian
narratives, while supporting their transboundary production and circulation.
Notably, the GWN initiative is premised on relational practices anchored in
reflexive experience-sharing around different water realities. Doing so has
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produced relations of equality and partnership, supporting the sharing of
discourses intent on producing shared sustainability and equity rather than
perpetuating hydrohegemonic relations and subjectivities.
The water realities methodology also produces a discourse of responsibility.
Facilitation is pursued in ways that encourage participants to recognise the
multiple causes of water-related inequities. As theorised earlier in this study, a
critical recognition of power asymmetry and the causes of conflictual relations is
an important premise for the transformation of such relations. Similarly, water
realities practices are rooted in a wider intentionality of creating the conditions
for addressing and rectifying water and related injustices. The study has made
it evident that the GWN project as a whole has supported the development of
related equity and sustainability processes, as in the case of the scaled-up
Jordan River rehabilitation project.
Practices of sustainability of Israeli and other regional water/peace practitioners
here are pursued jointly and with agreed, collective, transboundary intention.
This is reflected in the practice of youth trustees endeavouring to improve the
efficiency of water use in each and all of their communities. It is also reflected in
the development of shared wastewater treatment facilities, transboundary
stream restoration and LJR rehabilitation efforts of practitioners. Indeed,
sustainability is jointly pursued and used as a practice of equitable partnership
rather than as a discursive device for the (re-) production of asymmetric and
hydrohegemonic power relations favouring Israel and Israelis. In these multiple
ways, Israeli water/peace practitioners engaged through FOEME can be said to
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be engaged in hydropolitical peacebuilding, without contemporary evidence or
threat of hydrohegemonic residue.
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Concluding Thoughts
This chapter has examined and discursively analysed the practices of Israeli
transboundary water/peace practitioners who are variously engaged in one
seminal academic and civil society initiative as well as several initiatives of
three transboundary water, environment and peace organisations. The first
Joint Management of Shared Aquifers initiative was launched during the years
of the Madrid/Oslo peace process and came to term at the end of the 1990s.
The other three weathered the storm of the second Palestinian Intifada and
adapted to the post-peace process realities, in some shared and some
particular ways.
Several of the shortcomings of the Madrid/Oslo process are themselves
embodied in the Joint Management initiative. Well-intentioned Israeli as well as
Palestinian water/peace practitioners worked in partnership with one another to
address a major issue of contention, i.e. transboundary water. Their partnership
practices sought to produce equality, but in important discursive ways failed to
do so. Nowhere is this more evident that in their intentional side-stepping of
equity as an objective and practice of partnership. These practitioners put-off
this difficult concern, to be addressed at a later time, by different people, in
another context.
This is perhaps not so eerily reminiscent of the construction of final status
issues, themselves put off to be addressed at a later time, in another context,
possibly by other people. Essentially, the technical work was pursued, while the
hydropolitical work was deferred. Such practice reflects Israeli hydrohegemony
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throughout the Madrid/Oslo process. It is important to learn from such a failure,
recognising that ‘peace’ processes demand and produce acknowledgement of
discursive equality for and of conflict actors and priorities. It is not enough that
conflict parties or actors cooperate or collaborate together. As evident from the
Madrid/Oslo process and related academic and civil society practices, such
partnerships and cooperative efforts may indeed be detrimental to
peacemaking and peacebuilding.
This chapter has also examined and analysed the Israeli practices of three
transboundary organisations, namely IPCRI, AIES and FOEME. They have
been grouped together for analytical purposes. They resemble one another in
important ways. For example, all are interested in building, sustaining and
expanding a transboundary water/peace community of practice. Their practices,
both in relation to expert practitioners and in an intergenerational frame, have
made important contributions in this respect. Upon closer examination, these
organisations are also quite different in several respects, as noted throughout
this study and reiterated succinctly below. Overall, these organisations are
often referred to together in studies on civil society, generally laudably though
also critically. However, they are rarely if ever compared to one another
discursively. Among other things, the current study modestly fills this gap in the
literature.
As similar organisations, they work in a transboundary manner. Their initiatives
are geared to address transboundary issues related to cross-border relations,
notably in terms of the environment and specifically water. To do so, these
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organisations bring together Israelis and cross-border Palestinian, Jordanian
and/or international partners. Their efforts specifically target peace issues, with
similarities and differences in the discursive practices of their Israeli
practitioners. Yet there are important discursive differences of note in some of
their practices. Thus, a concluding examination of their Israeli water/peace
practices informs this study’s overall discussion of hydropolitical peacebuilding.
IPCRI is the longest standing of the three organisations, with an institutional
leadership structure comprised of Israelis and Palestinians. It has been a
central enabler of transboundary cooperation, creating opportunities for a broad
range of water/peace discourses to critically confront one another. Its Israeli
practitioners, in coalescence with its Palestinian practitioners, have engaged in
ways that endeavour to tip the asymmetric balance in favour of the Palestinians
in production of greater discursive symmetry. IPCRI has done this over much of
its 20-plus years, reflecting a discursive practice of hydropolitical peacebuilding
as defined in this study. IPCRI’s Israeli practitioners practice and enable
transboundary cooperative partnerships. They seek to promote the equality of
Israeli and Palestinian discourses, while notably advocating for Israel to give
the Palestinians “a fair deal”. Without such fairness, or equity, there can be no
prospect for peace.
IPCRI’s Israeli practitioners engaged in hydropolitical peacebuilding also betray
a discrete hydrohegemonic residue. IPCRI’s water/peace practice involves
dialoguing with Palestinians about the merits of making compromises in
pursuing solutions that advance their human needs, for water, sanitation and
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other vital environmental services, though they may not advance Palestinian
human rights. Such practice is sometimes discouraged, even denounced as
violent and counter-productive by perpetuating Israel’s dominance and
producing greater Palestinian dependency on Israel. Even without going so far,
the critique of hydrohegemonic residue suggests in this case that IPCRI’s
Israeli water/peace practice may not reflect an appreciation of the extent to
which the Palestinian hydropolitical self-determination movement may be
unwilling to make Faustian bargains with Israel and Israelis for the short-term
welfare of Palestinian communities, for better or worse.
The second of the three transboundary organisations, the AIES, differs from the
others in that its Director is Israeli and its leadership structure is asymmetrically
Israeli and Jewish. At a project level, there is greater symmetry evident, which
is also the case in AIES practices. Israeli practitioners at AIES engaged in
hydropolitical work are also recognised as engaging in hydropolitical
peacebuilding practice as per the terms of this study, though with the threat of
hydrohegemonic residue.
Israeli AIES water/peace practitioners engage in partnership with both
Palestinians and Jordanians. They cultivate relational equality and create
meaningful opportunities for transboundary practitioner collaboration and
intergenerationality. They enable a range of discursive practices to come into
contact and negotiation with one another. They also endeavour to leverage the
participation of external actors to contribute to the production of project-based
equality, cognisant of the structural and relational asymmetric context. These
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practitioners also engage in the production of transboundary and environmental
peacebuilding through programming such as PELS.
While considered as practicing hydropolitical peacebuilding, there is in the case
of the AIES a threatening hydrohegemonic residue of note. The predominant
threat identified in this study resides within the funding trend at the AIES.
Transboundary water cooperation has historically been funded by international
donors. Increasingly, the Israeli government has demonstrated interest in AIES
transboundary practices. This is reflected in growing funding and support it has
offered to the AIES, welcomed by the organisation and its Israeli leadership.
Such a trend may become a threat to the integrity and perpetuation of
hydropolitical peacebuilding practices of Israeli practitioners at the AIES, should
Israeli water/peace practitioner discourse become dominated by technical
considerations, in response to a possible eventual growing unwillingness to
critique an important donor.
Of all three transboundary organisations discussed in this study, FOEME is
practicing hydropolitical peacebuilding with the least hydrohegemonic residue, if
nearly at all, as reflected in its Israeli water/peace practitioner discourse. There
are clear and specific reasons for this conclusion, re-iterated in the final pages
of this chapter. FOEME’s leadership structure and practice is completely
transboundary, bringing together Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians. Israeli
water/peace practitioners at FOEME do everything in intimate transboundary
cooperation with Palestinian and Jordanian partners. Equality among partners
is evident and produced at all levels and in all practices; though it is impossible
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for them to fully and completely escape the overall structural context of Israel’s
occupation.
FOEME water/peace practitioners engage in practices that bring together the
dominant technical discourse privileged by Israel and the political discourse
pursued counter-hegemonically by Palestinians. They engage directly with
issues of equity and responsibility, through transboundary knowledge
production, e.g. water realities. They engage in the material production of
initiatives that respond to such concerns for equity, creating longer-term
commitments in project communities and throughout the region. The discourse
of sustainability pursued by Israelis at FOEME is such that it is leveraged for
the production of equitable development and eco-systemic health on the
ground. Sustainability practices are intentionally situated to construct relational
equality and material benefits. Even some of the most critical Palestinian
leaders (e.g. those associated with HAMAS) have chosen to reserve their
critique of FOEME practices, if not provide support for their activities outright
(Personal interview, IF3 2010; Personal interview, PF1 2010).
In so many ways, Israeli water/peace practitioners engaged through FOEME
pursue practices that are critical and contestatory, as well as associational,
bringing together two important strands of civil society practice (Kaldor, 2003).
They intentionally identify and reject the hydrohegemonic relational model while
practicing an alternative model of partnership rooted in transboundary equality,
equity and shared sustainability. Such practices are understood as building a
relational culture that is desirable to all partners, given the existing and
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historical political and relational hydropolitical context. Of course, this may
change in response to changing political circumstance (Jabri, 2007a: 172-173).
Interestingly, such a political change did in fact take place for FOEME, when it
was confronted with the end of the Madrid/Oslo process and the emergence of
the second Palestinian Intifada. Far from being detrimentally perceived, this
reveals FOEME’s adaptive practice as a transboundary hydropolitical
peacebuilding organisation, dynamically engaged in, responding to and shaping
the politics of peace in the Middle East.
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CONCLUSION
Introduction
In recent years, the discursive significance of cooperation between people and
organisations across conflict lines has become a central question in the field of
Peace Studies (Jabri, 2007a; Ramsbotham et al., 2005). The current study has
contributed to a few contemporary debates in this field, with specific reference
to the protracted, asymmetric and violent Israel-Palestinian conflict. In doing so,
it has specifically examined and discursively analysed the cooperative practices
of Israeli (and also Palestinian) transboundary water/peace practitioners.
The purpose and methodology of this work has been to assess whether, and if
so, how, Israeli practitioners are constrained in their practice by a discourse of
Israeli hydrohegemony; whether, and if so, how they are practicing
hydropolitical peacebuilding; whether, and if so, how their ostensibly peaceable
practice is marred by hydropolitical residues. With the conclusion of this study,
there is an opportunity to share a few closing remarks about transboundary
practice and peacebuilding in the conflictual Middle East, and in other conflict
environments.
This conclusion is structured in four substantive parts. The first will revisit the
transboundary community of water/peace practitioners. Drawing on the analysis
pursued throughout this work, it will restate that while there is generally
considered to be one transboundary community of water/peace practitioners,
there are at least three identifiable discourses in practice. Thus, it may be said
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that there are three discursive communities in practice. These reflect the broad
critical framework used in this study, comprising hydrohegemony, hydropolitical
peacebuilding, and hydrohegemonic residues.
The second concluding section reflects upon the relevance of transboundary
environmental and natural resources, and water more specifically, as a location
of peacebuilding, both with respect to the Israel-Palestinian conflict and
elsewhere. This study concludes that cooperation over environment, natural
resources, and water more specifically, does not inevitably and invariably
contribute to ‘peace’ or constitute ‘peacebuilding’ practice in conflict
environments. For this to be the case, however, such cooperation will likely
pursue and engage in critique, resistance, desistance, and alternative relational
formations in practice, with a clear analysis of contextualised power relations.
In the third section, reflections are shared about hydrohegemony and the Israel-
Palestinian conflict specifically. This study was initiated and pursued from a
place of concern for the violence of relations between Israel and the
Palestinians, certainly since 1967, even throughout the peace process of the
1990s and into the 2000s. There are many longstanding and proximate causes
to this violence, stemming from both Israeli and Palestinian actions and
aspirations. Indeed, both bear some agency and responsibility for this violence.
There are also multiple reasons for its perpetuation and the failure of peace
processes, again stemming from both Israeli and Palestinian actions and
practices. What this study has made evident, and it is by no means exhaustive,
is that intentional dominance/hegemony, in this case hydrohegemony, generally
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does not and likely even cannot manifest as a practice of positive peace. In this
respect, it bears upon Israel and Israelis to transform ideations and practices of
hydro/hegemony, if indeed positive peace is, or will ever be the primary
intention and pursuit of Israel in its relations with the Palestinians.
A final concluding section will articulate some of the research implications
stemming from this study. These will be framed in terms of (a) hydropolitical
peacebuilding both within and outside the Middle East, (b) the significance of
produced water to conflict relations, (c) the peacebuilding significance of
cooperation related to environmental resources other than water, (d) the
significance of academic and civil society practice to peacebuilding, and (e) the
use of interpretive practice as a methodology for conflict and peace research.
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Discursive Communities in Practice
This study set out to examine and assess the discursive practice of Israeli
water/peace practitioners engaged in transboundary cooperation with
Palestinians (and also Jordanians and internationals). Building on the work of
several earlier studies, these practitioners are understood to participate in a
transboundary community of practitioners engaged in the production of
water/peace. What this study has concluded is that there may be one
overarching community of practitioners, but there are at least three discursive
water/peace communities in practice. These discursive communities may be
framed meaningfully and respectively as engaged in practices of
hydrohegemony, hydropolitical peacebuilding, and hydrohegemonic residue.
These are certainly not neat categorisations of people and organisations, as
there is some overlap between them. However, for analytic and heuristic
purposes, it is insightful to construct such communities in practice and to
associate discursive practices with each.
At the highest level, this study has found that Israeli water/peace practitioners
are discursively differentiated between government-aligned practitioners on the
one hand and civil society practitioners on the other. Among civil society
practitioners, there are those that are technically-oriented and those that are
politically-oriented. A few words will be shared about each, while specifically
highlighting the hydropolitical peacebuilding of Israeli, civil society, politically-
oriented practitioners. This last discursive community of, and more specifically
in practice is referred to as the transformative group, for perhaps obvious
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reasons. Let us however begin with government-aligned water/peace
practitioners and practices.
Israeli Government-Aligned Practice
All water/peace practitioners interviewed for this study who worked for or
advised the Israeli government were closely aligned with a dominant Israeli
perspective, engaging in hydrohegemonic practice. Such alignment has
manifested in different ways, and this despite the fact that all were rooted in a
desire to promote peace with the Palestinians through cooperative practice.
Their hydrohegemony is visible through a primary desire to perpetuate Israel’s
dominance in its relations with the Palestinians. As one practitioner explained,
making the link between water resources and peace processes  (Personal
interview, IG5 2010):
We are short of water. But what was very clever of our water negotiators
at the time, the Late Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister, he is very clever and
strategic... We give them water, we please them, and we hold them.
Always we can close [the tap]. They get water from [the] Sea of Galilee
and we can stop it. So it is strategic… Even if we have the peace, and
everything will be smooth, I do not advise the Israeli government to close
the air force or the tanks division. You still should have it, in case things
will happen in this area. Always we should be strong. But if you [are]
strong from the peace agreement, you are much stronger.
This hydrohegemony is also visible in these practitioners’ commitment to
technical as opposed to political solutions, thereby rejecting the expansion of
Palestinian water rights in favour of Palestinian water needs delivered by Israel.
In this sense, hydrohegemony entails the perpetuation of an Israeli provider-
Palestinian client/consumer relationship. It reflects an Israeli unwillingness to
accept responsibility and then pursue compensation for any injustices caused
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by Israel’s occupation and its continued infrastructural development of West
Bank, transboundary water resources.
This hydrohegemony is also deeply rooted in a narrative of necessity, as
outlined in this study. The following passage from an Israeli government
water/peace practitioner poignantly reiterates several elements of this narrative
(Personal interview, IW1 2010):
They do not have a problem to lie… We are already becoming tired
because they are not telling the truth. Now, not to us. With us they speak
the truth. We know the truth. They know the truth. They cannot lie. But
when they are in different places, they say things that are not true…This
is the Palestinians. One of their objectives is to delegitimate Israel.
This passage reflects the immense chasm of distrust that exists between Israel
and the Palestinians. For Israeli government (and government-aligned)
water/peace practitioners, hydrohegemony is understood to be a necessity, one
that can even accompany a stated desire for bilateral, albeit negative peace.
At the next level, this study has distinguished between government and civil
society water/peace practitioners. Simply put, the former have been found to
engage in hydrohegemonic practice. The latter are a diverse group, with
practitioners distinguishable between those that are engaged in hydropolitical
peacebuilding and those that have been referred to as principally
hydrohegemonically residual in their practice. For the purposes of clarity
through contrast, the next passage will focus on hydropolitical peacebuilding
discursive practices. Subsequently, a few words will be said about those where
hydrohegemonic residues are in evidence.
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Transformative Civil Society Practice
In sharp contrast to Israeli government-aligned practitioners engaged in
hydrohegemonic practice, a transformative group of Israeli, civil society,
politically-oriented practitioners has been discursively identified through the
current study. This is a numerically small group of people who actively and
intentionally engage in relational practices that are characterisable as
hydropolitical peacebuilding. Their practices are grounded in equality,
partnership, equity and the pursuit of shared sustainability. They also
intentionally challenge the pillars of Israel’s justificatory narrative underpinning
its hydrohegemony.
Transformative group practitioners, identifiable in this study as Israeli
practitioners engaged in three transboundary civil society organisations, largely
though with some variability recognise the legitimacy and pursue the equality of
both their Palestinian counterparts and political discourses. They work in
partnerships among equals, in developing a shared sustainability. The practice
they pursue is strongly anchored in a sense that equity is a fundamental pillar of
peace in the region, and that it must be structured into transboundary
partnership practices. Further, as Israelis, they reject the inevitability and
necessity of relating to Palestinians as threatening subjects. As stated by one
Israeli practitioner (Personal interview, IE2 2010 in abridged form):
[P]artners also means that there is a level playing field. It does not mean
a hierarchy, by any means… When I work in partnership with a person or
an organisation, I do my best to remove that hierarchy as much as I can.
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Hydropolitical peacebuilding practice reflects a deep understanding that water
and the environment more broadly are not simply technical issues that can be
resolved with the development of greater strategic infrastructure. Indeed, they
strike a balance between technical and political orientations, much more so that
any other water/peace practitioners in the region. They bring to the surface
issues of responsibility and equity, contributing to the transformation of Israeli-
Palestinian relations just as they respond to environmental issues on the
ground. Indeed, sustainable water and environmental management and
cooperation are understood to be implicitly connected to peaceable
transboundary relations, rooted in equality, partnership and equity. It is for this
very reason that their discursive practice is understood in terms of hydropolitical
peacebuilding.
Hydrohegemonically Residual Practice
A third community in discourse has been found to comprise civil society
water/peace practitioners who practice and circulate some, but neither all nor
necessarily most of the theorised dimensions of hydrohegemony. Between
hydrohegemony and hydropolitical peacebuilding, their discursive practices are
primarily recognisable as being infused with, and marred by hydrohegemonic
residues. The current section begins with a discussion of the pre-eminence of
such hydrohegemonic residues among technically-oriented civil society
practitioners engaged in transboundary water cooperation. It concludes with a
reflection on the power of ever-threatening hydrohegemonic residues.
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Among civil society water/peace practitioners, there are those with a strong
technical orientation to their work. These practitioners operate in transboundary
contexts, building strong transboundary affinities and friendships, sharing
projects together and the like. They do not however show evidence of
intentionally and reflexively engaging in the political dimensions or implications
of their work with transformative intent. It may be said that their practices
perpetuate dimensions, or echoes of hydrohegemony without necessarily
actively supporting it. Of course, this is a murky line indeed. As one such
technically-oriented civil society practitioner explained (Personal interview, IG2
2010):
I think that the people who have been involved in the [GLOWA] project
have become aware of the problems and issues that our colleagues from
Jordan and Palestine face…. I must say regretfully that the political
divisions overshadow whatever the awareness of your neighbours’
problems and concerns spilling over into your own work. Very little of
that. We are aware of it. But if your question is whether this has found
explicit expression in what we are doing, the question is, most of the
time, “no”.
In other words, technically-oriented civil society practitioners have largely
chosen or resigned themselves to the belief that their practice has little to no
political or transformative significance. In so doing, their water/peace practice
does nothing to critique, arrest or transform hydrohegemony as discussed in
this study.
Their practice is situated in the liminal space of knowing the Palestinian other
as a colleague, very much other than the Palestinian narratively constituted into
a threatening subject (as per the Israeli justificatory narrative). Yet this practice
manifests gingerly, even apologetically, ever reticent to engage critically and
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transformatively with Israel’s narratively justified hydrohegemony. By
comparison, the discursive practice of hydropolitical peacebuilding variously
and fundamentally critiques, resists, desists and engages in alternative
relational formations as compared to hydrohegemonic practice.
This study has also discussed hydrohegemonic residues as threats, notably
where there is solid evidence that water/peace practitioners are pre-eminently
engaged in hydropolitical peacebuilding. In asymmetric conflicts like the Israel-
Palestinian conflict, the discursive pressure to conform generated and imposed
by the over-arching hegemony on civil society practitioners is powerful indeed.
In such conflicts, conformity is understood as hegemonically-oriented alignment
in practice and ideation.
What this study has found is that those Israeli civil society practitioners
engaged in hydropolitical peacebuilding are operating in an overall
hydrohegemonic context from which they cannot fully escape (in foucauldian
parlance). Among other things, they are confronted with hydrohegemonically
threatening opportunities (e.g. new sources of funding from Israel). Also, they
frequently take calculated risks under the banner of peacebuilding (e.g. in
transboundary wastewater management programming). In these and many
other cases discussed in this work, such practitioners are constantly making
choices about how to pursue their hydropolitical work. In this study, their
discursive practices have primarily been framed as hydropolitical peacebuilding,
yet ever cognisant of the hydrohegemonic residues that threaten to undermine
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the very aspirations and hopes invested in their programmes, projects and
initiatives.
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Environmental Cooperation
Transformative group discursive practices offer valuable insights to the study of
hydropolitics and eco-politics in conflict regions more widely. An important
research concern in the field of Peace Studies is about the peacebuilding
significance of cooperation on environment and natural resources (including but
not limited to water). This particular study has found that environmental
cooperation does not inevitably or invariably contribute to peace or promote
peacebuilding in conflict environments. However, there are specific practices
associated with such cooperation that more than likely need to be pursued for,
and as peacebuilding. Reiterating a few points made in the previous section
and throughout this study, to promote peace and practice peacebuilding, such
cooperation will likely engage in critique, resistance, desistance, and alternative
relational formations with a clear analysis of contextualised power relations.
Beginning with the last point, it is essential that any such study make visible the
power relations of parties within a specific context. In this study, such visibility
was pursued through a critical, historical study of Israel’s relations with the
Palestinians. Bringing nuance and depth to this analysis, the study highlights
specific time periods during which these relations were significantly impacted or
changed. The study joins that of others (e.g. Zeitoun, 2009; Elmusa, 1997;
Lowi, 1993) in demonstrating the progressive construction of an Israeli
hydrohegemonic relation with the Palestinians.
Against this framework, and drawing on the methodology of interpretive
practice, this study then examined and assessed the discursive practices of
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Israeli, transboundary, water/peace practitioners. In so doing, it became clear
that hydropolitical peacebuilding is recognisable where practices of critique,
resistance, desistance, and alternative relational formation are being pursued.
A few words will be said about each of these, with reference to transformative
group practice in the context of the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
The transformative group as a community in discourse was found to be critical
of Israel’s hydrohegemonic relations with the Palestinians, unwilling to (re-)
produce such relations. In practice, they desist from (re-) producing Israel’s
larger hegemony as domain-specific hydrohegemony, pursuing relational
equality, partnership, equity and shared sustainability. They further resist the
Israeli regime of truth, discussed here in terms of a hydrohegemonic
justificatory narrative. A few points are worth highlighting about their practice in
this respect:
• They work as though Israel is no longer a victim, such that Israeli
practitioners must grapple with the fact of their being asymmetrically
more powerful actors than Palestinians;
• Their practice interprets the West Bank occupation as violence and not
redemption, despite the Jewish religious affinities of many practitioners;
• They operate on the assumption that Jewish biblical and historical rights
are limited, and that they must equitably confront the Palestinian claim of
water rights;
• They recognise and engage with the mutual facts of Israeli and
Palestinian un/sustainability, and of the environmental and socio-political
unsustainability of the Jewish redemption of Biblical Zion, rather than
leverage a discourse of sustainability to perpetuate Israeli dominance;
• They recognise that Israel’s claimed water-related ‘benevolence’ towards
the Palestinians is self-deceptive, even violent, and does not justify or
legitimate a continued provider-client relation; and
• They draw political distinctions between Palestinian practices rather than
lumping all Palestinians together into a totalising threat.
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The transformative group also practices alternative relational formations with
Palestinians, intently producing equality, partnership, equity and shared
sustainability. These relations are not all the same but are produced with a
diversity that befits critical, resistant, desistant and alternatives-oriented
practitioners. Drawing on insights from this study, transboundary environmental
cooperation benefits from being examined (both objectively and reflexively)
through such a discursive lens, in context. Environmental and water-domain
cooperation more specifically does not inevitably contribute to peace or produce
peacebuilding. To be anything of the sort, such cooperation must intentionally
engage with the violence of its particular relational context.
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On Peace with the Palestinians
The current section is seen as an opportunity to say a few words about
hydrohegemony and Israel-Palestinian peace in broader terms. Much word-
space was used in this study to examine Israel-Palestinian peace processes,
including and in particular the Madrid/Oslo processes. One of the perspectives
developed focused on Israel’s intentional dominance in relations with the
subjugated Palestinians. This Israeli hegemony was discussed in broad terms
while focusing on the water domain (in terms of hydrohegemony). As such,
hydrohegemony was examined as constitutive of Israel’s peacemaking practice.
This study has not focused principally on peacemaking processes, strategies or
tactics, but on peacebuilding. It is not therefore in its purview to draw extensive
theoretically-informed conclusions about peacemaking. Nonetheless, the
methodology of interpretive practice has made it essential to examine
discourses in practice and discursive practices, having them speak to one
another. In addition to exacting a deep reading of the relational literature on the
Israel-Palestinian conflict, this methodological choice has entailed extensive
interviewing with Israeli, but also Palestinian, water/peace practitioners. Having
discursively analysed the practices of Israeli practitioners, much of the
remaining space will draw on Palestinian water/peace practitioner interviews to
say a few words about hydrohegemony and peace, with relevance to
peacemaking as well as peacebuilding.
Palestinian discourses of water rights, partnership, equity and sustainability can
all be understood to share one central political message (among others, of
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course). In the simplest terms, the Palestinians aspire to self-determination, and
endeavour towards its realisation. This is largely understood to mean formal
statehood, as made evident by the recent Palestinian bid for full UN recognition.
As explained by one Palestinian participant (Personal interview, PW7 2010):
I believe I have [the] right to have a nation, to have my sovereignty over
my natural resources, without harming, with an appreciation for the
international law and principles. Very simple.
It is also and perhaps more profoundly understood to mean independence,
notably in terms of Palestinian relations with Israel, as explained by another
Palestinian participant (Personal interview, PW2 2010).
We believe in [a] two-state solution. We believe in peace and I believe
also that peace cannot happen unless there is a solid backing ground for
peace to take place. That means that Israelis have to respect our water
rights whether in indigenous water resources or transboundary water
resources. If that does not happen, the peace will be fragile…
The Palestinian water/peace practitioners interviewed for this study reveal a
willingness, even a desire to continue being engaged relationally with Israelis,
as equal but not subjugated partners (Personal interview, PW5 2010).
[W]e have to establish a fair relationship and not coexistence between
slaves or people under occupations and occupier. So occupation has to
be changed. Even in the water issue.
This point is shared widely by all Palestinians interviewed. In a related vein,
Palestinians also draw parallels between transboundary water/peace practice
among practitioners and cooperation at bi-national level, as reflected in the
following passage (Personal interview, PW2 2010).
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To add to this, all the time the Israelis act as an upper hand. They come
and they give orders. We do this and then the Palestinians do what they
order. Nobody accepts that anymore. We need to develop peace, to
defuse this upper hand attitude… This has to disappear and to be
replaced by cooperation. Cooperation, you need to develop things and
projects so people can cooperate on an equal basis… [C]ooperation is
the key for peace, but this, the peace, has to recognise our water rights
in full. We have to have absolute sovereignty over our water. There is no
meaning if we have a state and Israel is still controlling our water
resources, that means... you have an independent state and Israel
controls the tap of our country.
In process, Palestinians interviewed for this study call on Israel to make real
material progress with the Palestinians, to build and not undermine the
sometimes fragile confidence already developed among transboundary
water/peace practitioners. As explained by one Palestinian research participant
(Personal interview, PW6 2010):
It is hard for me to feel I am doing some peace projects while I cannot
dig into my land to find some water. And I know there is water there but
you cannot dig because you have limitations [on] the depth you can dig
for. And if you start digging, you will find [Israeli] IDF forces coming to
your land and sometimes they will take the digger, or they will kick them
out or they will stop them. It is your land. How would you feel if you were
digging for water and someone comes and prevents you from digging for
water? You need it for planting trees. You need it for drinking… Until you
stop feeling these issues, feeling threatened about not finding some
water, opening the tap, and finding no water, maybe you feel better, but
we have our own problems to deal with. What peace? What water? I
cannot see the water.
Still, the Palestinians interviewed in this study continue to cooperate with
Israelis, to work together, organising conferences together, attending joint
workshops, developing joint projects, publishing articles, disseminating results
and building the future, both uninationally and cooperatively. Such cooperation
is undertaken within power-laden relational contexts, such that cooperation is
itself a power-laden relation constituted by power-laden capillary relationships.
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As discussed throughout this study, such cooperation is largely
hydrohegemonic, or at best hydrohegemonically residual.
Within this wider hydro/hegemony, this study found that a small, narrow group
of transboundary water/peace practitioners are engaged in transformative
practice, framed herein as hydropolitical peacebuilding. In various ways and
perhaps to different degrees, these Israeli practitioners have grown to
appreciate the fundamental lesson contained in the very simple yet powerful
statement of one long-standing Palestinian water/peace practitioner: “People in
control do not have peace in mind...” (Personal interview, PW1 2010) The
transformative practice of Israeli, transboundary water/peace practitioners
engaged in hydropolitical peacebuilding is fundamentally informed by the
values contained in this simple yet poignant message. Israel and its leaders
would do well to learn from these practitioners, as they imagine, construct and
practice the next stage of peacemaking with Palestinians.
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Research Implications
This final concluding section affords an opportunity to concisely express the
research implications stemming from the study. There are specifically five areas
for study that are highlighted. These are discussed in terms of (a) hydropolitical
peacebuilding both within and outside the Middle East, (b) the significance of
produced water to conflict relations, (c) the peacebuilding significance of
cooperation related to environmental resources other than water, (d) the
significance of academic and civil society practice to peacebuilding, and (e) the
use of interpretive practice as a methodology for conflict and peace research.
Hydropolitical Peacebuilding Both Within and Outside the Middle East
On the first point, the current study is one among many that assesses the
significance of water to Israel-Palestinian conflict and peace. However, it makes
an original contribution in analysing the discursive practices of Israeli academic
and civil society water/peace practitioners within the explicitly articulated
context of Israel’s hydrohegemony and its related justificatory narrative. This
study is of course not the final word on the subject. There are numerous other
programmes, projects and practices of the three transboundary organisations
that may be studied in this way. There are also other organisations engaged in
transboundary water/peace whose activities and practice could be analysed in
terms of hydropolitical peacebuilding.
Further afield, water-domain practices in asymmetric conflict environments
other than the Israel-Palestinian milieu might also be studied through the
theoretical framework herein developed. Of particular interest are hydropolitical
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relational practices between Turkey and the Kurds, between China and the
Tibetans, between newly-established South Sudan and its Nile Basin
neighbours, and between the powerfully-differentiated states above the Guarani
Aquifer in South America.
Significance of Produced Water to Conflict Relations
This study has brought to light discursive cleavages between technical and
political approaches to water cooperation, management and development in the
context of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. In so doing, it speaks critically to the
idea that increasing quantities of water available to conflict parties neutralises
and prevents water-related conflict between them. This study concludes that
this is not necessarily the case, notably in the conflictual Middle East, given that
water has been a material, symbolic, relational and political resource. While it is
essential for the basic human need for water to be satisfied, it does indeed
matter how this is done, sensitive to the power relations thereby constructed,
(re-) produced and perpetuated within historical context. In the Israel-
Palestinian context, increasing quantities of non-conventional water currently
produced and supplied by Israel have enabled the perpetuation of Israel’s
hydrohegemony rather than contributing to the peaceable transformation of the
relational order.
It is said that the global hydrological future is found in produced water. In this
vein, seawater desalination is being pursued aggressively across the planet
(and is indeed expanding). This includes areas of potential and escalated
protracted, asymmetric and violent conflict, notably in the Middle East, North
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Africa and Australia. There is significant research potential in analysing the
peacebuilding significance of non-conventional, and specifically desalinated
waters to relations between conflict parties in these regions and elsewhere.
Peacebuilding Significance of Cooperation on Environmental Resources
Other than Water
As a theoretical guide, hydropolitical peacebuilding is rooted in principles of
equality, partnership, equity and shared sustainability. It is articulated in the
form of critical, resistant and desistant practices, as well as the active pursuit of
alternative relational formations between conflict actors, cognisant of the
dominant relational context. In many ways, hydropolitical peacebuilding and
environmental peacebuilding are mutually-constitutive bodies of thought, with
the former theoretically stemming from the latter. In this sense, the theoretical
choices made to construct what is referred to herein as hydropolitical
peacebuilding can indeed be applicable elsewhere, with reference to
environmental resources other than water.
In the Middle East, a hydropolitical peacebuilding analysis may be leveraged to
look at Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and management on the matter of
hazardous waste, a significant transboundary area of concern and practice. It
may be used to further assess the peacebuilding significance of both shared
and separate efforts of Israeli and Palestinian ecopolitical practitioners to
protect the region’s biodiversity and open spaces. In the Israel-Palestinian
region, it is often said that nature knows no boundaries. Yet, the spaces of the
Israel-Palestinian conflict are nothing if not fragmented, bordered, securitised
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and contested. Outside the Middle East, the analysis of hydropolitical
peacebuilding could meaningfully be leveraged to study relations between
indigenous and non-indigenous communities on matters of resource
governance. In Canada, the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement (CBFA) would
be an insightful place to start, given the asymmetric relational context
underpinning this agreement (penned by environmental NGOs and forestry
sector corporations), and its inclusions/exclusions of aboriginal knowledge.
Significance of Academic and Civil Society Practice to Peacebuilding
Most of the research and analysis on water, conflict and peace in terms of
Israel-Palestinian relations has focused on inter-governmental and/or
sanctioned processes. In the current study, this is also done, but as a critical (if
fundamental) discursively contextualising exercise rather that as the primary
purpose of study. Further, the current study has analytically focused on the
relational practices of academic and civil society water/peace practitioners.
Drawing on the foucauldian notion that power is expressed, (re-) produced and
circulated through extensive capillary circuits, this study has privileged socio-
political capillary practices found in academic and civil society-based relations
and relationships. In so doing, this study has made visible the expression and
operation of hydrohegemony, hydropolitical peacebuilding and hydrohegemonic
residues among and between Israelis and Palestinians, by comparison and in
contrast to Israel and the Palestinians.
Such an approach to the study of power and peacebuilding may prove valuable
to the analysis of other conflict areas, both in terms of water and more broadly,
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wherever there is evidence of transboundary communities of practice. For
instance, relations between recognised and controversial riparians of the Tigris-
Euphrates system may be studied through inter-state relations (notably
including Kurdish representation). It may also be studied through an
ethnomethodological and discursive analysis of the academic-practitioner
Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC). In this and other cases, doing
so would also enable an analysis of relational subjecthood formations, drawing
on the hydropolitical peacebuilding factors of equality, partnership, equity and
shared sustainability. Doing so would also allow for a contextualised
appreciation of the hydrohegemonic residues of practitioners seeking to
promote and practice peacebuilding.
Use of Interpretive Practice as a Methodology for Conflict and Peace
Research
The current study has been anchored in a methodology of interpretive practice,
itself making visible discourse-in-practice and discursive practices. This
methodology relies on methods that include ethnography and foucaldian
discourse analysis, to which was supplemented narrative construction and
analysis in this study. As a methodology of conflict and peace research,
interpretive practice has been valuable in enabling the unfolding story of civil
society relational practices to be told while juxtaposing and comparing it to the
dominant relational context.
Such a methodological approach to the study of conflict and peace is valuable
given that the politics of peace and peacebuilding, as well as relational
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practices on the ground are altogether ever changing. Interpretive practice
provides a methodological basis for studying these changing socio-political
practices, and ideational and meaningful formations. As a way to assess the
peacebuilding significance of specific programmes, projects and activities on
the ground in conflict environments, interpretive practice provides a way for
theorists to explicitly articulate the context within which political relevance may
be gauged. It allows researchers and theorist-practitioners to gain an
ethnographically rich and discursively-laden appreciation of multi-sectoral and
multi-level conflict relations and relational practices. Such knowledge is
valuable for those who engage in reflexive action with respect to the
peacebuilding significance of practices on the ground. As such, the
methodology of interpretive practice itself paves the way for a critical, reflexive
and appreciative research practice in the field of peace studies.
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Concluding Thoughts
This doctoral research project has framed and discussed Israel’s
hydrohegemony as a relation of protracted and asymmetric violence in the
Israel-Palestinian context. Hydrohegemony has filtered into the relational
discourse, ideationally and practically, of a majority of Israelis. It is produced
through different relational domains, including transboundary water resource
management and cooperation. And it is justified and reproduced through an
Israeli justificatory narrative that poignantly contains and limits relational
possibilities for the future. The relational order thereby produced is principally of
Israeli dominance and Palestinian subjugation, of Israel as provider and the
Palestinians as clients, of independent Israeli statehood and of Palestinians
under occupation.
Within this asymmetric relational context, a small contingent of Israeli (and
Palestinian) water/peace practitioners has taken meaningful risks. These
practitioners have critiqued Israel’s hydrohegemony, they have both resisted
and desisted from participating in its (re-) production, and they have continued
to imagine and practice alternative relational formations. Their discursive
practices of hydropolitical peacebuilding, their ways of seeing and doing, their
real efforts on the ground, make it clear that this powerful hegemonic, relational
system is not totalistic if totalising. There are people, in this case water/peace
practitioners, who both imagine and meaningfully build diverse Israeli-
Palestinian relations as compared to the one dominantly prescribed.
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It is obviously not clear from the current research if such hydropolitical
peacebuilding is likely to bring an end the Israel-Palestinian conflict, this being
neither this study’s purpose nor methodology. What can be said, in conclusion,
is that the dominant relational formation of hydrohegemony (and hegemony
more broadly) has thus far powerfully perpetuated violence. That some Israelis
are imagining and practicing something profoundly and relationally other, rooted
in recognition of Palestinian equality, in transboundary partnership, motivated
by a deep human need for shared equity and sustainability, provides a powerful
glimpse into a perhaps more peaceful alternative relational world.
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APPENDIX 4
Email request to participate in the research project, including preliminary
acknowledgement of informed consent
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A WATER COMMUNITY AND PEACE
RESEARCH PROJECT
Dear (potential research participant),
 
I wish to invite you, as a water and peace practitioner, to participate in a
research project designed to appreciate the significance of ‘transboundary
water community’ engagements with respect to Middle East peace efforts. The
interview process is designed as an opportunity for you to reflect on what you
do, claim and imagine in terms of water (management, development and
projection) and peace, given the wider Israel/Palestinian conflict.
 
My overall research question is as follows: How do you, a water community
member, imagine your transboundary water efforts with reference to the claim
of contributing to peace in the Middle East?
 
The commitment you make in participating at this stage entails a 2-hour, semi-
structured interview that I would conduct with you (with possible follow-up for
clarification purposes). This interview is a component of my PhD research in the
field of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. I would be most grateful for
your participation.
 
I shall be in the Israel from July 2 to 9 and again from July 14 to 22. I will be
pleased to meet at a location that is convenient to you. Please propose two
alternative times and a location where this might take place.
 
In agreeing to the interview, you are giving informed consent, indicating that
you are participating freely, and that you have been assured of confidentiality
(except where you have chosen to waive it). It is entirely within your right to
terminate an interview and withdraw from the research project at any time. I
would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have about the
research project at this or any later stage.
 
Thank you for your time and considered response.
I hope to have the pleasure of meeting with you soon.
 
Sincerely,
Eric Abitbol
PhD (ABD) Researcher
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Who I am: Eric Abitbol BA (McGill), MSc (LSE)
A Peace and Sustainability researcher and practitioner, currently undertaking
PhD studies at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford (UK), I
have studied and engaged in water and peacebuilding processes over 18
years, notably in the Middle East and on the African continent. At several
Canadian universities (Concordia, St-Paul, York), I continue to teach peace
studies, ecopolitics, global governance and sustainable development. I am an
Associate Fellow at York’s Institute for Research and Innovation in
Sustainability (IRIS) and an International Advisory Committee member of the
Journal of Peacebuilding and Development (American University, DC).
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APPENDIX 5
List of research participants
The following listing reflects the self-perception of research participants as
practitioners diversely situated at the nexus of water and peace in the Middle
East. While some have waived their right to confidentiality, the identity of all
participants has been concealed to reflect this researcher’s choice, in
acknowledgement of considerations stemming from the Israel-Palestinian
conflict environment. The organisational and/or professional affiliation of
participants has been selectively included, reflecting also their requests and
waivers of confidentiality.
Israeli Participants: Government-Aligned
IG4 Nature Conservation Expert, Israel Nature and Parks Authority
IG5 Agricultural Consultant
IG6 Water Specialist, formerly with the Israel-Palestinian Joint Technical
Committee
IW1 Transboundary Water Governance Specialist, Israel-Palestinian Joint
Water Committee
IW2 Engineer, Israel Water Authority
IX3 Chemist, formerly with Ministry of Science and Technology, Government
of Israel
IX4 Engineer, Water Resources Management Specialist, formerly with
Mekorot National Water Company
Israeli Participants: Academic and Civil Society
IA1 Water and Peace Researcher, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
IE1 Environment and Peace Educator, Arava Institute for Environmental
Studies (AIES)
IE2 Transboundary Water and Peace Practitioner, Arava Institute for
Environmental Studies (AIES)
IE3 Economist, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies (AIES)
IE4 “Masters student doing my thesis on transboundary stream restoration, a
joint project with Israelis and Palestinians.”
IE5 Transboundary Water and Peace Researcher and Practitioner, Dead
Sea and Arava Science Center
IE6 Sustainable Environment and Peace Researcher, Van Leer Jerusalem
Institute
IF1 Natural Resource Economist
IF2 Natural Resource Economist; Mining Geologist; Energy and Water Policy
Analyst
IF3 Advocate of Sustainable Water and Peace Issues, Friends of the Earth
Middle East (FOEME)
IF4 Transboundary Water and Peace Practitioner, Friends of the Earth
Middle East (FOEME)
IG1 Climate and Climate Change Researcher, Tel Aviv University
IG2 Transboundary Natural Resource and Environment Researcher
IG3 Climate and Climate Change Researcher
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IX1 Environment and Peace Practitioner, Israel/Palestine Center for
Research and Information (IPCRI)
IX2 Environmental Lawyer
Palestinian Participants: Government-Aligned
PW1 Hydrologist, Regional Peace Practitioner, Palestinian Water Authority
PW4 Civil Engineer, Water and Environment Specialist, Palestinian Water
Authority
PW5 Engineer, Regional Water Specialist, Palestinian Water Authority
Palestinian Participants: Academic and Civil Society
PF1 Transboundary Water and Peace Practitioner
PF2 Engineer, Transboundary Environment and Peacebuilding Practitioner,
Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME)
PW2 Civil Engineer, House of Water and Environment (HWE)
PW3 Environmental Chemist, Transboundary Water and Peace Practitioner
PW6 Water Practitioner
PW7 Engineer, An-Najah National University
PW8 “Water Expert Concerned about Peace”, Palestinian Hydrology Group
(PHG)
